【摘要】：反壟斷執(zhí)法對(duì)中國(guó)和國(guó)際的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)格局產(chǎn)生了重要的影響,本文以反壟斷執(zhí)法的法律制衡機(jī)制為研究對(duì)象,分析了現(xiàn)行反壟斷執(zhí)法架構(gòu)存在的問(wèn)題和造成的后果,運(yùn)用權(quán)力制衡理論、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)政策理論、軟法與硬法理論在反壟斷法中的應(yīng)用,探討在反壟斷執(zhí)法中反壟斷法律和政策的合法有效適用,研究了反壟斷執(zhí)法程序內(nèi)部的制衡和外部司法部門的法律制衡。通過(guò)對(duì)行政處罰執(zhí)法與監(jiān)督程序、行政處罰自由裁量權(quán)、寬大政策、行政指導(dǎo)等問(wèn)題的研究,理出現(xiàn)在的反壟斷執(zhí)法體制存在的問(wèn)題。并根據(jù)我國(guó)行政體制改革的現(xiàn)狀與需要,提出建立中國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)委員會(huì)、行政處罰委員會(huì)、審裁分離、實(shí)行行政法官、建立競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法庭的必要和實(shí)施辦法。本文由引言、正文與結(jié)論組成,引言部分介紹了本文的研究背景與現(xiàn)狀、研究目的與內(nèi)容、研究思路與方法、以及創(chuàng)新與不足之處。結(jié)論部分概括了本文的主要結(jié)論。正文部分由五章組成。第一章介紹了三大法律制衡的理論的發(fā)展,探究反壟斷行政執(zhí)法法律制衡的基本法學(xué)理論,探討了三大理論對(duì)反壟斷法及執(zhí)法的影響。首先分析了權(quán)力制衡理論的基礎(chǔ)和發(fā)展,總結(jié)和洛克、孟德斯鳩、漢密爾頓的分權(quán)與制衡理論,研究了古典學(xué)派的自由競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、新古典學(xué)派的完善競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論在反壟斷執(zhí)法中的發(fā)展和適用,又對(duì)軟法和硬法理論在行政執(zhí)法中的重要作用進(jìn)行了剖析。在此基礎(chǔ)上總結(jié)了權(quán)力制衡理論、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論和軟硬法結(jié)合理論是反壟斷執(zhí)法法律制衡的法律基礎(chǔ),我國(guó)反壟斷執(zhí)法部門的構(gòu)成、權(quán)力設(shè)置、救濟(jì)和監(jiān)督都體現(xiàn)了權(quán)力制衡,反壟斷執(zhí)法中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)政策的考量、壟斷行為對(duì)市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和損害后果的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析體現(xiàn)了對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論在反壟斷執(zhí)法中的重要作用。闡釋了需要在執(zhí)法實(shí)踐中加強(qiáng)三理論作用,對(duì)反壟斷司法制衡、執(zhí)法部門內(nèi)部制衡進(jìn)行調(diào)整的必要性。分析了反壟斷執(zhí)法理論對(duì)執(zhí)法的影響。首先,權(quán)力制衡理論在反壟斷執(zhí)法中得到應(yīng)用,現(xiàn)行的反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)的設(shè)置體現(xiàn)了權(quán)力制衡,其次競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論在反壟斷執(zhí)法中發(fā)揮重要影響,歐美國(guó)家在反壟斷執(zhí)法中運(yùn)用競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論對(duì)我國(guó)反壟斷執(zhí)法產(chǎn)生啟示和影響,再次分析了軟硬法兼施在反壟斷執(zhí)法中的社會(huì)效果,行政處罰自由裁量權(quán)和反壟斷行政指導(dǎo)在反壟斷執(zhí)法中地位明顯。提出了因?yàn)閳?zhí)法內(nèi)部的制衡導(dǎo)致反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)執(zhí)法效率不高等問(wèn)題。第二章提出了我國(guó)反壟斷行政執(zhí)法呈現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題,由于反壟斷執(zhí)法部門的授權(quán)范圍、初步調(diào)查權(quán)的設(shè)定、中止調(diào)查和承諾規(guī)定、寬免政策、聽證規(guī)定等執(zhí)法程序設(shè)定不同導(dǎo)致執(zhí)法后果差異,結(jié)合實(shí)際案例探討由于執(zhí)法部門規(guī)章不同導(dǎo)致造成的反壟斷法分裂執(zhí)行和執(zhí)法條塊化和威權(quán)不足的后果。著重分析了發(fā)改委和工商總局兩執(zhí)法部門在執(zhí)法風(fēng)格和執(zhí)法方式及執(zhí)法透明度不同形成的執(zhí)法競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和效率低下,反壟斷程序不完善、自由裁量權(quán)過(guò)大導(dǎo)致行政相對(duì)人合法權(quán)益不能得到有效保障及司法對(duì)反壟斷執(zhí)法審查力度不夠和問(wèn)題。第三章分析了反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)制衡與效果。首先分析了反壟斷執(zhí)法部門之間制衡的狀態(tài)及存在的問(wèn)題,認(rèn)為存在著反壟斷職責(zé)交叉、執(zhí)法力度和執(zhí)法認(rèn)定方式、執(zhí)法效果不同導(dǎo)致形成執(zhí)法條塊分割,進(jìn)一步造成對(duì)反壟斷法的執(zhí)法肢解。第二對(duì)反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部制衡包括執(zhí)法程序、執(zhí)法監(jiān)督方式進(jìn)行了梳理,包括舉報(bào)、受理、現(xiàn)場(chǎng)檢查、收集證據(jù)、聽證、行政處罰送達(dá)、行政復(fù)議和訴訟整體程序進(jìn)行剖析,對(duì)比法國(guó)和歐盟委員會(huì)、日本在反壟斷執(zhí)法中遵守的程序理清中國(guó)反壟斷執(zhí)法部門中存在的問(wèn)題。再次分析了中國(guó)反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)上下級(jí)的法律制衡,反壟斷行政執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)通過(guò)行政授權(quán)、行政復(fù)議和行政訴訟形成制約關(guān)系,認(rèn)為新的行政復(fù)議法和行政訴訟法修改后,上級(jí)反壟斷執(zhí)法部門與下級(jí)反壟斷執(zhí)法部門的制衡作用更為明顯。第四章對(duì)司法部門對(duì)反壟斷執(zhí)法的制衡進(jìn)行了研究,結(jié)合了國(guó)際和國(guó)內(nèi)反壟斷司法的最新實(shí)踐。首先對(duì)反壟斷民事訴訟中法院認(rèn)定和反壟斷行政執(zhí)法部門執(zhí)法決定約束力的探討,法院和反壟斷行政執(zhí)法部門在實(shí)體案例判斷中的沖突解決。并對(duì)法院對(duì)反壟斷行政執(zhí)法決定的司法審查中的問(wèn)題如新修的行政訴訟法對(duì)法院司法審查反壟斷執(zhí)法決定的影響、司法審查對(duì)反壟斷執(zhí)法的促進(jìn)效應(yīng)、行政壟斷違法主體認(rèn)定對(duì)司法審查效果的影響進(jìn)行研究,提出學(xué)習(xí)歐美建立司法審查對(duì)反壟斷行政執(zhí)法的尊重權(quán)制度。還分析了反壟斷行政執(zhí)法的司法審查重點(diǎn),對(duì)反壟斷訴訟案件中舉證責(zé)任的分配、法院對(duì)反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)關(guān)濫用行政處罰自由裁量權(quán)的制約進(jìn)行了研究�？偟膩�(lái)說(shuō),本章通過(guò)對(duì)反壟斷司法對(duì)反壟斷行政執(zhí)法的司法審查實(shí)踐,進(jìn)一步說(shuō)明了現(xiàn)行的反壟斷司法法律制衡中不足。第五章是對(duì)權(quán)力制衡理論、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論、軟法與硬法相結(jié)合理論做出的進(jìn)一步適用,對(duì)前幾章分析的反壟斷執(zhí)法法律制衡中存在的制度性、結(jié)構(gòu)性、程序性問(wèn)題的具體解決辦法。針對(duì)三個(gè)反壟斷執(zhí)法部門的權(quán)利分散、執(zhí)法競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、效率不高、分解法律的情況提出構(gòu)建統(tǒng)一的反壟斷執(zhí)法部門中國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)委員會(huì),在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)委員會(huì)內(nèi)設(shè)行政處罰委員會(huì),實(shí)行裁審分離,反壟斷競(jìng)爭(zhēng)執(zhí)法局只負(fù)責(zé)調(diào)查案件由行政處罰委員會(huì)集體討論進(jìn)行案件定性和處罰。為增加執(zhí)法透明度和公正性,推行執(zhí)法全過(guò)程記錄制度,推行反壟斷行政處罰自由裁量權(quán)制度防止濫權(quán)和執(zhí)法不一,推行行政法官制度促進(jìn)執(zhí)法中立。為解決司法對(duì)反壟斷執(zhí)法的有效制衡提出建立競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法庭,統(tǒng)一審判反壟斷等競(jìng)爭(zhēng)案件,包括反壟斷民事訴訟和行政訴訟,建立優(yōu)秀穩(wěn)定的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法官隊(duì)伍,推行法院尊重行政的模式,建立均衡的司法和執(zhí)法系統(tǒng)執(zhí)行反壟斷法,促進(jìn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)政策的基礎(chǔ)性地位,建立統(tǒng)一有序、公平公正的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序。
[Abstract]:The anti-monopoly law enforcement has an important influence on the competition pattern of China and the international. This article takes the legal balance mechanism of antitrust law enforcement as the research object, analyzes the existing problems and consequences of the existing anti-monopoly law enforcement framework, and uses the theory of power balance, the theory of competition policy, the application of the soft law and the hard law theory in the antitrust law. The legal and effective application of antitrust laws and policies in antitrust law enforcement is discussed, and the checks and balances within the anti-monopoly law enforcement procedures and the legal balance of the external judicial departments are studied. Through the research on the law enforcement and supervision procedures of administrative penalties, the discretion of administrative penalties, the broad policy, and the administrative guidance, the antitrust enforcement has emerged. In accordance with the current situation and needs of the reform of the administrative system in China, the necessity and implementation methods of establishing the Chinese competition committee, the administrative penalty Committee, the trial and the separation, the administrative judges and the establishment of the competition court are put forward. The introduction, the text and the conclusion are made in this paper, and the introduction introduces the background and the present situation of this study. The purpose and content of the research, the research ideas and methods, and the innovation and deficiency. The conclusion part summarizes the main conclusions of this article. The main body is composed of five chapters. The first chapter introduces the development of the theory of the three legal checks and balances, explores the basic law theory of the counterbalance of the antitrust administrative law enforcement, and probes into the three major theories on the antitrust law and The influence of law enforcement. First, it analyzes the basis and development of the theory of power balance, sums up the theory of decentralization and balance between Rock, Montesquieu and Hamilton, and studies the free competition of the classical school, the perfect competition of the neoclassical school, the development and application of the effective competition theory in the antitrust law enforcement, and the administration of the soft and hard law theories. The important role of the law is analyzed. On this basis, the theory of balance of power is summed up. The theory of competition and the combination of soft and hard law is the legal basis of the counterbalance of the law of antitrust law enforcement. The constitution of the antitrust law enforcement department, the setting of power, the relief and supervision are all reflected in the balance of power, the consideration of the competition policy in the antitrust law enforcement, and the monopoly of the monopoly law enforcement. The economic analysis of the market competition and the consequences of the damage reflects the important role of the competition theory in the anti-monopoly law enforcement. It explains the necessity of strengthening the three theoretical role in the practice of law enforcement, the necessity of adjusting the counterbalance of the antitrust judicature and the internal balance of the law enforcement departments. First, the theory of power balance is applied in the antitrust law enforcement. The current setting of antitrust law enforcement agencies embodies the balance of power. Secondly, the theory of competition plays an important role in the law enforcement of antimonopoly. The social effect in the anti-monopoly law enforcement, the discretionary power of administrative punishment and the anti trust administrative guidance in the anti-monopoly law enforcement are obvious. The second chapter puts forward the problems of the anti-monopoly law enforcement in China because of the internal balance between the law enforcement and the anti trust law enforcement agencies. The scope of authorization of the Department, the setting of the preliminary investigation right, the discontinuance of the provisions of the investigation and commitment, the policy of wide exemption, the different setting of the law enforcement procedures, and the consequences of the fragmentation and enforcement of the antitrust law and the lack of authority due to the different rules and regulations of the law enforcement departments. The two law enforcement departments of the development and Reform Commission and the General Administration for Industry and Commerce have low law enforcement competition and low efficiency in law enforcement style, law enforcement mode and law enforcement transparency. The antitrust procedures are not perfect, and the excessive discretion has caused the legal rights and interests of the administrative counterpart to not be effectively guaranteed and the judicial review of the antitrust law enforcement is not enough and the problem is not enough. The three chapter analyzes the balance and effect of antitrust law enforcement agencies. First, it analyzes the state and existing problems of the counterbalance between the anti-monopoly law enforcement departments, and considers that there is a cross of antitrust duties, the enforcement of law enforcement and the way of law enforcement, the difference of law enforcement effect leads to the formation of law enforcement fragmentation, and further causes the dismemberment of the law enforcement of antitrust law. Two the internal checks and balances of the antitrust law enforcement agencies including the law enforcement procedure and the law enforcement supervision have been combed, including reporting, accepting, on-site inspection, collecting evidence, hearing, administrative punishment, administrative reconsideration and the whole procedure of litigation, compared with the French and European Commission, and the procedures of Japan in anti monopoly law enforcement to clarify China's counterpart. The problems existing in the monopoly law enforcement department are analyzed. The legal balance between the upper and lower levels of the anti monopoly law enforcement agencies of China is re analyzed. The anti monopoly administrative law enforcement agencies have restricted the relationship between administrative authorization, administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation. After the new administrative reconsideration law and administrative procedure law have been amended, the superior antitrust law enforcement departments and the lower antitrust enforcement agencies are held. The balance of the law department is more obvious. The fourth chapter studies the balance between the judicial department and the anti-monopoly law enforcement. It combines the latest practice of the international and domestic antitrust judicature. First, the court and the administrative law enforcement department of the antitrust administrative law enforcement departments are discussed. The influence of the new administrative procedure law on the decision of the antitrust law enforcement of the court's judicial review, the effect of the judicial review on the anti-monopoly law enforcement, the influence of the judicial review on the effect of the judicial review. On the basis of the study, the author puts forward the system of establishing the judicial review of the European and American judicial review on the administrative law enforcement of antitrust administrative law. It also analyzes the emphasis of the judicial review of the antitrust administrative law enforcement, the distribution of the burden of proof in the antitrust litigation cases, and the court's research on the restriction of the abuse of administrative punishment by the antitrust law enforcement agencies. This chapter, through the judicial review of antitrust judicial review on the administrative law enforcement of antitrust, further illustrates the shortcomings of the current antitrust judicial checks and balances. The fifth chapter is a further application of the theory of balance of power, competition theory, the combination of soft law and hard law, and the existence of the legal checks and balances of antitrust law enforcement in the previous chapters. A specific solution to the problems of institutional, structural and procedural problems. In view of the decentralization of the rights of the three anti-monopoly law enforcement departments, the competition of law enforcement, the low efficiency and the breakdown of the law, the Chinese Competition Commission of a unified antitrust law enforcement department is set up, and the administrative penalty committee is set up in the competition committee, the separation of trial and the antitrust competition is implemented. In order to increase the transparency and impartiality of the law enforcement, the law enforcement bureau is responsible for the investigation of cases by the administrative penalty Committee. In order to increase the transparency and impartiality of the law enforcement, the whole process of recording the process of law enforcement is carried out, the system of antitrust administrative penalty discretion is carried out to prevent the abuse of rights and law enforcement, and the administrative judge system is pushed to promote the neutrality of law enforcement. The effective counterbalance of antitrust law enforcement is put forward to establish competition tribunals, unified trial antitrust and other competitive cases, including anti-monopoly civil and administrative litigation, to establish an excellent and stable contingent of competitive judges, to carry out the court's mode of respect for administration, to establish a balanced judicial and law enforcement system to implement antitrust law and to promote the basis of competition policy. To establish a unified, orderly, fair and just market economic order.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：D922.294
，

本文編號(hào)：2161095