多邊法律體制下碳關(guān)稅的法律分析及應(yīng)對思考
發(fā)布時間：2018-11-06 16:05
【摘要】：碳關(guān)稅是伴隨著國際氣候環(huán)境危機而被提出的，其理論機制是通過施加貿(mào)易限制而督促各國減排二氧化碳等溫室氣體。最初，碳關(guān)稅是由法國提出用以警告美國退出《京都議定書》的行為。如今，《京都議定書》的一期減排在2012年即將結(jié)束，二期減排計劃在千呼萬喚中進入談判議程。但是被賦予眾望的2009年哥本哈根世界氣候大會和2010年的坎昆氣候會議均未能達成有效的減排約束，由此，碳關(guān)稅再次被某些國家重提并試圖單方面將其引入國際減排機制中。 碳關(guān)稅這一概念的產(chǎn)生對世界經(jīng)濟和政治都產(chǎn)生了復(fù)雜的影響，各國因為自身利益的考慮，對其持有不同的態(tài)度。如今，美國和歐盟均出臺了有關(guān)碳的貿(mào)易政策，試圖在金融危機余勢與氣候危機并存的今天，挽回其自身經(jīng)濟發(fā)展頹勢，搶占未來國際低碳經(jīng)濟的制高點。而我國和印度等發(fā)展中國家是美歐政策的主要受損方，對美歐的行為表示堅決的反對。 但是，無論是美國的“國際儲備配額計劃”，還是歐盟將航空業(yè)納入到ETS體系下的行為，都是帶有利益傾向的政策，非但不能發(fā)展成為減排的國際機制，還會限制和扭曲國際貿(mào)易，甚至有可能造成國際貿(mào)易的退步，阻礙全球氣候保護進程。從國際貿(mào)易發(fā)展的角度來看，美歐的單邊政策均是對國際合作和交流的阻礙，其倒行逆施的行為必然寸步難行。而氣候環(huán)境危機的深化最終必然喚回國際減排的多邊合作，屆時碳關(guān)稅將有很大的發(fā)揮空間。在本文中，筆者將碳關(guān)稅制度僅僅作為一項減排機制來分析和研究，提煉其內(nèi)在的減排理論，將其獨立于美歐的碳貿(mào)易壁壘政策，并對其冠以各國達成減排計劃的前提，賦予了碳關(guān)稅中立、獨立的概念；進而通過逐一分析碳關(guān)稅與《WTO協(xié)定》、GATT的各種規(guī)則、《技術(shù)壁壘協(xié)議》以及多邊環(huán)境公約的關(guān)系，，論證了碳關(guān)稅在WTO框架下的合法性。而后對美國和歐盟的“國際儲備配額計劃”和“EU-ETS”覆蓋航空業(yè)政策進行了類似分析，驗證了其非法性和不合理性。最后，為我國應(yīng)對碳關(guān)稅制度提出了包括加征碳稅、建立健全排放交易體系、合理開發(fā)利用CDM資源以及發(fā)展國內(nèi)低碳技術(shù)和產(chǎn)品的幾點建議。
[Abstract]:Carbon tariff is proposed along with the international climate and environment crisis. Its theoretical mechanism is to urge countries to reduce greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide by imposing trade restrictions. Initially, the carbon tariff was proposed by France to warn the United States of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Now that the Kyoto Protocol's first phase of emissions cuts is coming to an end in 2012, the second phase is on the negotiating agenda. However, the Copenhagen World Climate Conference in 2009 and the Cancun Climate Conference in 2010 failed to achieve effective emission reduction constraints, so carbon tariffs were again raised by some countries and tried to unilaterally introduce them into the international emission reduction mechanism. The concept of carbon tariff has a complex impact on the world economy and politics, and countries have different attitudes towards it because of their own interests. Today, both the United States and the European Union have issued trade policies on carbon, trying to salvage their own economic decline and seize the commanding heights of the future international low-carbon economy at a time when the balance of the financial crisis and the climate crisis coexist. Developing countries, such as China and India, are the main losers to US and European policies, and strongly oppose the actions of the US and Europe. However, whether it is the "international reserve quota plan" of the United States or the European Union's action of bringing the aviation industry into the ETS system, it is a policy with an interest tendency, and not only cannot it develop into an international mechanism for reducing emissions. It also limits and distorts international trade, and may even cause a setback in international trade, hindering the global climate protection process. From the perspective of the development of international trade, the unilateral policies of the United States and Europe are obstacles to international cooperation and exchange. And the deepening of climate and environment crisis will eventually call back the multilateral cooperation of international emission reduction, when carbon tariffs will have a lot of room to play. In this paper, the author analyzes and studies carbon tariff system as a mechanism of emission reduction, refines its internal emission reduction theory, makes it independent of the carbon trade barrier policy of the United States and Europe, and presupposes it as a precondition for countries to reach emission reduction plans. The concept of carbon tariff neutrality and independence is given; By analyzing the relationship between carbon tariff and WTO Agreement, various rules of GATT, Technical Barrier Agreement and multilateral environmental conventions, the legitimacy of carbon tariff under the framework of WTO is demonstrated. Then a similar analysis of the "International Reserve quota Plan" and "EU-ETS" coverage policy of the United States and the European Union is carried out, which verifies its illegality and irrationality. Finally, some suggestions are put forward for China to deal with the carbon tariff system, including the imposition of carbon tax, the establishment of a sound emissions trading system, the rational development and utilization of CDM resources, and the development of domestic low-carbon technologies and products.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D996.9
本文編號：2314772
[Abstract]:Carbon tariff is proposed along with the international climate and environment crisis. Its theoretical mechanism is to urge countries to reduce greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide by imposing trade restrictions. Initially, the carbon tariff was proposed by France to warn the United States of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Now that the Kyoto Protocol's first phase of emissions cuts is coming to an end in 2012, the second phase is on the negotiating agenda. However, the Copenhagen World Climate Conference in 2009 and the Cancun Climate Conference in 2010 failed to achieve effective emission reduction constraints, so carbon tariffs were again raised by some countries and tried to unilaterally introduce them into the international emission reduction mechanism. The concept of carbon tariff has a complex impact on the world economy and politics, and countries have different attitudes towards it because of their own interests. Today, both the United States and the European Union have issued trade policies on carbon, trying to salvage their own economic decline and seize the commanding heights of the future international low-carbon economy at a time when the balance of the financial crisis and the climate crisis coexist. Developing countries, such as China and India, are the main losers to US and European policies, and strongly oppose the actions of the US and Europe. However, whether it is the "international reserve quota plan" of the United States or the European Union's action of bringing the aviation industry into the ETS system, it is a policy with an interest tendency, and not only cannot it develop into an international mechanism for reducing emissions. It also limits and distorts international trade, and may even cause a setback in international trade, hindering the global climate protection process. From the perspective of the development of international trade, the unilateral policies of the United States and Europe are obstacles to international cooperation and exchange. And the deepening of climate and environment crisis will eventually call back the multilateral cooperation of international emission reduction, when carbon tariffs will have a lot of room to play. In this paper, the author analyzes and studies carbon tariff system as a mechanism of emission reduction, refines its internal emission reduction theory, makes it independent of the carbon trade barrier policy of the United States and Europe, and presupposes it as a precondition for countries to reach emission reduction plans. The concept of carbon tariff neutrality and independence is given; By analyzing the relationship between carbon tariff and WTO Agreement, various rules of GATT, Technical Barrier Agreement and multilateral environmental conventions, the legitimacy of carbon tariff under the framework of WTO is demonstrated. Then a similar analysis of the "International Reserve quota Plan" and "EU-ETS" coverage policy of the United States and the European Union is carried out, which verifies its illegality and irrationality. Finally, some suggestions are put forward for China to deal with the carbon tariff system, including the imposition of carbon tax, the establishment of a sound emissions trading system, the rational development and utilization of CDM resources, and the development of domestic low-carbon technologies and products.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D996.9
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