法律事實概念的再認(rèn)識
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-18 16:36
【摘要】：德國潘德克頓法學(xué)的代表人物薩維尼認(rèn)為,作為私法上法律效果最主要內(nèi)容的法律關(guān)系的動態(tài)運行必須具備兩個前提要素：首先是特殊的法律規(guī)則,其次是符合法律規(guī)則假設(shè)的具體生活事實。作為抽象法律規(guī)則和具體法律關(guān)系的中間橋梁,法律事實被作為一個獨立的私法概念而提出。薩維尼第一次將法律事實作為一個成熟的理論而論述道：“我將引起法律關(guān)系開始和結(jié)束的事件稱為法律事實。所有法律事實的共同點在于,通過它們,特定人的法律關(guān)系會在時間中產(chǎn)生某些變化�！崩^承了德國潘德克頓法學(xué)的主要精神,我國傳統(tǒng)的法學(xué)理論將法律事實的概念幾乎如出一轍地界定為“法律規(guī)定的,能夠引起法律關(guān)系產(chǎn)生、變更和消滅的現(xiàn)象”。 而站在法學(xué)方法指導(dǎo)疑難案件裁判,以及應(yīng)然權(quán)利保護的角度,傳統(tǒng)理論在界定法律事實概念時所采用的三方面標(biāo)準(zhǔn)均存在缺陷,即形式、表現(xiàn)與題材。形式標(biāo)準(zhǔn)使用法律規(guī)則作為前置條件,人為限縮了法律事實可以采擷的題材范圍,潛藏著權(quán)利保護被拒絕的風(fēng)險；外在的表現(xiàn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)無視法律事實并非“引起法律關(guān)系產(chǎn)生、變更和消滅”的必要條件,而把后者誤讀為法律事實的本質(zhì)屬性；而題材標(biāo)準(zhǔn)則冗雜了與人類社會生活無關(guān)的自然現(xiàn)象,人為擴大了法律事實的題材空間。 基于生活事實與法律事實實際上存在著的派生與被派生的關(guān)系。我們將生活事實作為法律事實的題材來源和采擷空間,選擇從生活事實的自身定義及其與法律事實之間的邏輯關(guān)系出發(fā),找尋界定法律事實概念的應(yīng)然標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在形式方面,為妥善劃分法內(nèi)、法外空間,兼顧司法實踐中的形式正義與實質(zhì)正義、普遍正義與個案正義,選取包含法律規(guī)則、原則及習(xí)慣的法律規(guī)范作為界定法律事實概念的形式性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在實質(zhì)方面,基于法產(chǎn)生的原初目的在于劃定自由邊界、維護正當(dāng)權(quán)利,選取權(quán)利保護的訴求作為界定法律事實概念的實質(zhì)性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在程序方面,基于法律事實的真實面相應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)玫阶畲笙薅鹊倪�原,以及系爭生活事實應(yīng)當(dāng)經(jīng)歷“最高認(rèn)識水平”檢驗的目的,選取訴訟程序作為界定法律事實概念的程序性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在主體方面,為了使發(fā)生在過去時間和法庭之外的事實在法庭之中得以合乎情理的重構(gòu),選取多方訴訟主體的共同參與和法官的最終認(rèn)定作為界定法律事實概念的主體性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 在新的應(yīng)然標(biāo)準(zhǔn)下,重新界定后的法律事實同樣具有全新的構(gòu)成要件、內(nèi)在特征和分類方式。它由時間與空間、主體與客體、權(quán)利、證據(jù)及法律關(guān)系五個要件構(gòu)成。具有權(quán)利主張性、合規(guī)范性與具體性、聯(lián)系性與完整性、權(quán)威性與終局性的內(nèi)在特征。依據(jù)所主張權(quán)利性質(zhì)的不同、權(quán)利效力來源的不同、對立方主體的存在與否,法律事實可以不同方式加以分類。法官認(rèn)定事實的過程是在訴訟法規(guī)范及證據(jù)規(guī)則規(guī)制下的法定程序空間內(nèi),多方主體參與下完成的一個從具體到抽象交替推進,最后歸之于具體的過程。該過程可概略描述為：具體(生活事實)——抽象(事實構(gòu)成)——具體(法律事實)——抽象(規(guī)范意義的法律關(guān)系)——具體(事實意義的法律關(guān)系)�？傮w觀之,該過程亦即人們所常說的“認(rèn)定事實”和“適用法律”的統(tǒng)合。 用發(fā)展的眼光、秉持揚棄的精神,對法律事實概念進行再認(rèn)識,無論于理論抑或?qū)嵺`,其意義有三：首先,有助于深化對法律本質(zhì)屬性的認(rèn)知；其次,有助于重述法律確定性的應(yīng)有之義；第三,有助于促進制定法的完善。
[Abstract]:Savigny, a representative of Pandekton Law in Germany, holds that the dynamic operation of legal relations, as the main content of legal effects in private law, must have two prerequisites: first, special legal rules, and secondly, concrete facts of life which conform to the hypothesis of legal rules. Savigny first described legal facts as a mature theory: "I call the events that cause the beginning and the end of legal relations legal facts legal facts. The common point of all legal facts is that, through them, the legal relationship of a particular person will be in time." It has inherited the main spirit of German Pandekton's jurisprudence, and the concept of legal fact is almost identically defined in Chinese traditional jurisprudence as "the phenomenon of legal relationship arising, changing and extinguishing as provided by law".
From the point of view of jurisprudence to guide the adjudication of difficult cases and the protection of due rights, the three standards adopted by traditional theories in defining the concept of legal facts have defects, namely, form, expression and subject matter. There is a risk that the protection of rights will be refused; the external standard of performance ignores the fact that the legal fact is not a necessary condition for "causing the legal relationship to arise, change and disappear", but misinterprets the latter as the essential attribute of the legal fact; while the subject standard misinterprets the natural phenomenon unrelated to human social life and artificially enlarges the legal fact. Theme space.
Based on the relationship between the derivation and the derivation of the fact of life and the fact of law, we regard the fact of life as the source of the subject matter of the fact of law and the space to collect it. We choose to find the standard to define the concept of the fact of law from the definition of the fact of life and its logical relationship with the fact of law. In order to properly divide the inner and outer space of the law, give consideration to both formal justice and substantive justice in judicial practice, universal justice and case justice, legal norms including legal rules, principles and customary legal norms are selected as the formal criteria for defining the concept of legal facts. As for procedure, the truth based on legal facts should be restored to the maximum extent, and the contention for life facts should go through the purpose of "the highest level of understanding" test. Procedure is chosen as the process of defining the concept of legal facts. On the subject, in order to reconstruct the facts which happened in the past time and outside the court reasonably in the court, we choose the joint participation of multi-party litigant subjects and the final determination of judges as the subjective criteria to define the concept of legal facts.
Under the new standard of due course, the redefined legal facts also have new elements, intrinsic characteristics and classification. They are composed of five elements: time and space, subject and object, right, evidence and legal relationship. According to the nature of the claim, the source of the validity of the right, the existence of the main body of the opposite party or not, the legal facts can be classified in different ways. The process can be briefly described as: concrete (facts of life) - Abstract (facts of fact) - concrete (facts of law) - Abstract (legal relations of normative meaning) - concrete (legal relations of factual meaning). In general, the process is also known as "factual affirmation" and "factual affirmation". The integration of "applicable law".
From the perspective of development and adhering to the spirit of sublation, there are three meanings of re-understanding the concept of legal facts, whether in theory or in practice. First, it is helpful to deepen the understanding of the nature of law; second, it is helpful to restate the due meaning of legal certainty; third, it is helpful to promote the perfection of statutory law.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D90
本文編號：2190047
[Abstract]:Savigny, a representative of Pandekton Law in Germany, holds that the dynamic operation of legal relations, as the main content of legal effects in private law, must have two prerequisites: first, special legal rules, and secondly, concrete facts of life which conform to the hypothesis of legal rules. Savigny first described legal facts as a mature theory: "I call the events that cause the beginning and the end of legal relations legal facts legal facts. The common point of all legal facts is that, through them, the legal relationship of a particular person will be in time." It has inherited the main spirit of German Pandekton's jurisprudence, and the concept of legal fact is almost identically defined in Chinese traditional jurisprudence as "the phenomenon of legal relationship arising, changing and extinguishing as provided by law".
From the point of view of jurisprudence to guide the adjudication of difficult cases and the protection of due rights, the three standards adopted by traditional theories in defining the concept of legal facts have defects, namely, form, expression and subject matter. There is a risk that the protection of rights will be refused; the external standard of performance ignores the fact that the legal fact is not a necessary condition for "causing the legal relationship to arise, change and disappear", but misinterprets the latter as the essential attribute of the legal fact; while the subject standard misinterprets the natural phenomenon unrelated to human social life and artificially enlarges the legal fact. Theme space.
Based on the relationship between the derivation and the derivation of the fact of life and the fact of law, we regard the fact of life as the source of the subject matter of the fact of law and the space to collect it. We choose to find the standard to define the concept of the fact of law from the definition of the fact of life and its logical relationship with the fact of law. In order to properly divide the inner and outer space of the law, give consideration to both formal justice and substantive justice in judicial practice, universal justice and case justice, legal norms including legal rules, principles and customary legal norms are selected as the formal criteria for defining the concept of legal facts. As for procedure, the truth based on legal facts should be restored to the maximum extent, and the contention for life facts should go through the purpose of "the highest level of understanding" test. Procedure is chosen as the process of defining the concept of legal facts. On the subject, in order to reconstruct the facts which happened in the past time and outside the court reasonably in the court, we choose the joint participation of multi-party litigant subjects and the final determination of judges as the subjective criteria to define the concept of legal facts.
Under the new standard of due course, the redefined legal facts also have new elements, intrinsic characteristics and classification. They are composed of five elements: time and space, subject and object, right, evidence and legal relationship. According to the nature of the claim, the source of the validity of the right, the existence of the main body of the opposite party or not, the legal facts can be classified in different ways. The process can be briefly described as: concrete (facts of life) - Abstract (facts of fact) - concrete (facts of law) - Abstract (legal relations of normative meaning) - concrete (legal relations of factual meaning). In general, the process is also known as "factual affirmation" and "factual affirmation". The integration of "applicable law".
From the perspective of development and adhering to the spirit of sublation, there are three meanings of re-understanding the concept of legal facts, whether in theory or in practice. First, it is helpful to deepen the understanding of the nature of law; second, it is helpful to restate the due meaning of legal certainty; third, it is helpful to promote the perfection of statutory law.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D90
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