商事仲裁程序問題的經(jīng)濟分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-16 16:18
【摘要】：商事仲裁是國際通行的一種爭議解決方式。隨著經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展和爭議當事人權(quán)利意識的不斷增強,現(xiàn)有的商事仲裁機制在多個方面已經(jīng)無法滿足爭議當事人的需求。爭議當事人在追求己方利益最大化的驅(qū)動下,通過各種方式尋求對商事仲裁的改變。目前,國內(nèi)仲裁機構(gòu)還未對仲裁實踐中的問題給予足夠重視,還未對爭議當事人與仲裁庭的實際需求做出回應(yīng)。本文結(jié)合仲裁實踐中已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)的各種問題,運用經(jīng)濟分析的方法分析這些問題出現(xiàn)的成因以及發(fā)展情況,并對現(xiàn)有仲裁機制的調(diào)整及應(yīng)對提出了意見和建議。本文除了導(dǎo)論和結(jié)語之外,正文分為六章,主要內(nèi)容如下：第一章,仲裁協(xié)議的經(jīng)濟分析。本章回避了傳統(tǒng)研究內(nèi)容,首先運用博弈論的方法分析了實踐中出現(xiàn)的仲裁地之爭的問題,然后根據(jù)當事人的實際需求,分析了選擇性仲裁協(xié)議以及概括性仲裁協(xié)議的效力。第二章,仲裁規(guī)則的經(jīng)濟分析。本章以實踐中出現(xiàn)的規(guī)則完整化傾向為研究對象,通過實證分析和制度分析方法分析了這種傾向的成因。然后通過成本收益理論分別從靜態(tài)和動態(tài)兩方面對完整化傾向進行分析,最后通過對比分析國內(nèi)與國外仲裁發(fā)展的不同道路,說明國內(nèi)仲裁不具備國外仲裁自我調(diào)整的可能,國內(nèi)仲裁機構(gòu)要避免出現(xiàn)規(guī)則過度完整所引起的制度性阻礙。第三章,仲裁請求提出的經(jīng)濟分析。本章首先分析仲裁請求提起程序中的“權(quán)利不均衡狀態(tài)”,以仲裁機構(gòu)受理申請人仲裁請求為分界點,在前一階段,申請人權(quán)利的行使明顯受到限制,仲裁請求“明確而唯一”的要求、“一事不再理”規(guī)則的設(shè)置使申請人提起仲裁的行為難以自如實現(xiàn)。相反,在受理后的階段,申請人權(quán)利得到擴充,仲裁請求的變更和撤回規(guī)則使申請人掌握著仲裁程序的主動。本章對申請人行使權(quán)利與當前的仲裁環(huán)境之間的關(guān)系進行分析,運用“蛛網(wǎng)模型”分析申請人變更或者撤回仲裁請求對仲裁環(huán)境的影響,說明仲裁機構(gòu)應(yīng)當適當限制當事人意思自治。然后對預(yù)備性仲裁請求、重復(fù)性仲裁請求進行研究,通過當事人雙方收益對比說明預(yù)備性仲裁請求存在的意義,并運用成本收益分析方法說明仲裁中一事不再理規(guī)則的不適應(yīng)性。第四章,仲裁庭組成程序的經(jīng)濟分析。本章分為兩個部分,一是仲裁員的選定,二是仲裁庭的組成規(guī)則。首先分析當事人和仲裁員的實際需求,以促進兩者之間的信息平衡,實現(xiàn)兩者需求的有效銜接。然后分析現(xiàn)有仲裁規(guī)則下仲裁庭組成程序的“異化”趨勢,運用博弈論的方法分析各類組庭方式和實際效果,并提出修正后的仲裁組庭規(guī)則。第五章,仲裁調(diào)解的經(jīng)濟分析。本章分析實踐中存在的兩種沖突：一種是仲裁庭與當事人之間的調(diào)解意愿沖突。另一種是當事人調(diào)解意愿與調(diào)解技巧之間的沖突。文章通過分析影響仲裁庭與當事人調(diào)解意愿的因素以及之間的關(guān)系,說明相互配合是解決第一種沖突的手段；通過嘗試使用經(jīng)濟學(xué)中的雙邊壟斷理論和博弈論的方法分析第二種沖突產(chǎn)生的原因,說明當事人自發(fā)調(diào)解并無深層次動力,只有通過外部引導(dǎo)的方式才能促進當事人積極調(diào)解。第六章,仲裁裁決的經(jīng)濟分析。本章首先分析仲裁裁決的可接受性問題,分析仲裁庭與爭議當事人之間的信息不平衡引起的沖突,然后對仲裁庭分階段披露裁決信息的可行性進行了論證。最后分析“一裁終局”規(guī)則的經(jīng)濟價值,提出一裁終局與裁決救濟之間的沖突與協(xié)調(diào)。
[Abstract]:Commercial arbitration is an international popular way of dispute settlement. With the rapid economic development and the increasing awareness of the rights of the parties to the dispute, the existing commercial arbitration mechanism has been unable to meet the needs of the parties to the dispute in many ways. At present, the domestic arbitration institutions have not paid enough attention to the problems in the practice of arbitration and have not responded to the actual needs of the disputed parties and the arbitration tribunal. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text is divided into six chapters. The main contents are as follows: Chapter 1, Economic Analysis of Arbitration Agreement. This chapter avoids the traditional research content. Firstly, it uses game theory to analyze the disputes over the place of arbitration in practice. Then, according to the actual needs of the parties, the paper analyzes the effectiveness of selective arbitration agreements and general arbitration agreements. Chapter two is the economic analysis of arbitration rules. The theory analyzes the tendency of completeness from static and dynamic aspects respectively. Finally, by comparing and analyzing the different development paths of domestic and foreign arbitration, it shows that domestic arbitration does not have the possibility of self-adjustment of foreign arbitration, and domestic arbitration institutions should avoid the institutional obstacles caused by the excessive integrity of the rules. Chapter three, arbitration claims. This chapter first analyzes the "imbalance of rights" in the procedure of filing an arbitration claim. Taking the arbitration institution's acceptance of the applicant's arbitration claim as the demarcation point, in the previous stage, the exercise of the applicant's rights was obviously restricted, and the arbitration request was "clear and unique" and the "no longer reason for one thing" rule enabled the application. On the contrary, in the later stage of acceptance, the rights of the applicant are expanded, and the rules of alteration and withdrawal of the arbitration request enable the applicant to grasp the initiative of the arbitration procedure. The influence of the requestor's alteration or withdrawal of the arbitration request on the arbitration environment indicates that the arbitration institution should appropriately restrict the party's autonomy of will. Then it studies the preparatory arbitration request and the repetitive arbitration request, and explains the significance of the preparatory arbitration request by comparing the two parties'income, and uses the cost-benefit analysis method to explain the existence of the preparatory arbitration request. Chapter IV, Economic Analysis of the Procedure for the Formation of the Arbitration Tribunal. This chapter is divided into two parts: the selection of arbitrators and the rules for the formation of the arbitration tribunal. Then it analyzes the "alienation" trend of the composition procedure of arbitral tribunals under the existing arbitration rules, analyzes the various forms and actual effects of arbitral tribunal formation by means of game theory, and puts forward the revised rules of arbitral tribunal formation. The other is the conflict between the parties'willingness to mediate and the mediation skills. By analyzing the factors influencing the arbitral tribunal and the parties' willingness to mediate and the relationship between them, this paper shows that mutual cooperation is the means to solve the first conflict, and tries to use the bilateral monopoly theory and the game theory in economics. Chapter 6: Economic analysis of arbitral award. This chapter first analyzes the acceptability of arbitral award and the information inequality between arbitral tribunal and disputed parties. Finally, the economic value of the rule of "final adjudication" is analyzed, and the conflict and coordination between the final adjudication and the remedy of adjudication are proposed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D997.4
，
本文編號：2186512
[Abstract]:Commercial arbitration is an international popular way of dispute settlement. With the rapid economic development and the increasing awareness of the rights of the parties to the dispute, the existing commercial arbitration mechanism has been unable to meet the needs of the parties to the dispute in many ways. At present, the domestic arbitration institutions have not paid enough attention to the problems in the practice of arbitration and have not responded to the actual needs of the disputed parties and the arbitration tribunal. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text is divided into six chapters. The main contents are as follows: Chapter 1, Economic Analysis of Arbitration Agreement. This chapter avoids the traditional research content. Firstly, it uses game theory to analyze the disputes over the place of arbitration in practice. Then, according to the actual needs of the parties, the paper analyzes the effectiveness of selective arbitration agreements and general arbitration agreements. Chapter two is the economic analysis of arbitration rules. The theory analyzes the tendency of completeness from static and dynamic aspects respectively. Finally, by comparing and analyzing the different development paths of domestic and foreign arbitration, it shows that domestic arbitration does not have the possibility of self-adjustment of foreign arbitration, and domestic arbitration institutions should avoid the institutional obstacles caused by the excessive integrity of the rules. Chapter three, arbitration claims. This chapter first analyzes the "imbalance of rights" in the procedure of filing an arbitration claim. Taking the arbitration institution's acceptance of the applicant's arbitration claim as the demarcation point, in the previous stage, the exercise of the applicant's rights was obviously restricted, and the arbitration request was "clear and unique" and the "no longer reason for one thing" rule enabled the application. On the contrary, in the later stage of acceptance, the rights of the applicant are expanded, and the rules of alteration and withdrawal of the arbitration request enable the applicant to grasp the initiative of the arbitration procedure. The influence of the requestor's alteration or withdrawal of the arbitration request on the arbitration environment indicates that the arbitration institution should appropriately restrict the party's autonomy of will. Then it studies the preparatory arbitration request and the repetitive arbitration request, and explains the significance of the preparatory arbitration request by comparing the two parties'income, and uses the cost-benefit analysis method to explain the existence of the preparatory arbitration request. Chapter IV, Economic Analysis of the Procedure for the Formation of the Arbitration Tribunal. This chapter is divided into two parts: the selection of arbitrators and the rules for the formation of the arbitration tribunal. Then it analyzes the "alienation" trend of the composition procedure of arbitral tribunals under the existing arbitration rules, analyzes the various forms and actual effects of arbitral tribunal formation by means of game theory, and puts forward the revised rules of arbitral tribunal formation. The other is the conflict between the parties'willingness to mediate and the mediation skills. By analyzing the factors influencing the arbitral tribunal and the parties' willingness to mediate and the relationship between them, this paper shows that mutual cooperation is the means to solve the first conflict, and tries to use the bilateral monopoly theory and the game theory in economics. Chapter 6: Economic analysis of arbitral award. This chapter first analyzes the acceptability of arbitral award and the information inequality between arbitral tribunal and disputed parties. Finally, the economic value of the rule of "final adjudication" is analyzed, and the conflict and coordination between the final adjudication and the remedy of adjudication are proposed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D997.4
，
本文編號：2186512
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