發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-02-24 12:16

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 氣候合作 博弈 成本-收益 國(guó)際環(huán)境法　出處：《河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：國(guó)際氣候合作已從科學(xué)研究階段延伸至氣候公約的談判、履行階段,目前已初顯成效,國(guó)際社會(huì)圍繞減排方案已經(jīng)簽署并生效了諸如《聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候變化框架公約》、《京都議定書(shū)》、《巴厘島路線(xiàn)圖》、《哥本哈根協(xié)議》、《坎昆協(xié)議》等若干國(guó)際公約,締約國(guó)在減排政策與減排行動(dòng)上不斷修正策略的談判本質(zhì)是國(guó)家間的談判博弈。鑒于國(guó)家行為體的理性假設(shè),在國(guó)際氣候合作問(wèn)題上不一定為增進(jìn)集體利益采取一致的合作策略。由于公共物品的非排他性,不合作的國(guó)家也能同等程度的享用其他國(guó)家提供的公共物品,導(dǎo)致國(guó)際氣候合作出現(xiàn)“供給不足”、“搭便車(chē)”的制度困境。本文在借鑒相關(guān)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,從博弈理論和“成本收益”理論的角度出發(fā),系統(tǒng)分析國(guó)際氣候合作中出現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題根源及解決方案。 本文首先分析國(guó)際氣候變化的“自然屬性公共物品”的特性,闡釋國(guó)際氣候合作的必要性。通過(guò)考察國(guó)際氣候談判的歷史進(jìn)程,闡述國(guó)際氣候談判的實(shí)質(zhì)是締約國(guó)國(guó)家利益間的博弈。其次,闡述國(guó)際氣候談判格局變化的國(guó)家(利益集團(tuán))博弈本質(zhì),主要分析六種基本博弈,歸納時(shí)間、數(shù)目、收益分配、談判民主制以及主權(quán)國(guó)家政策的互動(dòng)影響等國(guó)際氣候合作成敗的博弈因素。在氣候談判的過(guò)程中協(xié)調(diào)各國(guó)的國(guó)家利益難度凸顯,建立公平合理的談判機(jī)制是保證國(guó)際氣候合作成效的關(guān)鍵。另外,運(yùn)用“成本-收益”的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析方法分析氣候變化國(guó)際公約的締約談判、履約機(jī)制和國(guó)內(nèi)實(shí)施以及對(duì)“成本-收益”的程序價(jià)值的論述,降低減排成本,完善減排方案,提高國(guó)際氣候條約履約成效。最后,運(yùn)用歷史考察、比較分析的方法分析國(guó)際氣候合作中的主要國(guó)家政策與立法現(xiàn)狀,進(jìn)而從協(xié)調(diào)我國(guó)生存權(quán)、發(fā)展權(quán)和環(huán)境權(quán)的角度,重點(diǎn)闡述中國(guó)在氣候談判中的基本立場(chǎng)、中國(guó)氣候變化戰(zhàn)略的優(yōu)先行動(dòng)領(lǐng)域及中國(guó)應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化的立法構(gòu)建。
[Abstract]:International climate cooperation has been extended from the stage of scientific research to the negotiation and implementation of the UNFCCC, and is now beginning to show results. The international community has signed and entered into force a number of international conventions, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Road Map, the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreement, etc. The negotiating nature of the parties' constantly revising their strategies in terms of emission reduction policies and actions is essentially a negotiation game between countries. In view of the rational assumptions of national actors, International climate cooperation is not necessarily a coherent cooperative strategy for the collective good. Because of the non-exclusivity of public goods, non-cooperative countries have equal access to public goods provided by other countries, This paper, based on the relevant research results, starts from the point of view of game theory and cost-benefit theory, and leads to the system dilemma of "insufficient supply" and "free rider" in international climate cooperation. Systematically analyze the root causes and solutions of the problems in international climate cooperation. This paper first analyzes the characteristics of "natural attributes of public goods" of international climate change, and explains the necessity of international climate cooperation. The essence of the international climate negotiation is the game between the national interests of the parties. Secondly, the essence of the national (interest group) game with the change of the international climate negotiation pattern is expounded, and the six basic games are analyzed, including induction time, number and income distribution. Negotiation democracy and the interaction of sovereign state policies are the game factors of the success or failure of international climate cooperation. It is difficult to coordinate the national interests of various countries in the process of climate negotiations. The establishment of a fair and reasonable negotiating mechanism is the key to ensuring the effectiveness of international climate cooperation. In addition, the "cost-benefit" economic analysis method is used to analyze the negotiations on the conclusion of international conventions on climate change. The implementation mechanism and domestic implementation, as well as the procedural value of "cost-benefit", reduce the cost of emission reduction, perfect the scheme of emission reduction, and improve the performance of international climate treaties. The comparative analysis method analyzes the current state of national policies and legislation in international climate cooperation, and then expounds China's basic position in climate negotiations from the perspective of coordinating China's rights to subsistence, development and environment. Priority areas for action in China's climate change strategy and legislation to address climate change in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D996.9

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