本文選題：董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn) + 沖突�。� 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度的價(jià)值主要在于:(1)有利于保護(hù)無(wú)辜的董事和高級(jí)管理人員抵御不當(dāng)?shù)馁r償請(qǐng)求;(2)激勵(lì)有能力的人積極的擔(dān)任董事和高級(jí)管理職務(wù);(3)防止股東的無(wú)理訴訟。1激勵(lì)作用是董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的最重要的價(jià)值。現(xiàn)代公司法為了完善公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu),逐漸強(qiáng)化公司經(jīng)營(yíng)者的個(gè)人責(zé)任。在現(xiàn)代社會(huì),公司的管理職位,面臨巨大的訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn),如果沒(méi)有有效的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,具有管理才能的人才可能不愿擔(dān)任公司的董事和高級(jí)管理職務(wù)。而董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度為公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)者的職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供了有效的保護(hù)。公司購(gòu)買董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn),可以激勵(lì)公司的董事和高級(jí)管理人員放心努力地工作,從而為公司創(chuàng)造更多的利益。在歐美發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,絕大多數(shù)的上市公司購(gòu)買了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)。而在我國(guó),由于《公司法》和《證券法》等法律法規(guī)對(duì)董事和高級(jí)管理人員承擔(dān)的義務(wù),規(guī)定的并不清晰。所以,我國(guó)公司的董事和高級(jí)管理人員的法律責(zé)任風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不大,即使出現(xiàn)鄭百文、銀廣夏、大慶聯(lián)誼等案件,公司和高級(jí)管理人員也沒(méi)有都被課以民事賠償責(zé)任。因此,在我國(guó),董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的需求不大,各界對(duì)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的研究也不多。2為此,本文將嘗試研究我國(guó)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度,把研究的焦點(diǎn)對(duì)準(zhǔn)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度與我國(guó)現(xiàn)有法律制度之間的沖突、對(duì)立的問(wèn)題,并通過(guò)逐一分析、論證,尋找解決、調(diào)和這些沖突的方法和機(jī)制,最后為架構(gòu)一套完善合理的我國(guó)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度提出若干建議。 本文分四部分。第一部分,介紹了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的定義、發(fā)展歷程、董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)合同的被保險(xiǎn)人及被保險(xiǎn)人的法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 第二部分,分析了我國(guó)現(xiàn)有法律制度和董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度的沖突。主要有:一、董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度,把董事的賠償責(zé)任,轉(zhuǎn)由保險(xiǎn)公司承擔(dān),相應(yīng)減輕了董事個(gè)人的賠償責(zé)任。這樣,董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)具備的分散董事責(zé)任的功能,和民事責(zé)任理論中的抑制違法行為的功能,產(chǎn)生了沖突。二、公司法中沒(méi)有規(guī)定如何衡量注意義務(wù)的履行標(biāo)準(zhǔn),而且,現(xiàn)行公司法也沒(méi)有列舉違反董事注意義務(wù)的情形,也沒(méi)有規(guī)定違反董事注意義務(wù)的法律后果。三、董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)對(duì)于董事的過(guò)失行為導(dǎo)致的責(zé)任的承保范圍,和現(xiàn)行《證券法》的規(guī)定,是不一致的。董事的過(guò)錯(cuò)行為,包括重大過(guò)失、一般過(guò)失,董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)承保的,只是其中的一般過(guò)失。對(duì)于重大過(guò)失,保險(xiǎn)公司是不承保的。 第三部分,嘗試討論了為了調(diào)和法律制度的沖突,應(yīng)該采取的措施:一、設(shè)計(jì)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)承保的民事責(zé)任,要兼顧民事責(zé)任制度的違法抑制功能和董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度的保險(xiǎn)職能。必須調(diào)和董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)和我國(guó)現(xiàn)行民事法律制度的沖突問(wèn)題。董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)承保的應(yīng)該只是董事因?yàn)檫^(guò)失而承擔(dān)的民事責(zé)任,對(duì)于董事的違法行為,是不承保的。這樣設(shè)計(jì),既體現(xiàn)了民事責(zé)任的違法抑制功能,同時(shí)也分散了董事過(guò)失行為的民事責(zé)任。二、以后修改公司法時(shí),建議詳細(xì)規(guī)定如何界定董事的注意義務(wù),這是最徹底的方法。在目前沒(méi)有修改公司法的情況下,可以建議公司在制定公司章程時(shí),在公司章程中約定董事的注意義務(wù)。三、建議以后修改《證券法》時(shí),對(duì)其中的推定過(guò)錯(cuò),進(jìn)行界定,區(qū)分一般過(guò)失和重大過(guò)失。由董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)承保其中的一般過(guò)失行為導(dǎo)致的民事賠償責(zé)任�；蛘�,在董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的條款中做特別規(guī)定,董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)對(duì)董事的違反證券法的哪些行為導(dǎo)致的責(zé)任進(jìn)行賠償,對(duì)董事的違反證券法的哪些行為導(dǎo)致的責(zé)任不賠償。 第四部分,提出了關(guān)于我國(guó)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度的建議:一、擴(kuò)大承保范圍。我國(guó)目前董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)發(fā)展處于起步階段,應(yīng)該適當(dāng)擴(kuò)大承保范圍,應(yīng)該承保董事的重大過(guò)失行為導(dǎo)致的賠償責(zé)任。只有根據(jù)我國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí),變更承保范圍,才能吸引市場(chǎng)需求,發(fā)展董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)。二、界定除外范圍。險(xiǎn)公司提供的董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)中一般約定,違法的不當(dāng)行為、欺詐行為、明知故犯的惡意行為,和違反法律規(guī)定的行為,都屬于董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的除外范圍,在任何情況下,保險(xiǎn)公司都不予承保。三、引進(jìn)責(zé)任限額、自負(fù)額和保費(fèi)支付比例的規(guī)定。四、保險(xiǎn)法的最大誠(chéng)信原則,要求投保人具有告知義務(wù),投保人、被保險(xiǎn)人具有通知義務(wù)。保險(xiǎn)公司有義務(wù)向被保險(xiǎn)人詳細(xì)說(shuō)明保險(xiǎn)條款的內(nèi)容和含義,尤其應(yīng)當(dāng)詳細(xì)說(shuō)明保險(xiǎn)條款中的保險(xiǎn)人的除外責(zé)任,以及投保人的告知義務(wù),投保人、被保險(xiǎn)人的通知義務(wù)等內(nèi)容。五、引進(jìn)公司補(bǔ)償制度。公司補(bǔ)償制度,對(duì)于董事和高級(jí)管理人員對(duì)他人所應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)的個(gè)人賠償責(zé)任,可以提供一定的資金支持。
[Abstract]:The value of the liability insurance system of directors mainly lies in: (1) it is beneficial to protect the innocent directors and senior managers against improper claims; (2) to motivate the competent people to actively serve as directors and senior management posts; (3) the most important value of the director's liability insurance is to prevent the irrational litigation.1 incentive for shareholders. In order to improve the corporate governance structure, the individual responsibility of the company operators is gradually strengthened. In modern society, the management positions of the company are faced with huge litigation risks. If there is no effective incentive mechanism, the talents with management ability may not be willing to serve as directors and senior management positions of the company. The occupational risk of the operator provides an effective protection. The company's purchase of directors' liability insurance can encourage the directors and senior managers of the company to work hard and create more benefits for the company. In the developed countries in Europe and America, the vast majority of the listed companies have purchased the liability insurance of the directors. The obligations of the securities law and other laws and regulations to the directors and senior managers are not clear. Therefore, the legal liability of the directors and senior managers of our company is not very risky. Even if Zheng Baiwen, silver Guangxia, Daqing friendship and other cases appear, the company and senior management personnel are not subject to civil liability. Therefore, In our country, the demand for the liability insurance of the directors is not large, and the research on the liability insurance of the directors is not much.2. This article will try to study the liability insurance system of the directors in our country and focus the research on the conflict between the director's liability insurance system and the existing legal system in our country. Finally, it puts forward some suggestions for building a sound and reasonable system of directors' liability insurance in China.
This article is divided into four parts. The first part introduces the definition of the liability insurance of the director, the course of development, the legal risk of the insured and the insured of the liability insurance contract of the director.
The second part analyzes the conflict between the existing legal system and the liability insurance system of the directors in China. The main factors are: the first, the liability insurance system of the director, the liability of the directors, the liability of the insurance company and the compensation liability of the directors. Two, the company law does not specify how to measure the performance standards of the duty of attention, and the current company law does not enumerate the circumstances that violate the directors' duty of attention, nor does it stipulate the legal consequences of violating the directors' duty of attention. (three) the director's liability insurance is caused by the negligence of the director. The liability coverage of the liability is inconsistent with the provisions of the current securities law. The director's fault, including major negligence, general negligence, and the insurance of the director's liability insurance, is only the general negligence. For major negligence, the insurance company is not insured.
In the third part, we try to discuss the measures that should be taken to reconcile the conflict of the legal system: first, to design the civil liability of the liability insurance of the directors' liability insurance, to take into account the illegal restraining function of the civil liability system and the insurance function of the director's liability insurance system, and to reconcile the conflict between the liability insurance of the director and the current civil law system in China. The liability insurance of the director's liability insurance should be only the civil liability for the negligence of the director and the unlawful act of the director. This design not only embodies the illegal restraining function of the civil liability, but also disperses the civil liability of the director's negligent behavior. Two, when the company law is amended later, it is suggested to specify in detail how It is the most thorough method to define the duty of attention of the director. In the case of no revision of the company law at present, it may be suggested that the company stipulate the duty of attention of the directors in the articles of association when making the articles of association. Three, when it is suggested to amend the securities law later, the presumption is wrong, and the general negligence and major negligence are distinguished. The liability insurance of the director's liability insurance covers the civil liability for general negligence. Or, in the provisions of the liability insurance of the director, the director's liability insurance is compensated for the liability of the director in violation of the acts of the securities law and the liability of the director in violation of the Securities Law.
In the fourth part, the suggestions on the insurance system of directors' liability in China are put forward: first, to expand the scope of insurance. The current development of the liability insurance of directors in our country is in the initial stage. It should expand the scope of the insurance, and should cover the liability caused by the major negligence behavior of the director. Only according to the reality of our country, the scope of the insurance will be changed to attract the city. Field demand, the development of director liability insurance. Two, define the exception. The general agreement in the liability insurance provided by a risk company, illegal misconduct, fraudulent behavior, malicious behavior, and violations of the law are all excluded from the liability insurance of the director. In any case, the insurance company will not undercover. Three, Four, the maximum honesty principle of the insurance law requires the insured to have the obligation to inform, the insured and the insured have the obligation of notice. The insurance company is obliged to specify the content and the meaning of the insurance clause to the insured, especially the insurer in the insurance clause. The liability for exception, the informing obligation of the applicant, the applicant and the notification obligation of the insured. Five, the introduction of the company compensation system. The company compensation system can provide certain financial support to the directors and senior managers for individual liability for others.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91;D922.287

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