中央與地方稅權(quán)配置的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-02-28 01:10
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 稅權(quán)配置 法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué) 效率 公平 法治 出處:《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2014年博士論文 論文類(lèi)型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:當(dāng)今中國(guó)正在逐漸由一個(gè)“自產(chǎn)國(guó)家”向“稅收國(guó)家”轉(zhuǎn)型,對(duì)國(guó)家治理提出了新的要求。稅權(quán),是稅法學(xué)與稅收學(xué)研究的邏輯起點(diǎn)與核心,,也是一種稀缺的資源。作為一項(xiàng)制度安排,稅權(quán)配置問(wèn)題對(duì)整個(gè)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)影響深遠(yuǎn)。事實(shí)上,近年來(lái)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)的很多問(wèn)題都可以在稅權(quán)配置上找到根源,強(qiáng)化對(duì)該問(wèn)題的研究具有重要的理論與實(shí)踐意義。 已有的研究中,法學(xué)界與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界基本上是涇渭分明,鮮有將二者結(jié)合起來(lái)的學(xué)術(shù)成果。稅權(quán)配置涉及國(guó)家的根本權(quán)力,具有復(fù)雜性與特殊性,單純從法學(xué)或經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度展開(kāi)研究,并不足以將問(wèn)題分析清楚。在目前學(xué)術(shù)界,特別是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)領(lǐng)域,對(duì)稅權(quán)的研究尚顯薄弱的情況下,運(yùn)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究思路與方法,深入探討中國(guó)中央與地方稅權(quán)配置問(wèn)題就成為本文的一種嘗試。 本文所要解決的核心問(wèn)題是:中國(guó)中央與地方稅權(quán)配置是否符合效率、公平標(biāo)準(zhǔn)?其背后的制度成因是什么?圍繞該問(wèn)題,本文主要采用了文獻(xiàn)調(diào)查、均衡分析、統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、歷史分析、比較分析、博弈論等方法,以稅收債務(wù)關(guān)系理論為研究始點(diǎn),在法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理性選擇范式下,分析中央、地方的行為選擇與動(dòng)因;從不同角度考察中央與地方稅權(quán)配置是否效率以及是否公平;從制度供給、需求層面研究實(shí)踐中稅權(quán)配置出現(xiàn)不公平和效率損失的原因,并在此基礎(chǔ)上闡述優(yōu)化中國(guó)稅權(quán)配置的路徑選擇。 本文的核心觀點(diǎn)是:當(dāng)前中國(guó)稅權(quán)配置的根本癥結(jié)在于行政化的分權(quán)方式,稅權(quán)法治以起點(diǎn)公平為始,總成本最小,也最有效率;優(yōu)化中國(guó)稅權(quán)配置應(yīng)遵循法治的路徑前行。創(chuàng)新之處有: (1)研究視角的創(chuàng)新。本文以稅收債務(wù)關(guān)系理論作為研究的邏輯起點(diǎn),將效率、公平作為衡量稅權(quán)配置的標(biāo)準(zhǔn);基于法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理性選擇范式,通過(guò)分析中央政府與地方政府在稅權(quán)配置中的行為,對(duì)中國(guó)稅收分權(quán)進(jìn)行動(dòng)態(tài)考察,并從制度層面探討現(xiàn)有稅收分權(quán)模式的成因。與傳統(tǒng)法學(xué)、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)對(duì)中央與地方稅權(quán)配置的分析路徑相比,本文在研究視角與思路上有所突破。 (2)稅權(quán)配置的公平效率觀。本文在運(yùn)用效率、公平指標(biāo)分別對(duì)中央與地方稅權(quán)配置進(jìn)行考量的基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)一步探討當(dāng)前中國(guó)稅收分權(quán)中存在種種問(wèn)題的根本原因正是由于制度安排的起點(diǎn)不公,即行政化的稅權(quán)配置方式。稅權(quán)法治則恰恰補(bǔ)正了行政分權(quán)的不足,起點(diǎn)的公平不僅有助于結(jié)果公平的實(shí)現(xiàn),也有利于長(zhǎng)期效率的提高。 (3)將稅權(quán)橫向、縱向配置相結(jié)合。稅權(quán)配置的兩個(gè)維度間并非孤立存在。在探討中央與地方政府間的稅權(quán)配置時(shí),將其與橫向配置結(jié)合,認(rèn)為中國(guó)稅權(quán)縱向配置失衡源于橫向配置的失控。因此,盡管縱向分權(quán)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響更為顯著,但問(wèn)題的解決卻最終應(yīng)歸結(jié)于稅收立法權(quán)的橫向配置,這也使得所提出的稅權(quán)法治化的路徑選擇更具說(shuō)服力。 (4)分析了所有制結(jié)構(gòu)變動(dòng)對(duì)稅權(quán)配置的影響。市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下,私營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展使得來(lái)自“私人部門(mén)”的稅收收入在國(guó)家財(cái)政收入中的地位越來(lái)越重要,這大大提升了對(duì)稅權(quán)的合法性、正當(dāng)性等方面的要求。然而,中國(guó)的稅權(quán)配置方式依然沿襲過(guò)往的行政化路徑,沒(méi)有適時(shí)調(diào)整及擺脫對(duì)“人治”路徑的依賴(lài),未能很好地適應(yīng)當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的要求,從而導(dǎo)致實(shí)踐中諸多問(wèn)題的產(chǎn)生。 (5)構(gòu)建更加符合中國(guó)國(guó)情的稅收分權(quán)指標(biāo)——地方稅收自給率,實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,近年來(lái)中國(guó)的稅收分權(quán)狀況并不利于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。
[Abstract]:The China are gradually from a "- state" to "tax" transformation, put forward new requirements for national governance. Tax right, is the logical starting point and the core of tax law and tax research, is a kind of scarce resources. As an institutional arrangement, allocation of tax rights for the effect of Q the social economy is profound. In fact, there are many problems in China economy in recent years can be found in the root of tax power allocation, it has important theoretical and practical significance to strengthen the research on this problem.
The existing research, law circles and economic circles basically are quite distinct from each other, rarely combine the two academic achievements. The tax right allocation involves the fundamental power of the country, with the complexity and particularity, simple from law or economics point of view, the problem is not enough to analyze clearly. In the current academic circles, especially the field of economics, research on tax power is weak, the research ideas and methods of law and economics, in-depth discussion on the allocation of right of tax China central and local governments will become a try in this paper.
The core problem of this thesis is: the central and local tax power allocation is in accordance with the China efficiency and fairness standard? What is the institutional reasons behind it? Around this problem, this paper mainly adopts the literature investigation, equilibrium analysis, statistical analysis, historical analysis, comparative analysis, game theory, the theory of tax debt relation as the research starting point, in the method of rational choice in economics analysis, the central paradigm, behavior selection and motivation of local; study from different angles of the central and local tax power allocation is efficiency and fairness; from the supply system, causes the allocation of tax power is not fair and efficiency loss of the demand level and on the basis of research and practice. On the optimization of path configuration China tax right choice.
The core point of this paper is: the crux of the current tax allocation in China lies in the decentralization way of administration. The rule of tax right is based on the starting point of fairness. The total cost is the minimum and the most efficient. The optimization of Chinese tax allocation should follow the path of rule of law.
(1) the innovation of research perspective. Based on the theory of tax debt relation as the logical starting point, research efficiency, fair allocation of tax rights as a measure of the standard of law and economics; rational choice paradigm based on the analysis of the central and local governments in the allocation of tax rights in the behavior of dynamic investigation of Chinese tax decentralization, and to explore the the causes of the existing tax decentralization mode from the aspect of system. Compared with traditional law, the configuration of the central and local tax power path analysis of economics, this paper make a breakthrough in the research perspective and ideas.
(2) equity and efficiency of Taxation configuration concept. On the basis of the application of efficiency, fairness index were considered based on the allocation of central and local tax power, to further explore the root causes of the problems in the current China tax decentralization is the starting point of the institutional arrangement of injustice, namely the Administration of the tax power allocation. The rule of law is the right of tax correction lack of administrative decentralization, the starting point of the fair is not only helpful to the realization of fairness, but also conducive to the long-term efficiency.
(3) the tax right lateral, vertical configuration combination. There is not an isolated two dimensions of the configuration of the tax right. In the discussion on the allocation of tax power between the central and local government, combined with the horizontal configuration, that Chinese longitudinal imbalance in the allocation of tax power sources out of control in the transverse configuration. Therefore, although the effect of longitudinal the economic decentralization is more significant, but the solution of the problem is ultimately attributed to the horizontal configuration of tax legislative power, the right of tax law proposed path selection more convincing.
(4) analysis of changes in ownership structure influence on the allocation of tax rights. Under the environment of market economy, the rapid development of the private economy from the "private sector" tax revenue plays a more and more important in the national fiscal revenue, which greatly enhanced the legitimacy of tax right, when positive and other aspects of the request however, the allocation of tax power Chinese still followed the administrative path of the past, not timely adjustment and get rid of the dependence on the "rule of man" path, the current economic development can't adapt to the requirements of good, which leads to many problems in the practice.
(5) build a tax decentralization index, which is more consistent with China's national conditions, the local tax self-sufficiency rate. The empirical results show that China's tax decentralization in recent years is not conducive to economic growth.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】:F812.42;D90-059
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 吳瀚;;稅收分權(quán)下中央政府與地方政府博弈分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)界(學(xué)術(shù)版);2015年11期
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 李X;中國(guó)地方稅體系改革研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2015年
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