本文關(guān)鍵詞： 不對(duì)稱互動(dòng) 政策失靈 正常化 常態(tài)化 朝鮮核問(wèn)題　出處：《外交學(xué)院》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文的研究問(wèn)題是:為什么美國(guó)沒(méi)能使朝鮮棄核?這一問(wèn)題來(lái)源于美國(guó)對(duì)朝政策目標(biāo)與朝鮮半島核問(wèn)題實(shí)際發(fā)展路徑的反差,是對(duì)外政策效用的衍生問(wèn)題。基于朝鮮半島核問(wèn)題的結(jié)構(gòu)性矛盾,現(xiàn)有研究多從系統(tǒng)性視角出發(fā),將解釋方法鎖定于國(guó)內(nèi)——國(guó)際雙層路徑上,強(qiáng)調(diào)美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)因素、美國(guó)與盟國(guó)關(guān)系、朝鮮特殊性、第三方影響等是造成美國(guó)促使朝鮮棄核政策失靈的原因。這些研究為本文的研究問(wèn)題提供了較為豐富的解釋,但是卻多是靜態(tài)分析或場(chǎng)景性分析,缺少對(duì)歷史性互動(dòng)的把握,在戰(zhàn)略過(guò)程意義上有所欠缺。針對(duì)上述研究問(wèn)題與現(xiàn)有解釋的不足,本文以美朝不對(duì)稱戰(zhàn)略互動(dòng)為出發(fā)點(diǎn),將結(jié)構(gòu)性矛盾作為論述的背景性知識(shí),著眼于兩個(gè)決策者在互動(dòng)過(guò)程中出現(xiàn)的認(rèn)知異位現(xiàn)象,認(rèn)為美國(guó)政策失靈的原因是沒(méi)能使正常化成功轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槌B(tài)化。究其根本,是因?yàn)樵诓粚?duì)稱戰(zhàn)略互動(dòng)中,大國(guó)和小國(guó)之間對(duì)彼此的關(guān)注是不對(duì)稱的,大國(guó)對(duì)小國(guó)往往存在關(guān)注不足的情況,而小國(guó)對(duì)大國(guó)通常存在關(guān)注過(guò)度,這與國(guó)家體量密切相關(guān),是脆弱性決定下國(guó)家權(quán)力的表現(xiàn),體現(xiàn)在不對(duì)稱戰(zhàn)略互動(dòng)過(guò)程中,就是對(duì)彼此行動(dòng)預(yù)期估計(jì)的差異,容易導(dǎo)致雙方對(duì)彼此的承諾以及履行承諾的程度產(chǎn)生不滿,出現(xiàn)雙方都不滿意的情況,造成雙方政策都不成功的狀況。本項(xiàng)研究采取過(guò)程追蹤的研究方法,通過(guò)梳理二十年來(lái)美國(guó)與朝鮮關(guān)于核問(wèn)題的不對(duì)稱互動(dòng),將克林頓政府、小布什政府、奧巴馬政府等三個(gè)時(shí)期按照戰(zhàn)略內(nèi)容在同一光譜上歸位,具體觀察每位美國(guó)總統(tǒng)任內(nèi)美朝圍繞核問(wèn)題不對(duì)稱互動(dòng)過(guò)程中的認(rèn)知異位現(xiàn)象。在克林頓政府時(shí)期,美朝達(dá)成《朝美框架協(xié)議》,緩解了第一次朝核危機(jī),但是在后續(xù)實(shí)施過(guò)程中,卻沒(méi)能化解認(rèn)知分歧,常態(tài)化努力失敗;在小布什政府時(shí)期,雖然六方會(huì)談使美朝雙方以多變協(xié)議的方式達(dá)成棄核共識(shí),但是缺少常態(tài)化所需要的制度保障,認(rèn)知異位現(xiàn)象仍然沒(méi)有得到解決,期間努力也多以失敗告終;在奧巴馬政府時(shí)期,美國(guó)對(duì)朝采取戰(zhàn)略忍耐的態(tài)度,雙方缺少走向合作的基本承諾,無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)正�；�,更勿論常態(tài)化。
[Abstract]:The question in this paper is: why did the United States fail to get North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons? This problem is derived from the contrast between the policy goal of the United States towards the DPRK and the actual development path of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, which is a derivative of the effectiveness of the foreign policy, and is based on the structural contradiction of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Most of the existing studies focus on the domestic and international two-tier approaches from a systematic perspective, emphasizing the internal factors of the United States, the relationship between the United States and its allies, and the particularity of North Korea. Third party influence is the cause of the failure of North Korea's nuclear policy. These studies provide a rich explanation for the research of this paper, but mostly static analysis or scenario analysis. The lack of historical interaction in the strategic process of the lack of understanding. In view of the above research problems and the shortcomings of the existing explanations, this paper starts with the US-DPRK asymmetric strategic interaction as the starting point. Taking the structural contradiction as the background knowledge, this paper focuses on the cognitive heterotopia of the two decision makers in the process of interaction. The reason for the failure of American policy is the failure to normalize the normalization. The fundamental reason is that in the asymmetric strategic interaction, the attention between big and small countries is asymmetrical. Large countries tend to pay insufficient attention to small countries, while small countries usually pay too much attention to large countries, which is closely related to the size of the country and is the manifestation of state power under the decision of vulnerability. In the process of asymmetric strategic interaction, the difference in the estimation of each other's action expectations can easily lead to dissatisfaction with each other's commitments and the degree to which they fulfill their commitments, resulting in a situation where both sides are not satisfied with each other. This study adopts a process-tracking approach that combs the asymmetrical interactions between the United States and North Korea on the nuclear issue over the past two decades, bringing together the Clinton administration and the Bush administration. Obama administration and other three periods according to the strategic content in the same spectral position, observe the United States and North Korea during each US president's term of office in the process of asymmetric interaction around the nuclear issue, cognitive heterotopia. In the Clinton administration. The United States and North Korea reached the "DPRK-US Framework Agreement", which alleviated the first North Korean nuclear crisis, but in the course of subsequent implementation, it failed to resolve the cognitive differences and the regular efforts failed; During the Bush administration, although the Six-Party talks made the United States and North Korea reach a consensus on denuclearization in the form of a changeable agreement, it lacked the institutional safeguards needed for normalization, and the phenomenon of cognitive ectopic still remained unresolved. Efforts during the period also ended in failure; During the Obama administration, the United States adopted a strategic patience with North Korea, and the two sides lacked the basic commitment to cooperate and could not normalize, let alone normalize.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：外交學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：D771.2
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本文編號(hào)：1451829