發(fā)布時(shí)間：2016-03-15 17:28

Abstract 

在EC - 特惠關(guān)稅，上訴機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)為，世貿(mào)組織授權(quán)條款允許發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家比給別人，在一定條件下給予更好的關(guān)稅待遇，一些發(fā)展中國(guó)家。它還認(rèn)為，這些條件未得到歐盟的所謂“藥物的安排”，額外自選設(shè)置的系統(tǒng)（通常免稅處理），歐盟已經(jīng)決定均需要特殊的關(guān)稅優(yōu)惠某些國(guó)家見面，感謝他們參與打擊毒品生產(chǎn)和販運(yùn)。針對(duì)這一裁決，當(dāng)歐盟在2005年重申了其普惠制方案，它取代了毒品安排和兩個(gè)相似的，雖然不那么大方，勞工和環(huán)境與俗稱的“GSP +安排”的新安排安排。在這種安排下，，額外的關(guān)稅優(yōu)惠（一般免稅待遇），分別提供給發(fā)展中國(guó)家的承諾批準(zhǔn)和執(zhí)行人權(quán)和良好治理公約清單。根據(jù)歐盟普惠制+安排與授權(quán)條款的上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的解釋的規(guī)定。本文認(rèn)為，事實(shí)并非如此。這是因?yàn)槭紫龋瑲W盟選擇的選擇GSP +受益者實(shí)質(zhì)性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，不符合上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差分關(guān)稅待遇的發(fā)展中國(guó)家。其次，這是因?yàn)闅W盟的要求，即可能的受益者必須在某一日期已經(jīng)應(yīng)用，復(fù)制受益人“封閉名單”，這是致命的歐盟普惠制方案的早期化身的問題。文章最后設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)GSP +安排更容易滿足上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的條件比歐盟目前的安排提出了一些建議。In EC – Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body held that the WTO Enabling Clause permitted developed countries to grant better tariff treatment to some developing countries than to others, subject to certain conditions. It held further that these conditions were not met by the EU’s so-called ‘drugs arrangement’, a system of additional preferences (normally duty free treatment) for certain countries which the EU had determined were in need of special tariff preferences, thanks to their involvement in combating the production and trafficking of narcotics. In response to this ruling, when the EU renewed its GSP program in 2005, it replaced its drugs arrangement and two similar, though less generous, labour and environment arrangements with a new arrangement popularly known as the ‘GSP+ arrangement’. Under this arrangement, additional tariff preferences (normally duty free treatment), were made available to developing countries committing to ratify and implement a list of human rights and good governance conventions. According to the EU, the GSP+ arrangement complies with the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the Enabling Clause. This article argues that it does not. This is firstly because of the substantive criteria chosen by the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries, which do not meet the Appellate Body’s criteria for differential tariff treatment of developing countries. Second, it is because the EU’s requirement that would-be beneficiaries must have applied by a certain date, replicates the problem of the ‘closed list’ of beneficiaries that was fatal to the earlier incarnation of the EU’s GSP program. The article concludes with some suggestions for designing a GSP+ arrangement more likely to meet the Appellate Body’s conditions than the EU’s present arrangement.

I. The GSP+ arrangement
II. WTO rules
III. Application of WTO rules to GSP+ arrangement
IV. An alternative
Annex
Conventions referred to in Article 9 of the EU GSP Regulation





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