WTO裁決的執(zhí)行機(jī)制及其對發(fā)展中國家的影響
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-05 15:11
【摘要】：WTO爭端解決規(guī)則(DSU)解決了GATT時(shí)期爭端解決規(guī)則的重大缺陷：即敗訴方會(huì)阻止專家小組或上訴機(jī)構(gòu)報(bào)告后裁決的通過,從而使得案件不能進(jìn)入執(zhí)行階段。DSU新設(shè)的“反向一致”原則順利地解決了報(bào)告的通過問題。但是,這并不代表裁決能夠得到妥善執(zhí)行。WTO爭端解決實(shí)踐顯示,如今貿(mào)易糾紛案件中的主要問題已經(jīng)從報(bào)告或裁決的通過問題轉(zhuǎn)向了這些裁決的執(zhí)行問題,主要表現(xiàn)在敗訴方執(zhí)意拖延裁決的執(zhí)行。若發(fā)展中國家利用DSU成功地挑戰(zhàn)了發(fā)達(dá)國家的貿(mào)易措施,卻因?yàn)榘l(fā)達(dá)國家的延遲執(zhí)行而得不到及時(shí)救濟(jì)。這樣的執(zhí)行問題不僅無助于勝訴方的貿(mào)易利益,還會(huì)打擊和減弱成員國利用DSU解決貿(mào)易糾紛的信心和積極性。 對發(fā)展中國家實(shí)行特殊和差別待遇(Special and Different Treatment)是WTO協(xié)定的重要理論基礎(chǔ)。作為WTO框架下的爭端解決規(guī)則,它也采取對發(fā)展中國家實(shí)行特殊和差別待遇的做法。僅就執(zhí)行方面而言,DSU規(guī)定要特別注意影響發(fā)展中國家成員利益的執(zhí)行事項(xiàng)且要特別注意發(fā)展中國家提出的事項(xiàng)。但是,這樣的原則性規(guī)定高度概括,缺乏操作性,未能有效保護(hù)發(fā)展中國家的利益。 本文主要分為三個(gè)部分。第一部分就是本文的第一章。該部分探討了WTO框架發(fā)展中國家的范圍以及執(zhí)行機(jī)制給予發(fā)展中國家的優(yōu)惠措施。由于發(fā)展中國家的定義標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不一且不斷變化,WTO框架下的發(fā)展中國家范圍一直處于變化當(dāng)中。但是這不會(huì)阻礙本文分析執(zhí)行機(jī)制對發(fā)展中國家的影響。此外,本部分簡單介紹了執(zhí)行規(guī)則中涉及到特殊和差別待遇的條款。第二部分是本文的第二章至第五章。該部分是本文的重點(diǎn),它依次序介紹了執(zhí)行機(jī)制中的各個(gè)程序,即合理期限制度、執(zhí)行復(fù)審制度、補(bǔ)償制度和報(bào)復(fù)制度。每個(gè)章節(jié)不僅會(huì)從理論上分析它的概念和性質(zhì),而且還會(huì)結(jié)合實(shí)踐數(shù)據(jù)分析這些制度對發(fā)展中國家的影響。通過分析,筆者認(rèn)為執(zhí)行階段的程序存在著一些缺陷且使得發(fā)展中國家未能受益于爭端解決條款。因此,發(fā)展中國國家在多哈回合中提出了大量的改革方案,包括延遲合理期限,引入金錢補(bǔ)償,共同報(bào)復(fù)等等措施。筆者分析了這些改革意見并給出了自己的意見。本文最后一部分涉及到中國參與爭端解決的實(shí)踐情況以及中國在DSU改革上的努力。本部分首先簡要概括了涉華案件的執(zhí)行情況。然后,文章介紹和分析了我國就執(zhí)行機(jī)制提出的改革意見。最后,文章提出了我國在爭端解決機(jī)制中的若干建議和應(yīng)有態(tài)度。
[Abstract]:The WTO dispute settlement rule, (DSU), addresses a major flaw in the dispute settlement rules of the GATT era: that a losing party will block the passage of a ruling after a panel of experts or an appellate body reports it. So that the case can not enter into the implementation phase. DSU's new principle of "reverse consistency" successfully solved the problem of report adoption. However, this does not mean that decisions can be properly implemented. WTO dispute settlement practice shows that the main issues in trade dispute cases have now shifted from the issue of the adoption of reports or awards to the issue of enforcement of these awards. The main manifestation is that the losing party insists on delaying the execution of the award. If developing countries successfully challenge the trade measures of developed countries by using DSU, they can not get timely relief because of the delay of implementation in developed countries. Such an enforcement issue will not only not help the trade interests of the successful parties, but will also undermine and weaken the confidence and enthusiasm of member countries to use DSU to resolve trade disputes. Special and differential treatment (Special and Different Treatment) for developing countries is an important theoretical basis of WTO agreement. As a dispute settlement rule under the framework of WTO, it also adopts special and differential treatment for developing countries. As far as enforcement is concerned only, special attention shall be paid to matters of enforcement affecting the interests of developing country members and to matters raised by developing countries. However, such principled provisions are highly generalized and inoperable, and fail to effectively protect the interests of developing countries. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part is the first chapter of this paper. This part discusses the scope of developing countries in the WTO framework and the preferential measures given to developing countries by the implementation mechanism. Because the definition standard of developing country is different and the scope of developing country under WTO framework is changing all the time. But this does not prevent this article from analyzing the impact of the implementation mechanism on developing countries. In addition, this section briefly introduces the provisions of the executive rules relating to special and differential treatment. The second part is the second chapter to the fifth chapter. This part is the focus of this paper, it introduces the implementation mechanism in order of each procedure, that is, the system of reasonable time limit, the system of executive review, the system of compensation and the system of retaliation. Each chapter will not only theoretically analyse its concept and nature, but also analyse the impact of these regimes on developing countries in the context of practical data. Based on the analysis, the author thinks that there are some defects in the procedure of the implementation stage and that the developing countries are unable to benefit from the dispute settlement clause. Therefore, developing countries put forward a large number of reform proposals in the Doha Round, including the delay of reasonable period, the introduction of monetary compensation, common retaliation and other measures. The author analyzes these reform opinions and gives his own opinions. The last part of this paper deals with the practice of China's participation in dispute settlement and China's efforts in DSU reform. This part first briefly summarizes the implementation of cases involving China. Then, the article introduced and analyzed our country to carry out the mechanism to propose the reform opinion. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions and attitudes in the dispute settlement mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D996.1
本文編號：2166178
[Abstract]:The WTO dispute settlement rule, (DSU), addresses a major flaw in the dispute settlement rules of the GATT era: that a losing party will block the passage of a ruling after a panel of experts or an appellate body reports it. So that the case can not enter into the implementation phase. DSU's new principle of "reverse consistency" successfully solved the problem of report adoption. However, this does not mean that decisions can be properly implemented. WTO dispute settlement practice shows that the main issues in trade dispute cases have now shifted from the issue of the adoption of reports or awards to the issue of enforcement of these awards. The main manifestation is that the losing party insists on delaying the execution of the award. If developing countries successfully challenge the trade measures of developed countries by using DSU, they can not get timely relief because of the delay of implementation in developed countries. Such an enforcement issue will not only not help the trade interests of the successful parties, but will also undermine and weaken the confidence and enthusiasm of member countries to use DSU to resolve trade disputes. Special and differential treatment (Special and Different Treatment) for developing countries is an important theoretical basis of WTO agreement. As a dispute settlement rule under the framework of WTO, it also adopts special and differential treatment for developing countries. As far as enforcement is concerned only, special attention shall be paid to matters of enforcement affecting the interests of developing country members and to matters raised by developing countries. However, such principled provisions are highly generalized and inoperable, and fail to effectively protect the interests of developing countries. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part is the first chapter of this paper. This part discusses the scope of developing countries in the WTO framework and the preferential measures given to developing countries by the implementation mechanism. Because the definition standard of developing country is different and the scope of developing country under WTO framework is changing all the time. But this does not prevent this article from analyzing the impact of the implementation mechanism on developing countries. In addition, this section briefly introduces the provisions of the executive rules relating to special and differential treatment. The second part is the second chapter to the fifth chapter. This part is the focus of this paper, it introduces the implementation mechanism in order of each procedure, that is, the system of reasonable time limit, the system of executive review, the system of compensation and the system of retaliation. Each chapter will not only theoretically analyse its concept and nature, but also analyse the impact of these regimes on developing countries in the context of practical data. Based on the analysis, the author thinks that there are some defects in the procedure of the implementation stage and that the developing countries are unable to benefit from the dispute settlement clause. Therefore, developing countries put forward a large number of reform proposals in the Doha Round, including the delay of reasonable period, the introduction of monetary compensation, common retaliation and other measures. The author analyzes these reform opinions and gives his own opinions. The last part of this paper deals with the practice of China's participation in dispute settlement and China's efforts in DSU reform. This part first briefly summarizes the implementation of cases involving China. Then, the article introduced and analyzed our country to carry out the mechanism to propose the reform opinion. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions and attitudes in the dispute settlement mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D996.1
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