論文題目：CEO compensation and firm performance
論文語言：英語論文 English
論文專業(yè)：金融
字?jǐn)?shù)：11000
學(xué)校國家：英國
是否有數(shù)據(jù)處理要求：是
您的學(xué)校：英國名校 全英前十 金融學(xué)全英第二
論文用于：Master Dissertation 碩士畢業(yè)論文
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因?yàn)樯洗握撐臎]過，只有一次重交機(jī)會，請務(wù)必保證質(zhì)量。
需要建模和進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究，用stata進(jìn)行分析
不需要開題報(bào)告
論文可用Harvard style
文獻(xiàn)大概30-40個


Abstract摘要


CEO的薪酬是為大量學(xué)術(shù)研究的熱點(diǎn)之一。因此，本文的主要目的是通過檢查的總體非金融業(yè)CEO薪酬與公司業(yè)績之間的聯(lián)系。在美國公司的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與CEO薪酬之間的關(guān)系已經(jīng)成為越來越多的問題為企業(yè)，以便確定CEO的薪酬與企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略是否包括考慮。更重要的是，CEO的薪酬，公司業(yè)績和股東財(cái)富應(yīng)該保持組成為好。有許多研究都集中在現(xiàn)代商業(yè)世界（AGGARWAL和Samwick，1999年，，考夫蘭和施密特，1985年，蘭伯特和拉克爾，1987）高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。薪酬與公司績效指標(biāo)的信息可以從2007年至2011年期間在這篇文章中Execucomp和數(shù)據(jù)庫Compustat的OLS回歸測試將實(shí)施證明補(bǔ)償?shù)纫蛩刂g的薪酬與公司業(yè)績之間以及鏈接。CEO compensation is one of the hot topics for a large number of academic researchers. Therefore, the paper mainly aims to examine the links between CEO compensation and firm performance through the overall non-financial industry. The relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in US firms has become a increasing issue for corporations to consider in order to determine whether CEO compensation and corporation strategy are consist. More importantly, CEO compensation, firm performance and shareholders' wealth should keep consist as well. There are many studies have focused on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the modern business world (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999, Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The information of compensation and firm performance indicator is available on Execucomp and Compustat database from the period 2007 to 2011. In this essay, an OLS regression test will be implemented to prove the links between compensation and firm performance and that between compensation and other determinants. 

Content 

Chapter 1 Introduction 4
Chapter 2 Literature Review 6
2.1 The relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation 6
2.2 The relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance 9
2.2.1 Jensen and Murphy’s work on executive compensation 9
3.1 The factors influencing CEO compensation 11
3.1.1 The data source 11
3.1.2 Variables 12
3.1.3 Relations hypothesis 12
3.1.4 Descriptive Statistics 13
3.1.5 Correlation analysis on CEOs compensation, firm size and firm performance 16
3.2 Regression analysis 17
3.2.1 The factor analysis on CEO compensation 17
3.2.2 The robustness test 19
3.3 Principal component analysis 19
Chapter 4 Small sample analysis 20
4.1 Sample 20
4.2 Methodology 20
4.3 Empirical results and discussion 21
4.3.1 Differences in corporate governance practices between US and German firms 21
4.3.2 Differences of compensation structure between US and German firms 24
Chapter 5 Results and Conclusion 26
5.1 Empirical Results 26
5.2 Reasonable corporate governance system 27
5.3 Improving the performance appraisal system of executive team 29
5.4 Deficiencies and Prospects 30
5.5 Limitations 31
5.6 Conclusion 31


1.1 Research background and Purpose研究背景和目的


The American subprime crisis has lead to financial crisis in the global financial market as well as the real economy. The economic confidence of the global economy has been hit greatly. Therefore, corporations in different countries have decided to decrease compensation of CEOs in order to reduce the burden of corporations(你這句開頭我以為你準(zhǔn)備寫2008年以后的，并且是寫financial industry). The relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in US firms has become a increasing issue for corporations to consider in order to determine whether CEO compensation and corporation strategy are consist. More importantly, CEO compensation, firm performance and shareholders' wealth should keep consist as well. There are many studies have focused on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the modern business world (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999, Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The compensation packages for chief executive officers (CEOs) have drawn lots of attention from scholars all over the world. Added to this, many researchers have argued that corporate governance mechanism also plays an important role in determining the level of CEO compensation. It has been indicated that the level of CEO compensation in the US has increased from year to year, but the correlation relationship between the increase rate of CEO compensation and increase rate of firm performance is not always positive (Kaplan, 2008). It has been shown that since 2001, a series of corporate failures and scandals occur in the US such as Enron and WorldCom which has lead to the issue of Sarbances - Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. As a result, it is very essential for firms in the US to establish sound corporate governance mechanisms in order to avoid corporate failures and scandals.

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