本文選題：公司治理 + 公司監(jiān)督機(jī)制�。� 參考：《青島大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：自有公司以來(lái),其所有者和經(jīng)營(yíng)者就出現(xiàn)了分離。所有者們一方面必須盡可能給予經(jīng)營(yíng)者決策自由,以充分發(fā)揮他們的聰明才智,適應(yīng)瞬息萬(wàn)變的市場(chǎng)形勢(shì);另一方面則對(duì)自己無(wú)法直接控制自己的財(cái)產(chǎn)而感到惴惴不安,于是試圖對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者行為加以監(jiān)督控制,故從公司制度產(chǎn)生一開始,就產(chǎn)生了公司監(jiān)督制度。隨著公司制度的發(fā)展與完善,公司監(jiān)督制度也隨之變化發(fā)展。從一開始小作坊式企業(yè)到大規(guī)模應(yīng)用機(jī)器的產(chǎn)業(yè)工廠,再隨著資本主義發(fā)展成為壟斷企業(yè),到了現(xiàn)代社會(huì),則出現(xiàn)了跨國(guó)公司等富可敵國(guó)的大型公司,公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理與監(jiān)督等變得異常復(fù)雜與麻煩。上世紀(jì)六十年代,一系列公司丑聞事件,促使人們開始將公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理、公司監(jiān)督等整合成為一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的整體來(lái)研究,這就是公司治理。公司監(jiān)督變成公司治理中重要的一環(huán),而監(jiān)事會(huì)制度則是公司監(jiān)督機(jī)制的重要制度之一。有別于其他研究者只是單純的將監(jiān)事會(huì)制度本身作為研究對(duì)象,本文試圖將監(jiān)事會(huì)制度放在公司制度的發(fā)展歷程中,作為統(tǒng)一的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的一部分,以歷史的、整體的、辯證的角度來(lái)對(duì)監(jiān)事會(huì)制度進(jìn)行辨析與論證。中國(guó)公司法師法于德日英美等法律制度先進(jìn)國(guó)家,然而借鑒的法律需要解決的卻是中國(guó)自己在公司治理中面臨的問(wèn)題。面對(duì)這些中國(guó)獨(dú)有的公司治理問(wèn)題,單純以比較研究的方式分析國(guó)外制度的優(yōu)劣是不行的,本文試圖在分析清楚當(dāng)前中國(guó)公司治理中出現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題的前提下,比較分析各國(guó)公司監(jiān)督制度解決這些問(wèn)題的可行性,從中找出能借鑒的部分以完善我國(guó)公司監(jiān)事會(huì)制度。全文共分四個(gè)部分:第一部分通過(guò)公司與公司治理概念引出公司監(jiān)督問(wèn)題,論述各國(guó)公司監(jiān)督機(jī)制;第二部分比較分析域外各國(guó)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與公司監(jiān)督機(jī)制制度安排、產(chǎn)生、發(fā)展及變化趨勢(shì);第三部分分析中國(guó)公司治理與公司監(jiān)督機(jī)制運(yùn)行狀況,試圖找到目前中國(guó)公司治理中遇到的問(wèn)題,并探尋問(wèn)題根源;第四部分詳細(xì)闡述中國(guó)公司監(jiān)事會(huì)制度,論證其制度缺陷,探索完善途徑。
[Abstract]:Since its own company, its owners and operators on the emergence of separation. On the one hand, owners must give managers as much decision-making freedom as possible to bring their talents into full play and adapt to changing market conditions; on the other hand, they are nervous that they cannot directly control their property. Therefore, it tries to supervise and control the operator's behavior, so from the beginning of the company system, the company supervision system comes into being. With the development and perfection of the company system, the company supervision system also changes and develops. From small workshop enterprises to industrial factories that use machines on a large scale, and with the development of capitalism into monopolistic enterprises, to the modern society, large companies, such as multinational corporations, have emerged. The management and supervision of the company has become extremely complex and troublesome. In the 1960s, a series of corporate scandals prompted people to integrate corporate management, corporate supervision and so on into a unified whole, which is called corporate governance. Corporate supervision has become an important part of corporate governance, and the board of supervisors system is one of the important systems of corporate supervision mechanism. Different from other researchers, this paper tries to put the board of supervisors system in the development process of the company system, as a part of the unified corporate governance structure. Dialectical point of view to the system of board of supervisors analysis and demonstration. The law of Chinese companies is advanced in Germany, Japan and the United States and other countries. However, the problems that China itself faces in corporate governance need to be solved by using the law for reference. In the face of these unique corporate governance problems in China, it is impossible to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of foreign systems simply by means of comparative research. This paper compares and analyzes the feasibility of solving these problems under the supervision system of companies in various countries, and finds out the parts that can be used for reference in order to perfect the system of board of supervisors in our country. The thesis is divided into four parts: the first part introduces the problem of corporate supervision through the concept of corporate and corporate governance, and discusses the mechanism of corporate supervision in various countries, the second part compares and analyzes the system arrangement of corporate governance and corporate supervision mechanism in foreign countries. The third part analyzes the operation of Chinese corporate governance and corporate supervision mechanism, tries to find out the problems encountered in Chinese corporate governance, and explores the root causes of the problems. The fourth part elaborates the system of Chinese company board of supervisors. Demonstrate its system defect, explore the perfect way.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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本文編號(hào)：1946254