本文選題：政府監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：市場(chǎng)機(jī)制　出處：《四川師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展離不開制度的規(guī)范與完善的中介服務(wù),會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所作為中介組織,既是市場(chǎng)條件下聯(lián)系政府、企業(yè)與社會(huì)公眾的紐帶和橋梁,其提供的審計(jì)服務(wù)又是資本市場(chǎng)有序運(yùn)作的重要保障,審計(jì)質(zhì)量的高低直接關(guān)系著資本市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作的效率。我國注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)在政府、行業(yè)專家以及執(zhí)業(yè)人員的共同努力下,得到了快速發(fā)展。然而,在注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)迅速發(fā)展的同時(shí),國內(nèi)審計(jì)失敗的案例也接連發(fā)生。2002年,我國政府收回行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)的行政監(jiān)管職能,對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)開始采取政府監(jiān)管模式。隨著我國市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷推進(jìn),政府監(jiān)管在審計(jì)市場(chǎng)中是否真正起到了幫助作用,政府監(jiān)管對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響究竟如何,政府借助強(qiáng)制力制定一系列規(guī)則、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)后,對(duì)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的自主運(yùn)行又有何影響,基于這些問題,本文從注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)行證券期貨業(yè)務(wù)許可證管理制度的角度,以審計(jì)聲譽(yù)作為審計(jì)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的典范,對(duì)審計(jì)監(jiān)管、審計(jì)聲譽(yù)以及審計(jì)質(zhì)量三者的內(nèi)在邏輯關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。本文從理論上分析了我國政府監(jiān)管的動(dòng)因、審計(jì)聲譽(yù)的形成路徑與作用機(jī)制,并結(jié)合我國重大政治會(huì)議報(bào)告對(duì)政府監(jiān)管與市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了梳理。在理論分析基礎(chǔ)上,本文選取2010-2015年所有非金融類行業(yè)A股上市公司為研究樣本,以審計(jì)報(bào)告激進(jìn)度作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量衡量指標(biāo)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,一方面以監(jiān)管政策發(fā)布前后兩個(gè)時(shí)期為切入點(diǎn)對(duì)政府監(jiān)管與審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)系進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證,另一方面以連續(xù)三年位列“中國會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所綜合評(píng)價(jià)前百家排行榜”前十位的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所為高聲譽(yù)事務(wù)所代表對(duì)審計(jì)聲譽(yù)與審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)系進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證,最后通過引入交互項(xiàng)以及分組檢驗(yàn)的方法對(duì)政府監(jiān)管和審計(jì)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制相互關(guān)系以及兩者對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的共同作用進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證。通過以上理論分析與實(shí)證研究,本文得到如下結(jié)論:(1)政府監(jiān)管行為從整體上顯著促進(jìn)了會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所審計(jì)質(zhì)量的提高;(2)審計(jì)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制在我國審計(jì)市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)建立并得到有效發(fā)揮,即審計(jì)聲譽(yù)能夠顯著促進(jìn)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所審計(jì)質(zhì)量提高;(3)政府監(jiān)管與審計(jì)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制存在替代關(guān)系,一方面,政府監(jiān)管對(duì)高聲譽(yù)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所審計(jì)質(zhì)量的促進(jìn)作用顯著性降低,審計(jì)聲譽(yù)對(duì)政府監(jiān)管的作用發(fā)揮起到了干擾作用,另一方面,在政府監(jiān)管后,審計(jì)聲譽(yù)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的促進(jìn)作用減弱,即政府監(jiān)管措施讓審計(jì)市場(chǎng)中聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的有效發(fā)揮受到了限制。
[Abstract]:The development of the market economy can not be separated from the regulation of the system and the perfect intermediary service. As an intermediary organization, the accounting firm is the link and bridge between the government, the enterprise and the public under the market conditions. The audit service it provides is also an important guarantee for the orderly operation of the capital market, and the audit quality is directly related to the efficiency of the operation of the capital market. However, with the rapid development of the CPA industry, the failure of domestic audit has occurred one after another. In 2002, the government of our country withdrew the administrative supervision function of the trade association. With the development of the market economy in our country, whether the government supervision has really helped the audit market, and how does the government supervision affect the audit quality? The government makes a series of rules with the help of coercive force, and what impact does the standard have on the independent operation of the market mechanism? based on these problems, this paper, from the point of view of implementing the license management system of securities and futures business by certified public accountants, Taking audit reputation as the model of audit market mechanism, this paper studies the internal logical relationship among audit supervision, audit reputation and audit quality. The formation path and function mechanism of audit reputation, combined with the report of major political conference of our country, combed the relationship between government supervision and market mechanism. On the basis of theoretical analysis, In this paper, all A-share listed companies in non-financial industries from 2010 to 2015 are selected as research samples, and the radicalization of audit reports is used as an index to measure audit quality. On the one hand, the relationship between government supervision and audit quality is verified by the two periods before and after the release of the regulatory policy. On the other hand, for the third consecutive year, the top 10 accounting firms ranked in the Top 100 list of Comprehensive Evaluation of Chinese Accounting firms are representatives of high reputation firms to verify the relationship between audit reputation and audit quality. Finally, the relationship between government supervision and audit reputation mechanism and the interaction between them on audit quality are verified by introducing interactive items and grouping test. In this paper, the following conclusions are drawn: 1) Government supervision has significantly promoted the improvement of audit quality of accounting firms on the whole) the audit reputation mechanism has been established in our country's audit market and has been effectively brought into play. That is, audit reputation can significantly promote the audit quality of accounting firms. (3) there is a substitute relationship between government supervision and audit reputation mechanism. On the one hand, the role of government supervision in promoting audit quality of high reputation accounting firms is significantly reduced. Audit reputation interferes with the role of government supervision. On the other hand, after government supervision, audit reputation plays a weaker role in promoting audit quality. That is, government regulation limits the effective performance of reputation mechanism in audit market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D630.9;F239.4

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