INTRODUCTION介紹

多邊貿易體制的基石知識產權是經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的最佳途徑是非歧視性的貿易模式，逐步降低關稅，以及阻礙貿易流動的非關稅貿易壁壘，消除實現(xiàn)。盡管如此，在世界貿易組織（WTO）的非歧視原則是遠離教條。到非歧視原則的兩個最顯著例外榮譽，在違反最惠國（MFN）義務是：（1）已經(jīng)激增，在過去的二十年，而且?guī)装賲^(qū)域貿易安排不斷增加， （2）關稅與貿易（GATT）總協(xié)定和世貿組織的多邊貿易協(xié)定（MTA的）延伸優(yōu)惠待遇的發(fā)展中國家（在WTO的說法“特殊和差別待遇”）中發(fā)現(xiàn)的許多規(guī)定。
特殊和差別待遇的有利于發(fā)展中國家的法律基礎是普遍優(yōu)惠制度。自1971年以來，在中，普遍優(yōu)惠制（GSP）首次關貿總協(xié)定授權下主持今年，GSP已經(jīng)成為發(fā)達國家的貿易政策夾具。普惠制標志著其在2011年的適當時機成立40周年問GSP與否仍然是相關的。在2008年的報告，，美國國會研究服務給了以下幾部件不到樂觀的評價：在2006年的報告美國國會研究服務注意到20世紀70年代和80年代，其結論是GSP已經(jīng)有同樣的報告指出對發(fā)展中國家exports.6一個促進作用研究然而，GSP福利由美國方案的幾個特點的限制。 2005年，例如，從普惠制受惠國進口美國的不到10％了普惠制免稅待遇的優(yōu)勢。大多數(shù)的，共有GSP合格的產品被排除在外，最常見的，因為它們要么超出了特定產品的競爭需要限制或者因為他們不符合普惠制原產地規(guī)則。加劇的情況是，任何給定的給予優(yōu)惠國家的GSP資格的產品清單可以隨時間變化而不是所有捐助國作出同樣的產品普惠制資格。換句話說，捐助國不配合他們與其他捐助國各自的普惠制方案。

The intellectual keystone of the multilateral trade system is that economic development is best achieved through non-discriminatory trade patterns, the progressive reduction of tariffs, and the elimination of nontariff barriers that impede trade flows.1 Still, the principle of non-discrimination at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is far from dogma. The two most significant exceptions to the non-discrimination principle that honor the most-favored- nation (MFN) obligation in the breach are (1) the hundreds of regional trade arrangements that have proliferated over the past two decades and that continue to increase,2 and (2) the numerous provisions found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the WTO multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) that extend preferential treatment to developing countries (“special and differential treatment” in WTO parlance).
The legal cornerstone of special and differential treatment in favor of developing countries is the Generalized System of Preferences. Since 1971—the year in which the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was first authorized under GATT auspices—GSP has become a fixture in the trade policies of developed countries.4 The GSP marked its 40th anniversary in 2011, an appropriate occasion to ask whether or not GSP remains relevant. In a 2008 report the Congressional Research Service gave thefollowing less than sanguine appraisal:In a 2006 report the Congressional Research Service noted studies from the 1970s and 1980s which concluded that GSP has had a stimulative effect on developing countries’ exports.6 That same report observed, however, that GSP benefits are limited by several features of the U.S. program. In 2005, for example, less than 10 percent of U.S. imports from GSP beneficiary countries took advantage of GSP duty-free treatment. The majority of products that were GSP eligible were excluded, most often because they either exceeded the competitive need limit for a specific product or because they did not satisfy the GSP rule of origin.7 Exacerbating the situation is that any given preference-granting countries’ list of GSP-eligible products can change over time and not all donor countries make the same products GSP eligible. In other words, donor countries do not coordinate their respective GSP programs with other donor countries.


I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF S&D TREATMENT AT GATT AND THE WTO
II. MAKING THE 1971 GSP WAIVER PERMANENT: THE ENABLING CLAUSE
III. GSP CONDITIONALITY PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, INTEGRATING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INTO THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM


To quote an African proverb, “The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago. The next best time is now.” It is time to move beyond conditionality in GSP programs and to come to terms with the looming shrinking margin of preference. At UNCTAD’s inaugural conference in 1964, developing countries asserted that one of the major impediments to= their accelerated economic growth and development was their inability to compete with developed countries in the international trading system; the developing countries argued that preferential tariffs would allow them to increase exports and foreign exchange earnings necessary to diversify their economies and reduce dependence on foreign aid. The rationale for trade preferences was that poorer countries need to develop industrial capacity for manufacturing in order to move away from dependence on imports and production of traditional commodities that could be subject to declining prices in the long term. It was argued that poorer countries also needed time to retain some protection to develop their “infant industries,” but that increases in exports would be necessary to help countries develop economies of scale in production and earn foreign exchange. In addition, it was evident that some provision for the elimination of preferences once the industries were firmly established was necessary. The argument was that trade preferences should be temporary, introduced for a period of no less than 10 years with respect to any given industry in any developing country. At the end of the 10-year period, preferences would be withdrawn unless it could be shown that special circumstances warranted their continuation. At the second UNCTAD conference in 1968, the United States joined other participants in supporting a resolution to establish a mutually acceptable system of preferences. In order to permit the implementation of a generalized system of preferences, in June 1971 developed countries were granted a 10-year waiver from their international legal obligations under GATT. Following the grant of this waiver, developed countries created their national GSP programs, and Congress enacted the U.S. GSP program in January 1975. The United States maintained that GSP was a temporary program to advance trade liberalization in the developing world, but it recognized the need to address the legal basis for granting these preferences in anticipation of the expiration of the waiver in 1981. An agreement was reached at the 1979 conclusion of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, known as the “Enabling Clause,” which has no expiration date and replaced the waiver.

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