本文選題：法律推理 + 三段論��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：如果說(shuō),司法倒推是目前法律推理過(guò)程中普遍存在的一種慣常現(xiàn)象的話,那么,同案異判則是各國(guó)司法實(shí)踐中亟待合理應(yīng)對(duì)的棘手問(wèn)題,二者以經(jīng)驗(yàn)與邏輯(或者說(shuō)是過(guò)程與結(jié)果)的形式既存于法律推理的“矛盾律”之中。同案異判現(xiàn)象客觀上昭示了法律推理實(shí)質(zhì)是一條充滿分叉選擇的道路,法官通常基于內(nèi)心的確信作出主觀選擇;司法倒推則表現(xiàn)為法官一般情況下都是先憑借過(guò)往的司法經(jīng)驗(yàn)形成對(duì)案件的預(yù)判,然后以歸納和類比作為法律推理的邏輯起點(diǎn),進(jìn)而對(duì)事實(shí)進(jìn)行剪裁并據(jù)以尋找相應(yīng)的適用依據(jù)。我國(guó)現(xiàn)有的法律推理模式以三段論為主導(dǎo),以演繹作為邏輯起點(diǎn),通過(guò)蘊(yùn)含關(guān)系保障結(jié)論的唯一有效。作為小前提的案件事實(shí),其認(rèn)定過(guò)程本質(zhì)上屬于概率性的合情推理,而作為大前提的法律規(guī)則在適用中存在疑義和沖突,二者無(wú)法滿足演繹邏輯對(duì)前提真實(shí)、唯一的客觀要求。推理的本質(zhì)是邏輯與經(jīng)驗(yàn)相互作用的產(chǎn)物:邏輯貫穿于法律推理的全過(guò)程,經(jīng)驗(yàn)以法則的形式構(gòu)筑起推理的前提,并以說(shuō)理的形式填補(bǔ)于邏輯的縫隙之中。一方面,形式邏輯保障法律推理的公平性、融貫性;另一方面,形式邏輯的封閉性、必然性與法律推理的可廢止性、蓋然性之間卻難以協(xié)調(diào)。形式邏輯和法律推理的調(diào)和只有被擴(kuò)展到演繹之外才可能實(shí)現(xiàn)。法律推理是事實(shí)與案件之間的雙向互動(dòng),三段論下邏輯的單一性和單向性,使法律推理仍然停留在形式邏輯的簡(jiǎn)單應(yīng)用,亦無(wú)法回應(yīng)推理實(shí)踐中存在的現(xiàn)象。且三段論下的法律推理缺少靈活性和彈性的空間,解釋是法官解決疑難案件的唯一手段,難免陷入循環(huán)定義的怪圈。法律推理在實(shí)踐中的多樣選擇,對(duì)現(xiàn)有的模式形成倒逼,司法改革中案例指導(dǎo)制度的確立,本質(zhì)上便是類推與歸納的綜合運(yùn)用;法官需要從推理的形式向?qū)嵸|(zhì)轉(zhuǎn)變,加強(qiáng)裁判說(shuō)理的論證過(guò)程,而非僅滿足于形式上的唯一確定。
[Abstract]:If it is said that judicial backstepping is a common phenomenon in the process of legal reasoning, the same case is a difficult problem in the judicial practice of all countries. The two forms in the form of experience and logic (or the process and result) exist in the "contradiction law" of legal reasoning. The phenomenon of the same case is different. It is an objective manifestation that the essence of legal reasoning is a path full of bifurcations. Judges usually make subjective choices based on their inner conviction, and judicial backstepping shows that judges generally form a pre judgment of cases by virtue of past judicial experience in general, and then use induction and analogy as the logical starting point for legal reasoning, and then, In our country, the existing legal reasoning model is dominated by syllogism and the only validity of the deduction as a logical starting point and by implication relationship. As a small premise case fact, the process of its identification is essentially an inferential reasoning, and the law as a major premise. There are doubts and conflicts in the application of the rules. The two are unable to meet the objective requirements of the deductive logic to the premise. The essence of the reasoning is the product of the interaction between logic and experience: logic runs through the whole process of legal reasoning, and experience builds the premise of reasoning in the form of law, and fills the gap in logic in the form of reasoning. On the one hand, formal logic guarantees the fairness and coherence of legal reasoning; on the other hand, the closure of the formal logic, the inevitability of necessity and the revocability of legal reasoning, and the difference between the probability of legal reasoning. The harmony between formal logic and legal reasoning can be realized only when it is extended to deductive. Legal reasoning is between facts and cases. The two-way interaction, the single and unidirectional logic under the syllogism makes the legal reasoning still stay in the simple application of the formal logic, and can not respond to the phenomena in the reasoning practice. And the legal reasoning under the syllogism lacks flexibility and flexibility. Interpretation is the only means for the judges to resolve the difficult cases and inevitably fall into the circle. The various choices of legal reasoning in practice, the formation of the existing model, the establishment of the case guidance system in the judicial reform, is essentially the comprehensive use of analogy and induction; the judge needs to change from the form of reasoning to the substance, to strengthen the process of the justification of the referee, but not only to satisfy the sole determination in the form.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D90-051

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本文編號(hào)：1783954