本文選題：政府信息供給　切入點：消費者搜尋　出處：《華東師范大學》2017年博士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：十一屆三中全會以來,我國經濟取得了舉世矚目的成績,以制造業(yè)為代表的第二產業(yè)獲得了極大的進步,中國成為名副其實的制造業(yè)大國。令人遺憾的是,我國的產品質量水平與制造業(yè)大國形象不符,粗制濫造的商品為消費者所詬病。特別是近年發(fā)生的大量產品質量和食品安全事件,將我國的質量問題推上了風口浪尖。面對一系列的質量危機事件,政府各個監(jiān)管部門出臺了大量的法律法規(guī)和政策文件。雖然運動式的執(zhí)法對不法生產者起到了一定的震懾作用,但是,產品質量問題卻沒有得到有效解決。面對質量危機和監(jiān)管難題,我們應該重新審視和更新我們的質量規(guī)制思路。按照經濟學的邏輯,產品質量問題的產生源于買賣雙方的信息不對稱——信息不對稱激勵生產者進行質量欺詐——嚴重的信息不對稱甚至導致阿克洛夫式的市場"崩潰",因此,緩解市場上的信息不對稱成為政府質量規(guī)制的重要思路的之一。緩解市場上的信息不對稱,除了依靠生產者發(fā)送信號和消費者搜尋信息,政府這只"有形之手",也承擔著為市場特別是消費者供給信息的責任�；谶@一思路,本文將政府供給產品質量信息做為研究對象,進行相關的理論探討。首先,做為邏輯起點,本文利用數(shù)理研究著重分析政府信息供給是如何影響市場的,即探討政府信息供給條件下,消費者、生產者的福利變化和市場均衡;其次,根據(jù)前一研究結論,討論政府信息供給策略的決策條件和影響因素;再次,針對信息供給主體的"委托人"屬性,研究信息供給的激勵問題,即討論信息不對稱條件下,中央政府如何設計最優(yōu)合約激勵地方政府。對這三個問題的討論主要是基于委托代理理論,并結合生產者理論、演化博弈理論、公共品供給理論、組織激勵理論進行各個角度的研究。根據(jù)不同的研究目標,本文將政府這一研究對象的屬性進行了三次轉換:自然人→理性人(有限理性的委托人)→代理人,也就是從外生變量到內生變量的轉換。在理論研究的基礎上,本文還研究了西方發(fā)達國家政府信息供給的政策、特點、過程和啟示,以及我國政府信息供給的現(xiàn)狀和問題,期望為我國政府信息供給和質量規(guī)制等政策的制定和優(yōu)化,提供有益的借鑒。本文由三大部分組成,共計八章:第一部分包括緒論與文獻綜述兩章,第二部分包括第三章、第四章、第五章,是本文的核心部分,重點在于理論研究和數(shù)理推導。第三部分包括第六章、第七章、第八章,主要是根據(jù)理論研究的結論來分析西方發(fā)達國家政府信息供給的政策,探討我國的現(xiàn)狀和問題,同時,結合本文研究結論和我國實際提出完善我國政府信息供給的對策建議。通過理論分析和數(shù)理研究,得到的研究結論如下:(1)政府信息供給對市場的影響以及兩類信息之間的比較本文將政府信息供給分為兩類:門檻類信息和搜尋類信息。在考慮消費者搜尋成本的基礎上,利用縱向產品差異化模型研究了政府信息供給對市場的影響,我們發(fā)現(xiàn):政府信息供給有助于改善市場的產品質量狀況,但兩類信息對市場主體的影響是不一樣的。門檻類信息將造成生產者之間的不"公平"和消費者之間的不"公平",而搜尋類信息有助于市場福利水平的提高。此研究結論實際上為解決我國的產品質量危機提供了一個思路——政府應該關注信息供給特別是搜尋類信息的供給,通過降低消費者的搜尋成本來驅動生產者提高產品質量,改善市場狀況。(2)政府信息供給的影響因素和策略選擇將政府看做是外生的"自然人"存在不足,有必要將政府內生為信息供給系統(tǒng)的受影響變量。通過建立"政府——消費者"、"政府——生產者"兩個演化博弈系統(tǒng)并分析其穩(wěn)定狀態(tài),我們發(fā)現(xiàn):做為"理性人"的政府,其信息供給策略主要受到信息供給成本、行政補貼、市場質量狀況等因素的影響。具體來說,第一,當市場質量狀況良好時,中央的行政補貼并不是地方政府信息供給的"必需品",當市場質量狀況不好時,只要確保政府信息供給能夠為消費者帶來福利改善,政府仍然會選擇信息策略;第二,當信息成本較高時,政府將受到高額罰金收入的激勵而放棄信息供給策略,如果此時政府懲罰力度較小,市場最終將被低質量產品占領。(3)政府信息供給的激勵研究政府信息供給中面臨道德風險問題,本文通過激勵機制中的單任務委托代理模型和多任務委托代理模型研究政府信息供給的最優(yōu)契約設計問題,我們發(fā)現(xiàn):第一,監(jiān)督一獎懲機制能夠降低中央政府的代理成本,當"獎懲與共享"相結合的時候,可以有效激勵地方政府;第二,通過引入任務的相對重要性,中央政府可以對公共品生產任務和經濟發(fā)展任務設計對抗性激勵;當公共品生產任務與經濟發(fā)展任務存在不完全替代關系時,中央政府應該對地方政府進行互補性激勵,以防地方政府在經濟發(fā)展任務上套利。在明確政府信息供給的市場機制、影響因素、激勵機制的基礎上,借鑒國外政府的信息供給經驗,本文提出了改善我國質量監(jiān)管和信息供給的對策建議。主要包括:理順信息供給體制、建立信息專項基金;加強政府信息供給的法律和法規(guī)建設,確保法律授權;強化政府部門的信息化建設,并重視消費者的作用;增強信息采集能力,提高風險分析和評估能力。
[Abstract]:Since the third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, China's economy has achieved remarkable results, in the manufacturing industry as the representative of the second industry achieved great progress, China become the manufacturing country worthy of the name. Unfortunately, the level of product quality and manufacturing industry of our country power image does not match, the commodity crudely made criticized for consumers. Especially a lot the product quality and food safety incidents occurred in recent years, the quality problem of our country in the teeth of the storm. Faced with a series of quality crisis, various government regulators issued a large number of laws and regulations and policy documents. Although the movement law enforcement deterrent, some of the illegal producers play but the quality of the products the problem has not been solved. In the face of quality crisis and regulatory problems, we should review and update our ideas of quality regulation. According to economics The logic of product quality problems caused by information asymmetry between buyers and sellers of information asymmetry incentive producer quality fraud -- serious information asymmetry and even lead to Akedof's market "crash", therefore, alleviate the information asymmetry on the market becomes one of the important thought of government quality regulation. To alleviate the information asymmetry on the market. In addition to relying on the transmitted signal and the producer consumer search information, the government only the "visible hand", also bear the market especially the consumer information supply responsibility. Based on this idea, this paper will supply product quality information of government as the research object, discusses the related theory. First of all, as the logical starting point, mathematical research focuses on the analysis of the supply of government information is how to influence the market in this paper, which discusses the consumer government information supply conditions, producer welfare And the market equilibrium; secondly, based on the previous research conclusions, discussing the factors of government information supply decision conditions and influence; thirdly, according to the information the main supply of the "client" attribute, the research on the incentive of the supply of information, which is discussed under the conditions of asymmetric information, the central government to design the optimal incentive contracts for local government to discuss. The three problem is mainly based on the principal-agent theory, and combining with the producer theory, evolutionary game theory, theory of public goods supply, research aspects of organizational incentive theory. According to different research objectives, this paper carried out three conversion attribute as the research object of Government: the natural person, the rational person (Co. rational principal), agent, conversion is from exogenous to endogenous variables. On the basis of theoretical research, this paper also studies the western developed country government information supply administration Strategy, characteristics, process and inspiration, as well as our country government information supply situation and problems, expectations for the development and optimization of China's supply of government information and quality regulation policies, provide a useful reference. This paper consists of three parts, a total of eight chapters: the first part includes the introduction and Literature review of two chapters, including second parts the third chapter, the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter is the core part of this paper, focuses on the theoretical study and mathematical derivation. The third part includes sixth chapters, the seventh chapter, the eighth chapter, mainly analyzes the western developed countries government information supply policies according to the research results, to explore the current situation and problems of our country, at the same time, according to the research conclusion and the reality of our country to put forward some suggestions to improve our government information supply. Through theoretical analysis and mathematical research, the conclusions are as follows: (1) the supply of government information and the impact on the market The comparison between the two types of information will be supplied to the government information is divided into two categories: threshold information and search information. Considering the cost of consumer search on the effect of supply of government information on the market differentiation model based on the longitudinal products we found: product quality status of government information to help improve market supply the influence of two kinds of information, but the main body of the market is not the same. The threshold information will cause between between the producers and consumers are not "fair" is not "fair", and the search for information is helpful to improve the welfare level of the market. This conclusion is actually to solve product quality crisis in China provides a new government should pay attention to the supply of information especially the search information supply, by reducing consumer search costs to drive the producers to improve product quality, improve the market condition. (2) the government. Information supply factors and strategies will be exogenous government as a "natural person" problems, it is necessary for the government will be affected by the endogenous variable information supply system. Through the establishment of government -- consumer "," government - producer "two evolutionary game system and analysis of its steady state, we found that: as a" rational person "of the government, the strategy of information supply is mainly affected by the supply of information cost, administrative subsidy, factors affecting the quality of market conditions. Specifically, first, when the market is good in quality, the central and local government administrative subsidy is not the supply of information" necessities ", when the market is not in good quality. Just make sure that the supply of government information can bring benefits for the improvement of the consumer, the government would still choose the information strategy; second, when information cost is high, the government will be subject to fines and give information for incentive income To the strategy, if at this time the government punishment is small, the market will eventually be low quality products to capture. (3) facing the problem of moral hazard incentive of government information supply of government information in this paper, we found through the incentive mechanism in the single task principal-agent model and multi task principal agent problem of optimal contract design, the supply of government information model: first, the supervision of an incentive mechanism can reduce agency cost of the central government, when the "rewards and sharing" combination, can effective incentives of local government; second, through the introduction of the relative importance of tasks, the central government can incentive on public goods production task and the task of economic development design antagonism; when public goods the production task and the task of economic development are not perfect substitutes, the central government should be complementary to local government incentives, with one party government in economic development Show tasks. The influence factors of arbitrage in the market mechanism, a clear government information supply, based on incentive mechanism, from the experience of foreign government information supply, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve China's quality supervision and information supply. Mainly includes: to straighten out the information supply system, the establishment of a special fund of information; to strengthen the construction of government supply the information of the laws and regulations, to ensure the legal authority; strengthen the information construction of government departments, and the importance of the role of the consumer; to enhance the ability of information collection, improve risk analysis and assessment capabilities.

【學位授予單位】：華東師范大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F203
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本文編號：1646952