本文關鍵詞： 稅權配置 法經(jīng)濟學 效率 公平 法治　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學》2014年博士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：當今中國正在逐漸由一個“自產(chǎn)國家”向“稅收國家”轉型，對國家治理提出了新的要求。稅權，是稅法學與稅收學研究的邏輯起點與核心，，也是一種稀缺的資源。作為一項制度安排，稅權配置問題對整個社會經(jīng)濟影響深遠。事實上，近年來中國經(jīng)濟出現(xiàn)的很多問題都可以在稅權配置上找到根源，強化對該問題的研究具有重要的理論與實踐意義。 已有的研究中，法學界與經(jīng)濟學界基本上是涇渭分明，鮮有將二者結合起來的學術成果。稅權配置涉及國家的根本權力，具有復雜性與特殊性，單純從法學或經(jīng)濟學的角度展開研究，并不足以將問題分析清楚。在目前學術界，特別是經(jīng)濟學領域，對稅權的研究尚顯薄弱的情況下，運用法經(jīng)濟學的研究思路與方法，深入探討中國中央與地方稅權配置問題就成為本文的一種嘗試。 本文所要解決的核心問題是：中國中央與地方稅權配置是否符合效率、公平標準？其背后的制度成因是什么？圍繞該問題，本文主要采用了文獻調(diào)查、均衡分析、統(tǒng)計分析、歷史分析、比較分析、博弈論等方法，以稅收債務關系理論為研究始點，在法經(jīng)濟學理性選擇范式下，分析中央、地方的行為選擇與動因；從不同角度考察中央與地方稅權配置是否效率以及是否公平；從制度供給、需求層面研究實踐中稅權配置出現(xiàn)不公平和效率損失的原因，并在此基礎上闡述優(yōu)化中國稅權配置的路徑選擇。 本文的核心觀點是：當前中國稅權配置的根本癥結在于行政化的分權方式，稅權法治以起點公平為始，總成本最小，也最有效率；優(yōu)化中國稅權配置應遵循法治的路徑前行。創(chuàng)新之處有： （1）研究視角的創(chuàng)新。本文以稅收債務關系理論作為研究的邏輯起點，將效率、公平作為衡量稅權配置的標準；基于法經(jīng)濟學理性選擇范式，通過分析中央政府與地方政府在稅權配置中的行為，對中國稅收分權進行動態(tài)考察，并從制度層面探討現(xiàn)有稅收分權模式的成因。與傳統(tǒng)法學、經(jīng)濟學對中央與地方稅權配置的分析路徑相比，本文在研究視角與思路上有所突破。 （2）稅權配置的公平效率觀。本文在運用效率、公平指標分別對中央與地方稅權配置進行考量的基礎上，進一步探討當前中國稅收分權中存在種種問題的根本原因正是由于制度安排的起點不公，即行政化的稅權配置方式。稅權法治則恰恰補正了行政分權的不足，起點的公平不僅有助于結果公平的實現(xiàn)，也有利于長期效率的提高。 （3）將稅權橫向、縱向配置相結合。稅權配置的兩個維度間并非孤立存在。在探討中央與地方政府間的稅權配置時，將其與橫向配置結合，認為中國稅權縱向配置失衡源于橫向配置的失控。因此，盡管縱向分權對經(jīng)濟的影響更為顯著，但問題的解決卻最終應歸結于稅收立法權的橫向配置，這也使得所提出的稅權法治化的路徑選擇更具說服力。 （4）分析了所有制結構變動對稅權配置的影響。市場經(jīng)濟環(huán)境下，私營經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展使得來自“私人部門”的稅收收入在國家財政收入中的地位越來越重要，這大大提升了對稅權的合法性、正當性等方面的要求。然而，中國的稅權配置方式依然沿襲過往的行政化路徑，沒有適時調(diào)整及擺脫對“人治”路徑的依賴，未能很好地適應當前經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的要求，從而導致實踐中諸多問題的產(chǎn)生。 （5）構建更加符合中國國情的稅收分權指標——地方稅收自給率，實證結果表明，近年來中國的稅收分權狀況并不利于經(jīng)濟增長。
[Abstract]:The China are gradually from a "- state" to "tax" transformation, put forward new requirements for national governance. Tax right, is the logical starting point and the core of tax law and tax research, is a kind of scarce resources. As an institutional arrangement, allocation of tax rights for the effect of Q the social economy is profound. In fact, there are many problems in China economy in recent years can be found in the root of tax power allocation, it has important theoretical and practical significance to strengthen the research on this problem.
The existing research, law circles and economic circles basically are quite distinct from each other, rarely combine the two academic achievements. The tax right allocation involves the fundamental power of the country, with the complexity and particularity, simple from law or economics point of view, the problem is not enough to analyze clearly. In the current academic circles, especially the field of economics, research on tax power is weak, the research ideas and methods of law and economics, in-depth discussion on the allocation of right of tax China central and local governments will become a try in this paper.
The core problem of this thesis is: the central and local tax power allocation is in accordance with the China efficiency and fairness standard? What is the institutional reasons behind it? Around this problem, this paper mainly adopts the literature investigation, equilibrium analysis, statistical analysis, historical analysis, comparative analysis, game theory, the theory of tax debt relation as the research starting point, in the method of rational choice in economics analysis, the central paradigm, behavior selection and motivation of local; study from different angles of the central and local tax power allocation is efficiency and fairness; from the supply system, causes the allocation of tax power is not fair and efficiency loss of the demand level and on the basis of research and practice. On the optimization of path configuration China tax right choice.
The core point of this paper is: the crux of the current tax allocation in China lies in the decentralization way of administration. The rule of tax right is based on the starting point of fairness. The total cost is the minimum and the most efficient. The optimization of Chinese tax allocation should follow the path of rule of law.
(1) the innovation of research perspective. Based on the theory of tax debt relation as the logical starting point, research efficiency, fair allocation of tax rights as a measure of the standard of law and economics; rational choice paradigm based on the analysis of the central and local governments in the allocation of tax rights in the behavior of dynamic investigation of Chinese tax decentralization, and to explore the the causes of the existing tax decentralization mode from the aspect of system. Compared with traditional law, the configuration of the central and local tax power path analysis of economics, this paper make a breakthrough in the research perspective and ideas.
(2) equity and efficiency of Taxation configuration concept. On the basis of the application of efficiency, fairness index were considered based on the allocation of central and local tax power, to further explore the root causes of the problems in the current China tax decentralization is the starting point of the institutional arrangement of injustice, namely the Administration of the tax power allocation. The rule of law is the right of tax correction lack of administrative decentralization, the starting point of the fair is not only helpful to the realization of fairness, but also conducive to the long-term efficiency.
(3) the tax right lateral, vertical configuration combination. There is not an isolated two dimensions of the configuration of the tax right. In the discussion on the allocation of tax power between the central and local government, combined with the horizontal configuration, that Chinese longitudinal imbalance in the allocation of tax power sources out of control in the transverse configuration. Therefore, although the effect of longitudinal the economic decentralization is more significant, but the solution of the problem is ultimately attributed to the horizontal configuration of tax legislative power, the right of tax law proposed path selection more convincing.
(4) analysis of changes in ownership structure influence on the allocation of tax rights. Under the environment of market economy, the rapid development of the private economy from the "private sector" tax revenue plays a more and more important in the national fiscal revenue, which greatly enhanced the legitimacy of tax right, when positive and other aspects of the request however, the allocation of tax power Chinese still followed the administrative path of the past, not timely adjustment and get rid of the dependence on the "rule of man" path, the current economic development can't adapt to the requirements of good, which leads to many problems in the practice.
(5) build a tax decentralization index, which is more consistent with China's national conditions, the local tax self-sufficiency rate. The empirical results show that China's tax decentralization in recent years is not conducive to economic growth.

【學位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F812.42;D90-059

【引證文獻】

相關期刊論文 前1條

1 吳瀚;;稅收分權下中央政府與地方政府博弈分析[J];財經(jīng)界(學術版);2015年11期

相關博士學位論文 前1條

1 李X;中國地方稅體系改革研究[D];吉林大學;2015年

本文編號：1545116