本文選題：擁堵定價　切入點(diǎn)：車牌管制　出處：《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(季刊)》2017年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：本文建立了一個包含公交與私車兩種交通模式的擁堵定價模型,并分別以一人一票及福利加權(quán)兩種投票制度討論民眾對車牌拍賣、搖號及混合管制政策的態(tài)度。結(jié)果表明,若政府從無管制狀態(tài)引入管制,在一人一票制下,民眾將反對任何一種管制政策,但對混合制的反對力度最小,對拍賣反對力度最大;在福利加權(quán)制投票下,民眾通過拍賣管制,而反對另外兩種管制�？梢娀旌现剖钦檻]民眾公平意愿的優(yōu)選政策,而拍賣將是效率優(yōu)先的最優(yōu)選擇。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a congestion pricing model with two traffic modes, public transport and private traffic, is established, and the public attitudes towards license plate auction, lottery and mixed regulation are discussed with one-person, one-vote and welfare-weighted voting system respectively. If the government introduces regulation from a unregulated state, under the "one person, one vote" system, the public will oppose any kind of regulatory policy, but the opposition to the mixed system will be the least, and the opposition to auctions will be the strongest; under the welfare weighted voting system, Through auction regulation, people oppose the other two kinds of regulation. It can be seen that the mixed system is the preferential choice policy of the government concerned about the people's fair will, and the auction will be the best choice of efficiency priority.
【作者單位】： 西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究院;成都大學(xué)政治學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目(71101117) 中央高�；緲I(yè)務(wù)專項(xiàng)費(fèi)(JBK130502)的資助
【分類號】：D631.5
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本文編號：1580369