本文選題：上市公司收購(gòu) + 反收購(gòu)�。� 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：自2014年起我國(guó)進(jìn)入了新一輪的并購(gòu)狂歡季,而全國(guó)矚目的萬科收購(gòu)戰(zhàn)無疑是此次并購(gòu)潮中最為精彩的部分。受寶萬大戰(zhàn)的影響,我國(guó)許多上市公司如驚弓之鳥般一夜之間紛紛修改公司章程,引入反收購(gòu)措施,一時(shí)間反收購(gòu)措施魚龍混雜。這充分暴露了我國(guó)上市公司對(duì)反收購(gòu)措施的陌生。而我國(guó)現(xiàn)行法對(duì)具體反收購(gòu)措施的合法性問題規(guī)定較為模糊,許多反收購(gòu)措施的合法性在學(xué)理上處于不明晰的地位。而另一方面,現(xiàn)行法對(duì)部分合理的反收購(gòu)措施限制過死,導(dǎo)致目標(biāo)公司經(jīng)理層在面對(duì)惡意收購(gòu)時(shí)束手無策。針對(duì)上述問題,本文擬運(yùn)用公司法理論并結(jié)合美國(guó)的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)反收購(gòu)措施進(jìn)行剖析,論證目標(biāo)公司管理層反收購(gòu)權(quán)限的范圍,并就具體反收購(gòu)措施的合法性問題及改進(jìn)路徑提出自己的觀點(diǎn)。文章分為四部分:第一部分主要介紹了美國(guó)學(xué)界關(guān)于上市公司經(jīng)理層面對(duì)敵意收購(gòu)時(shí)的立場(chǎng)之爭(zhēng)并論證了我國(guó)上市公司采取反收購(gòu)措施的理論基礎(chǔ)及制度空間。第二部分運(yùn)用公司法原理對(duì)部分典型反收購(gòu)措施進(jìn)行了法理剖析。該部分主要分為四節(jié)。第一節(jié)主要探討了公司章程選出公司法的限制所在及其原因,并在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了提高行權(quán)條件這一章程策略為何無效。第二節(jié)主要基于忠實(shí)義務(wù)的視角探討了“皇冠寶石”、資本杠桿化、交叉董事會(huì)等問題。認(rèn)為對(duì)于“皇冠寶石”及資本杠桿化應(yīng)分情況進(jìn)行討論,而交叉董事會(huì)中的董事則受忠實(shí)義務(wù)所困,在收購(gòu)成功后處于尷尬境地。第三節(jié)主要闡述了金色降落傘的的對(duì)價(jià)理論,并論證了該對(duì)價(jià)在我國(guó)的缺失,進(jìn)而提出金色降落傘在我國(guó)構(gòu)成了公司財(cái)產(chǎn)的純粹浪費(fèi),主張法律應(yīng)當(dāng)禁止該策略。第四節(jié)主要論述了交叉持股條款原理及其針對(duì)派克人防御這一特殊情形的適用問題。此外,筆者還介紹了美國(guó)派克人防御中出現(xiàn)的“賽跑問題”,并指出我國(guó)并不會(huì)出現(xiàn)該問題。第三部分主要討論了“白衣騎士”及股份回購(gòu)這兩個(gè)反收購(gòu)措施在我國(guó)的困境。并提出了公司法解決進(jìn)路——確立授權(quán)資本制及放松對(duì)股份回購(gòu)的管制。第四部分主要在授權(quán)資本制及放松回購(gòu)管制的基礎(chǔ)上探討了毒丸及綠郵回購(gòu)合法性問題(授權(quán)資本制構(gòu)成了毒丸的基礎(chǔ),而綠郵回購(gòu)則以放松回購(gòu)管制為前提)。針對(duì)毒丸,筆者介紹了其常見的類型及運(yùn)行機(jī)理并從股東歧視問題,單方設(shè)定義務(wù)問題,苛刻性問題,股票自由轉(zhuǎn)讓問題等方面對(duì)其合法性問題展開討論,并得出毒丸非法的結(jié)論。針對(duì)綠郵,筆者主要介紹了美國(guó)學(xué)界就綠郵回購(gòu)的爭(zhēng)論。其大致分為反對(duì)說、支持說與中立說,而筆者比較傾向于中立說,認(rèn)為法律不應(yīng)一味地禁止或允許綠郵回購(gòu),而應(yīng)將該權(quán)利賦予股東大會(huì),由股東大會(huì)明確可以進(jìn)行綠郵回購(gòu)的情形。
[Abstract]:Since 2014, China has entered a new round of M & A carnival season, and the Vanke acquisition war is undoubtedly the most exciting part of the M & A tide. Under the influence of the war of Baowan, many listed companies in our country have amended their articles of association overnight, introduced anti-takeover measures, and have mixed up anti-takeover measures for a time. This fully exposed our country's listed companies to the strange measures of anti-takeover. However, the current law of our country has vague regulations on the legality of specific anti-takeover measures, and many anti-takeover measures are in a unclear position in theory. On the other hand, the current law limits some reasonable anti-takeover measures, which results in the managers of the target company being helpless in the face of the hostile takeover. In view of the above problems, this paper intends to use the theory of company law and combined with the advanced experience of the United States to analyze the anti-takeover measures, and to demonstrate the scope of the scope of the authority of the target company's management anti-takeover. The author also puts forward his own views on the legality of specific anti-takeover measures and the ways to improve them. The article is divided into four parts: the first part mainly introduces the position of the American academic circles on the hostile takeover of listed companies and demonstrates the theoretical basis and institutional space of the anti-takeover measures taken by listed companies in China. The second part analyzes some typical anti-takeover measures by using the company law principle. This part is divided into four sections. In the first section, the author mainly discusses the limitation of the company's articles of association and its reasons, and on this basis, analyzes why the constitution strategy of improving the exercise conditions is ineffective. The second section mainly discusses the crown gem, capital leverage and cross board of directors from the perspective of loyalty obligation. It is considered that the crown gem and capital leverage should be discussed separately, while the directors in the cross board are trapped by the duty of loyalty and are in an awkward position after the successful acquisition. The third section mainly elaborated the consideration theory of the golden parachute, and demonstrated the lack of the consideration in our country, then proposed that the golden parachute constituted the pure waste of the company property in our country, and advocated that the law should prohibit the strategy. The fourth section mainly discusses the principle of cross-shareholding clause and its application to the special situation of Peck's defense. In addition, the author introduces the "race problem" in American Parker defense, and points out that this problem does not appear in China. The third part mainly discusses the predicament of "White Knight" and share repurchase in China. And put forward the company law solution-to establish the authorized capital system and relax the regulation of share repurchase. The fourth part mainly discusses the legality of poison pill and green mail repo on the basis of authorized capital system and deregulation of repurchase control. The authorized capital system forms the basis of poison pill, while the premise of green mail repo is to relax repo control. In view of poison pill, the author introduces its common types and operation mechanism and discusses its legality from the aspects of shareholder discrimination, unilateral obligation, harshness, free transfer of stock, etc. And draw the conclusion that poison pill is illegal. In view of Green Mail, the author mainly introduces the debate on Green Mail repo in American academic circles. It is roughly divided into opposition theory, support theory and neutral theory, and the author tends to say that the law should not blindly prohibit or allow green mail repurchase, but should grant this right to the shareholders' general meeting. The general meeting of the shareholders shall specify the circumstances in which the green mail repurchase can be carried out.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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