《2012年美國雙邊投資協(xié)定范本》透明度條款研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-13 11:52
【摘要】：《2012年美國雙邊投資協(xié)定范本》（以下簡稱“《2012年范本》”）是美國繼《2004年美國雙邊投資協(xié)定范本》后推出的最新范本。該新范本對多處做了重點修訂，其中透明度條款是修訂的重點條文之一，修訂后的范本擴充了透明度條款的內容，對透明度要求進一步提高。這主要是因為提升透明度，以公開、透明和非歧視性的方式對待私人投資是美國BITs計劃的目標之一。聯(lián)合國國際貿易法委員會圍繞投資領域的透明度問題也展開了廣泛討論。作為重點修訂的條文，，《2012年范本》透明度條款必將引起美國BITs潛在締約方的關注。 盡管《2012年范本》透明度條款在用語上非常嚴謹，但仍然可能存在語義不明之處，這可能使其面臨潛在的解釋困境。再者由于對透明度要求進一步提高，其可能給談判帶來障礙。我國BITs中包含透明度條款的屈指可數(shù)，在解決投資爭端國際中心的實踐經驗匱乏，而我國當前正與美國從新開啟了BIT談判，對《2012年范本》透明度條款深入研究迫在眉睫。 由于在國際經濟法領域對有關“透明度”的概念并不統(tǒng)一，為使本文有一個清晰的脈絡，本文第一部分先從易混淆的具體概念入手。該部分簡要介紹透明度、透明度條款等有關概念的定義，透明度條款在國際投資法中的作用。以期對透明度條款有一個更清晰的認識，為下文的論述打下基礎。 本文第二部分以文本分析的方法，對《2012年范本》透明度條款的具體內容進行全面梳理。 本文第三部分通過與其他條約透明度條款的對比，總結《2012年范本》的一些鮮明特點。例如該范本體現(xiàn)WTO透明度原則的滲透，代表了BITs的最高水平，體現(xiàn)了“社會化”趨勢。 本文第四部分在以上分析的基礎上，指出透明度條款將面臨的潛在困境，即該范本仍然存在語義模糊之處。在當前的國際投資法體系下，對透明度條款中的語義模糊之處進行解釋可能面臨諸多困境。并且由于《2012年范本》對透明度的要求進一步提高，這種高要求很可能給BIT談判帶來障礙。為應對以上困境，筆者提出發(fā)揮判例法的作用，發(fā)揮締約國在條約解釋中的作用這兩種路徑以供探討。 文章最后一部分在前述分所論證的基礎上，結合我國BITs透明度條款的相關實踐，論述中美BIT談判中我國對《2012年范本》透明度條款應該堅持的立場。即總體接受透明度條款，但在具體內容上應區(qū)別對待。為使談判順利進行，我國還應提高立法過程的透明度。
[Abstract]:The 2012 US Model bilateral Investment Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "2012 Model") is the latest model that the United States has introduced after the 2004 Model bilateral Investment Agreement. The transparency clause is one of the key provisions of the revised model. The revised model expands the content of the transparency clause and further improves the transparency requirement. This is mainly because promoting transparency and treating private investment in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner is one of the goals of the BITs program. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has also held extensive discussions on transparency in the field of investment. As a key revision of the provisions, the 2012 Model 2012 transparency clause is bound to cause concern to potential parties to the BITs in the United States. Although the Model 2012 transparency clause is very precise in terms, there may still be semantic ambiguities, which may make it face a potential interpretation dilemma. Moreover, because of the further increase in transparency requirements, it may be an obstacle to negotiations. Only a handful of transparency clauses are included in our bits, and the practical experience in the International Center for the settlement of Investment disputes is scarce. At present, our country is starting the bit negotiation with the United States again, so it is urgent to study the transparency clause in Model 2012. Because the concept of "transparency" is not unified in the field of international economic law, in order to make this paper have a clear context, the first part of this paper begins with the concrete concept which is easy to be confused. This section briefly introduces the definition of transparency, transparency clause, and the role of transparency clauses in international investment law. In order to have a clearer understanding of the transparency clause, lay the foundation for the discussion below. In the second part, the text analysis method is used to analyze the transparency provisions of Model 2012. The third part summarizes some distinctive features of Model 2012 by comparing with other treaty transparency provisions. For example, the model embodies the penetration of WTO transparency principle, represents the highest level of bits, and reflects the trend of socialization. On the basis of the above analysis, the fourth part of this paper points out the potential dilemma that the transparency clause will face, that is, the model still has semantic ambiguity. In the current system of international investment law, it may be difficult to explain the semantic ambiguity of transparency clause. And because the Model 2012 demands for transparency are further enhanced, such high demands are likely to create obstacles to bit negotiations. In order to deal with the above dilemma, the author puts forward the two ways of giving play to the role of case law and the role of States parties in the interpretation of treaties. In the last part of the article, on the basis of the above argument and combining with the relevant practice of our country's bits transparency clause, this paper discusses the position that our country should adhere to in the bit negotiation between China and the United States on the transparency clause of "Model 2012". That is, the general acceptance of transparency provisions, but in the specific content should be treated differently. In order to make the negotiations smooth, our country should also improve the transparency of the legislative process.
【學位授予單位】：西南政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D996
本文編號：2119284
[Abstract]:The 2012 US Model bilateral Investment Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "2012 Model") is the latest model that the United States has introduced after the 2004 Model bilateral Investment Agreement. The transparency clause is one of the key provisions of the revised model. The revised model expands the content of the transparency clause and further improves the transparency requirement. This is mainly because promoting transparency and treating private investment in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner is one of the goals of the BITs program. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has also held extensive discussions on transparency in the field of investment. As a key revision of the provisions, the 2012 Model 2012 transparency clause is bound to cause concern to potential parties to the BITs in the United States. Although the Model 2012 transparency clause is very precise in terms, there may still be semantic ambiguities, which may make it face a potential interpretation dilemma. Moreover, because of the further increase in transparency requirements, it may be an obstacle to negotiations. Only a handful of transparency clauses are included in our bits, and the practical experience in the International Center for the settlement of Investment disputes is scarce. At present, our country is starting the bit negotiation with the United States again, so it is urgent to study the transparency clause in Model 2012. Because the concept of "transparency" is not unified in the field of international economic law, in order to make this paper have a clear context, the first part of this paper begins with the concrete concept which is easy to be confused. This section briefly introduces the definition of transparency, transparency clause, and the role of transparency clauses in international investment law. In order to have a clearer understanding of the transparency clause, lay the foundation for the discussion below. In the second part, the text analysis method is used to analyze the transparency provisions of Model 2012. The third part summarizes some distinctive features of Model 2012 by comparing with other treaty transparency provisions. For example, the model embodies the penetration of WTO transparency principle, represents the highest level of bits, and reflects the trend of socialization. On the basis of the above analysis, the fourth part of this paper points out the potential dilemma that the transparency clause will face, that is, the model still has semantic ambiguity. In the current system of international investment law, it may be difficult to explain the semantic ambiguity of transparency clause. And because the Model 2012 demands for transparency are further enhanced, such high demands are likely to create obstacles to bit negotiations. In order to deal with the above dilemma, the author puts forward the two ways of giving play to the role of case law and the role of States parties in the interpretation of treaties. In the last part of the article, on the basis of the above argument and combining with the relevant practice of our country's bits transparency clause, this paper discusses the position that our country should adhere to in the bit negotiation between China and the United States on the transparency clause of "Model 2012". That is, the general acceptance of transparency provisions, but in the specific content should be treated differently. In order to make the negotiations smooth, our country should also improve the transparency of the legislative process.
【學位授予單位】：西南政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D996
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