本文選題：公司清算 + 股東派生訴訟�。� 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】： 現(xiàn)代社會(huì)中,公司無疑是重要的民事主體。與自然人一樣,公司作為民事權(quán)利主體同樣具有一定的生命周期:公司成立,表明公司生命的開始;公司終止,表明公司生命的終結(jié)。公司終止需要經(jīng)過一系列的行為和程序,即公司的解散和清算程序。 公司解散后必然經(jīng)過清算程序。清算階段的公司,一切經(jīng)營活動(dòng)停止,只能進(jìn)行與清算有關(guān)的事務(wù)。此時(shí)公司完全處于清算組的控制下,清算組對(duì)內(nèi)處理各種事務(wù),對(duì)外代表公司進(jìn)行各種民事活動(dòng)和訴訟活動(dòng),其地位類似于公司正常經(jīng)營過程中的董事,擁有廣泛的職權(quán)。如果發(fā)生清算組成員損害公司、債權(quán)人或股東的利益的行為,則應(yīng)由清算組采取行動(dòng)予以制止。但在兩種情形下,這種內(nèi)控制度無法發(fā)揮作用。一是公司受控于清算組,清算組對(duì)其成員的違法行為采取放任態(tài)度;二是清算組成員集體侵害公司利益時(shí),根本不可能要求清算組采取什么行動(dòng)。根據(jù)公司法的規(guī)定及法理,債權(quán)人和公司可以對(duì)實(shí)施不當(dāng)行為的清算組成員直接提起訴訟,追究清算組成員的責(zé)任,這在法律上沒有任何障礙。但基于公司法公司人格獨(dú)立的原理,股東要求清算組成員承擔(dān)賠償責(zé)任可能并不現(xiàn)實(shí)。因此,《公司法司法解釋(二)》大膽借鑒股東代表訴訟制度,規(guī)定符合一定條件的股東可以代表公司向?qū)嵤┻`法行為的清算組成員追究民事賠償責(zé)任。本文就以此為中心展開討論。 論文共分三章,第一章主要通過對(duì)清算組地位、權(quán)力、義務(wù)等問題的闡述,分析了清算組成員損害賠償責(zé)任的法理依據(jù),并從《公司法》中對(duì)清算組成員損害賠償責(zé)任的追究機(jī)制的可行性出發(fā)具體分析該責(zé)任追究機(jī)制的局限性。在此基礎(chǔ)上,文章論證了《公司法司法解釋(二)》引入新制度——股東代表訴訟作為清算組成員不當(dāng)實(shí)施清算行為的責(zé)任追究機(jī)制的必要性和可行性。 第二章在對(duì)股東派生訴訟功能分析的基礎(chǔ)上,指出該制度對(duì)清算階段的借鑒意義;在對(duì)我國股東派生訴訟制度介紹的基礎(chǔ)上,分析了該條規(guī)定的股東派生訴訟制度的缺陷所在,提出在清算程序中重建該制度的基本思路。 第三章則以民法請(qǐng)求權(quán)基礎(chǔ)的法律分析方法和思考方式,對(duì)目前我國股東派生訴訟在公司非破產(chǎn)清算階段的可行性和規(guī)則設(shè)計(jì)作了具體分析。 通過上述分析,本文最后得出結(jié)論:股東派生訴訟在不同的國家、不同的歷史發(fā)展階段具有不同的價(jià)值目標(biāo)。司法解釋引入該制度作為對(duì)清算組權(quán)力的制衡機(jī)制,并且繞過公司法人格獨(dú)立的傳統(tǒng)規(guī)則,把追究清算組成員民事賠償責(zé)任的權(quán)利賦予符合一定條件的公司股東,使得清算組責(zé)任追究的權(quán)利主體由原來的債權(quán)人和公司,增加到債權(quán)人、公司和股東,這對(duì)于督促清算組依法履行職權(quán),保證清算工作的順利進(jìn)行,引導(dǎo)公司有秩序地退出市場,建立健康有序的市場退出機(jī)制都有一定的積極意義。
[Abstract]:In modern society, the company is undoubtedly an important civil subject. As a natural person, a company, as a subject of civil rights, also has a certain life cycle: the incorporation of the company indicates the beginning of the company's life, and the termination of the company's life means the end of the company's life. The termination of a company requires a series of actions and procedures, that is, dissolution and liquidation of the company. After dissolution, the company must go through liquidation procedures. The liquidation phase of the company, all business activities, can only carry out liquidation related affairs. At this time, the company is completely under the control of the liquidation group, which handles all kinds of internal affairs and carries out various civil and litigation activities on behalf of the company. Its status is similar to that of the directors in the normal operation of the company, and it has extensive powers and powers. In the event that the members of the liquidation group harm the interests of the company, creditors or shareholders, action shall be taken by the liquidation group to stop it. However, in two cases, this internal control system can not play a role. One is that the company is controlled by the liquidation group, and the liquidation group takes a laissez-faire attitude towards the illegal behavior of its members; the other is that when the members of the liquidation group collectively infringe upon the interests of the company, it is simply impossible to ask the liquidation group to take any action. According to the provisions and principles of the Company Law, creditors and companies can directly sue the members of the liquidation team who have committed misconduct, and investigate the liability of the members of the liquidation team. There is no legal obstacle to this. However, based on the principle of corporate personality independence, it may not be realistic for shareholders to ask liquidation group members to bear compensation liability. Therefore, the judicial interpretation of the Company Law (2) boldly uses the shareholder representative litigation system for reference, and stipulates that shareholders who meet certain conditions may, on behalf of the company, investigate the civil liability for compensation from the members of the liquidation group who carry out illegal acts. This paper focuses on the discussion. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter analyzes the legal basis of the liability for damages of the members of the liquidation group through the elaboration of the status, power and obligation of the liquidation group. The limitation of the liability investigation mechanism is analyzed in detail from the feasibility of the investigation mechanism of the liability for damages of the members of the liquidation group in Company Law. On this basis, the article demonstrates the necessity and feasibility of introducing a new system, shareholder representative litigation, as a mechanism to investigate the liability of the members of liquidation group for the improper implementation of liquidation behavior. On the basis of analyzing the function of shareholder derivative litigation, the second chapter points out the reference meaning of this system to the liquidation stage, and analyzes the defects of the shareholder derivative action system in this article on the basis of introducing the shareholder derivative litigation system in China. The basic idea of rebuilding the system in liquidation procedure is put forward. The third chapter analyzes the feasibility and rule design of shareholder derivative litigation in the stage of non-bankruptcy liquidation in our country by means of the legal analysis method and thinking method of civil law claim basis. Through the above analysis, this paper draws a conclusion that shareholder derivative litigation has different value objectives in different countries and different historical development stages. The judicial interpretation introduces this system as a check and balance mechanism to the powers of the liquidation group, and bypasses the traditional rules of the personality independence of the company law, and assigns the civil liability rights of the members of the liquidation group to the shareholders who meet certain conditions. So that the subject of the liquidation group's liability investigation will be increased from the original creditors and companies to creditors, companies and shareholders. This will urge the liquidation group to perform its functions and powers according to law and ensure the smooth progress of the liquidation work. It is of positive significance to guide the company to withdraw from the market in an orderly manner and to establish a healthy and orderly market withdrawal mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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