本文選題：跨國(guó)合資　切入點(diǎn)：公司僵局　出處：《華東政法大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：從組織法的角度看，，跨國(guó)合資可以采用合伙、公司或者合同等不同的方式，合資公司是兼具合伙和公司特征的企業(yè)組織形式，有人稱之為“公司型合伙”，即在具有資合和有限責(zé)任特點(diǎn)的同時(shí)，合資公司具有較高的人合性。合資各方之間的信任和協(xié)同一致是合資成功的基礎(chǔ)，但合資各方的利益并非總是一致，利益沖突最終都將在合資公司的董事會(huì)、股東會(huì)等層面表現(xiàn)出來(lái)。合資公司的封閉性限制了合資公司股份的自由轉(zhuǎn)讓和股東的退出，使得發(fā)生利益沖突的合資方極易陷入僵局的困局，甚至無(wú)法脫身。平衡合資各方的利益，發(fā)揮合資的利益、規(guī)避可能的缺陷，成為利用合資工具最重要的考慮之一。 本研究試圖從公司僵局這一合資公司的常見(jiàn)現(xiàn)象出發(fā)，結(jié)合跨國(guó)合資公司治理的特點(diǎn)，從僵局的預(yù)防、自救到司法救濟(jì)的各個(gè)層面探討僵局破解的法律對(duì)策，以期對(duì)合資公司這一組織形式有更深入的了解、并為未來(lái)在國(guó)內(nèi)國(guó)外更好地利用合資工具提供幫助。 本研究以“跨國(guó)”和“內(nèi)部人”為特征。跨國(guó)因素，意味著法律適用的沖突和不同國(guó)家公司（企業(yè)）法制的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)；“內(nèi)部人”因素則重點(diǎn)在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的識(shí)別和防范于未然。在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的背景下，有限責(zé)任公司法制顯現(xiàn)出立法上的獨(dú)立化（不再作為股份公司的附庸或例外）、組織形式上的靈活化（比如不再?gòu)?qiáng)制要求設(shè)立監(jiān)事會(huì)）、股東自治的自由化（允許股東在強(qiáng)制法之外對(duì)所有內(nèi)部治理問(wèn)題自由約定）等特點(diǎn)，作者希望選取的研究視角能夠反映這些發(fā)展趨勢(shì)。 全文分為六章。第一章討論跨國(guó)投資與合資企業(yè)。合資的本質(zhì)在于獨(dú)立企業(yè)之間開(kāi)展合作，有合伙、公司或者合同等不同組成方式，跨國(guó)合資是就是不同國(guó)際的投資者之間組建的合資企業(yè)。可以從不同角度解釋合資的理由。如果將市場(chǎng)和公司視為市場(chǎng)條件下分配資源兩種基本方式的話，合資就是介于獨(dú)資公司和市場(chǎng)之間的一個(gè)企業(yè)組織選擇，存在的原因在于交易成本更低。通過(guò)合資可以獲得新的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，或者互補(bǔ)的資源，合資還是開(kāi)展組織學(xué)習(xí)的重要工具，這些好處可望提升合資參與方的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力。合資因此成為跨國(guó)公司開(kāi)展全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)在組織工具上的一個(gè)重要選擇。在主權(quán)國(guó)家放松管制的背景下，傳統(tǒng)的、基于東道國(guó)法律限制的合資企業(yè)數(shù)量在減少，應(yīng)對(duì)全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇、市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提高的“新合資”（更多基于商業(yè)考慮）將是跨國(guó)合資的主要形式。在新型合資企業(yè)中，合資方自治將發(fā)揮基礎(chǔ)性作用，在自治失效的時(shí)候需要司法干預(yù)的及時(shí)救濟(jì)。 第二章討論合資公司的公司治理與公司僵局。不同性質(zhì)的公司具有不同的利益格局，應(yīng)當(dāng)選擇不同的治理方式。合資公司是合伙和有限責(zé)任公司的混合，屬于“公司型合伙”。合資公司兼具人合和資合的特征，與公眾公司相比，合資公司的人合性和封閉性表現(xiàn)得更強(qiáng)。合資公司常見(jiàn)的治理問(wèn)題是公司僵局和股東壓迫。公司僵局，源于股東間的利益沖突和封閉公司治理規(guī)則的共同作用。股東各有戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)從而利益沖突不可避免，信任是合資的基礎(chǔ)因而合資不允許輕易發(fā)生現(xiàn)有股東的退出或新股東的加入，公司僵局于是產(chǎn)生尤其在跨國(guó)合資中高發(fā)。發(fā)生公司僵局，最大的受害者是股東，對(duì)于其他利益相關(guān)方也將產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。跨國(guó)投資者應(yīng)充分認(rèn)識(shí)合資作為企業(yè)組織形式的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)，為公司僵局的事前預(yù)防和事后救濟(jì)做好充分的準(zhǔn)備。在放松管制的背景下，跨國(guó)合資公司的良好治理與公司僵局防范將以股東自治為主，國(guó)家干預(yù)為輔。 第三章討論合資公司僵局的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防控。預(yù)防，是跨國(guó)公司國(guó)際投資實(shí)踐中控制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的首要環(huán)節(jié)。僵局預(yù)防就是預(yù)見(jiàn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并據(jù)其設(shè)計(jì)出平衡各種利益的制度機(jī)制。本章討論了促進(jìn)合資成功、防止發(fā)生公司僵局的具體措施，涵蓋合資設(shè)立和運(yùn)營(yíng)的各個(gè)主要環(huán)節(jié)，包括合資工具的選擇、合資伙伴的選擇、合資公司控制權(quán)在股東之間的合理分配、表決機(jī)制中的僵局破解安排等內(nèi)容。所有這些預(yù)防措施都應(yīng)當(dāng)反映在合資公司的法律文件上，清楚的約定將為未來(lái)糾紛的預(yù)防和及時(shí)化解提供基礎(chǔ)。選擇合資，就意味著選擇妥協(xié)和合作，伙伴的重要性相當(dāng)于婚姻當(dāng)中的伴侶。只有平衡的利益分配方能保證持續(xù)的成功，欺壓將導(dǎo)致喪失信任、發(fā)生僵局、并致使合資最終失敗。合資公司的決策不得不在公司效率和股東公平之間平衡，某種意義上進(jìn)入了藝術(shù)而非科學(xué)的范疇。 第四章討論合資公司董事的雙重效忠問(wèn)題與合資的公司僵局。合資公司的董事地位尷尬，隨時(shí)面臨股東與合資公司利益之間利益的直接沖突，極易陷入“雙重效忠”的困境。這種困境是合資公司董事會(huì)僵局發(fā)生的重要原因，對(duì)合資公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效產(chǎn)生或多或少的負(fù)面影響。理論上，合資公司可以追究董事決策時(shí)選擇股東利益、違反對(duì)合資公司“受信”義務(wù)的行為。實(shí)踐中，這類訴訟只是作為尋求解決股東之間利益沖突的手段，董事個(gè)人因此承擔(dān)法律責(zé)任的情形較少實(shí)際發(fā)生。應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮從公司治理機(jī)構(gòu)的層面隔離董事的利益沖突，“凱撒的歸凱撒、上帝的歸上帝”，由股東（代表）負(fù)責(zé)處理股東之間的事務(wù)（如利益沖突）、而讓董事專注于合資公司的成功。同時(shí)，應(yīng)當(dāng)在合資公司的法律文件中清楚地界定合資公司董事的職責(zé)。 第五章討論通過(guò)股東退出合資公司的方式破解合資的公司僵局。在維持公司存續(xù)的前提下，某些股東可以選擇轉(zhuǎn)讓股份而退出合資公司，實(shí)現(xiàn)合資僵局的破解。合資公司的章程和股東協(xié)議往往根據(jù)合資封閉性的特點(diǎn)，為合資股權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)讓設(shè)定各種限制，常見(jiàn)的是“同意條款”和優(yōu)先購(gòu)買(mǎi)權(quán)限制。股東退出公司是股東不能剝奪的權(quán)利，為此要在退出股東與其他股東的利益間尋求平衡。為保證合資股權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)讓以當(dāng)事人合意和預(yù)見(jiàn)的方式進(jìn)行，防止不合意的新股東加入，合資股東可設(shè)立出售權(quán)、購(gòu)買(mǎi)權(quán)或選擇權(quán)等安排。這些約定可能沒(méi)有當(dāng)事人期望地有效，執(zhí)行上也可能存在困難，但約定本身為將來(lái)可能發(fā)生的股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓，仍然最大限度地提供了指引。合資公司的小股東在特定情形下還可利用股份購(gòu)買(mǎi)請(qǐng)求權(quán)實(shí)現(xiàn)退出公司。在當(dāng)事人無(wú)法自立救濟(jì)的情形下，司法干預(yù)可強(qiáng)制完成股權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)讓。 第六章討論通過(guò)解散合資公司的方式來(lái)破解合資的公司僵局。解散公司是破解合資僵局的最后手段，屬于“核武器”。解散公司通常對(duì)社會(huì)整體福利不利，還可能被機(jī)會(huì)主義的股東濫用，所以要特別慎重地運(yùn)用。解散公司有自愿和強(qiáng)制解散之分，司法解散實(shí)質(zhì)是干預(yù)封閉公司內(nèi)部私力強(qiáng)制（公司僵局和股東壓迫）的救濟(jì)手段。國(guó)家干預(yù)是股東自治失靈后的選擇，其運(yùn)用應(yīng)有嚴(yán)格的條件和程序。本章討論司法解散的適用條件、當(dāng)事人地位、適用原則、主要程序等問(wèn)題。為防止濫用解散公司訴訟，法律可設(shè)定諸如訴訟擔(dān)保和敗訴賠償?shù)闹萍s機(jī)制。法院在作出判決解散公司的選擇前，應(yīng)考慮替代性措施。各國(guó)基于各自的法律傳統(tǒng)，創(chuàng)立了不同的替代性措施，如美國(guó)的臨時(shí)董事和監(jiān)管人制度、德國(guó)的股東退出權(quán)和公司除名權(quán)制度，都是比較解散公司更為緩和的解決股東爭(zhēng)議、破解公司僵局的措施。合資公司解散后需要進(jìn)行清算，以了結(jié)各方面的法律關(guān)系、終止公司人格。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the organization law , the joint venture can adopt different modes , such as partnership , company or contract , and the joint venture company is the form of enterprise organization which has both the partnership and the company ' s characteristics . The joint venture company is referred to as " company type partnership " .

Based on the common phenomenon of the joint venture between the Company and the Company , this paper discusses the legal countermeasures of the deadlock in the aspects of the deadlock prevention , self - rescue and judicial relief from the aspects of the deadlock prevention , self - rescue and judicial relief , with a view to better understanding the organization form of the joint venture , and providing help for the better use of the joint venture in the future .

The study is characterized by " transnational " and " inner human " , which means the conflict of law application and the competition of the legal system of different state companies ( enterprises ) ;
In the background of economic globalization , the legal system of limited liability company appears to be independent in legislation ( no longer act as a proxy or exception to the joint stock company ) , the flexible activation in the form of organization ( such as the requirement for the establishment of the board of supervisors no longer mandatory ) , the liberalization of shareholder autonomy ( which allows shareholders to freely agree on all internal governance issues outside the jus cogens ) , and the author hopes that the selected research perspective can reflect these trends .

The text is divided into six chapters . The first chapter discusses cross - border investment and joint ventures . The essence of the joint venture is the cooperation between independent enterprises , and the joint venture is a joint venture between different international investors .

Chapter 2 discusses the corporate governance and corporate deadlock of the joint venture . The joint venture company is a mixture of partnership and limited liability company . The joint venture company is a partnership and a limited liability company . The joint venture is a joint venture .

Chapter Three discusses the risk prevention and control of the deadlock of the joint venture company . The prevention is the first step of controlling the risk in the international investment practice of transnational corporations . The deadlock prevention is to foresee the risk and to design the institutional mechanism for balancing the various interests . All these preventive measures should be reflected in the joint venture company ' s legal document , which means the choice of the joint venture , the choice of the joint venture partner , the reasonable distribution of the control of the joint venture between the shareholders , the deadlock in the voting mechanism , etc . All these preventive measures should be reflected in the joint venture company ' s legal document , which will lead to the loss of trust , the deadlock and the eventual failure of the joint venture . The decision of the joint venture company has to balance between the efficiency of the company and the fairness of the shareholders , and in a sense enters the artistic rather than scientific category .

Chapter four discusses the double effect of the directors of the joint venture company and the deadlock of the joint venture . The position of the director of the joint venture company is awkward , and the direct conflict between the shareholders and the interests of the joint venture company is very easy to fall into the dilemma of " double allegiance " . In practice , the joint venture can hold the director ' s decision - making with less adverse effect . In practice , the joint venture can hold the director ' s decision - making , and it is less practical . In practice , the joint venture can hold the affairs of the shareholders ( such as conflict of interest ) from the level of the corporate governance institution , and let the director focus on the success of the joint venture . At the same time , the role of the directors of the joint venture should be clearly defined in the legal documents of the joint venture .

Chapter V discusses the deadlock in the joint venture between the shareholders and the joint venture . Under the precondition of maintaining the company ' s existence , some shareholders may opt to transfer the shares to exit the joint venture and realize the joint venture deadlock . The Articles of Association and the shareholder agreement of the joint venture may set various restrictions on the transfer of the joint venture . In order to ensure that the transfer of the joint venture is carried out in a consensual and predictable manner , the joint venture may establish the right to sell , purchase power or option .

Chapter 6 discusses the way to break up the joint venture by dissolving the joint venture company . The dissolution of the company is the last resort to break the joint venture , which belongs to the " nuclear weapons " . The dissolution of the company usually has a negative effect on the whole welfare of the society and may be abused by the shareholders of opportunism . In order to prevent the abuse of the company ' s lawsuit , the law can set up various alternative measures .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1

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