本文關鍵詞： 國防工業(yè) 協(xié)同創(chuàng)新 產業(yè)鏈 軍民融合 產學研 博弈理論　出處：《天津大學》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：國防工業(yè)作為我國重要的戰(zhàn)略性支柱產業(yè),是高新技術產生與發(fā)展的核心領域。然而,在全球化時代背景下,由于社會分工的細化、國際競爭的加劇和現(xiàn)代科技的快速發(fā)展,單靠一個軍工企業(yè)的力量往往不足以承擔科技研發(fā)的全部成本和風險,也不可能具備創(chuàng)新所需的全部知識和技術,協(xié)同創(chuàng)新成為我國國防工業(yè)科技創(chuàng)新的必然選擇。本文以國防工業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新系統(tǒng)為研究對象,圍繞統(tǒng)籌國防建設與經濟建設協(xié)同發(fā)展這一核心理念,從國防產業(yè)鏈協(xié)同創(chuàng)新機制、軍民融合式協(xié)同創(chuàng)新體系、國防產學研協(xié)同創(chuàng)新行為以及國防工業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新保障框架四個方面對軍工企業(yè)參與協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的問題進行了深入探討。研究結論揭示了國防工業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新系統(tǒng)的行為機理和策略選擇,剖析了軍工企業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新行為的制約因素和決策機制;在此基礎上,結合我國實際情況,本文進一步提出了促進我國國防工業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新發(fā)展的對策建議。本文創(chuàng)新之處如下:(1)構建了由核心企業(yè)和配套企業(yè)組成的國防產業(yè)鏈協(xié)同創(chuàng)新機制微分對策模型,通過對無成本分擔的分散式決策、成本分擔下的分散式決策以及協(xié)同合作中的集中式決策三種決策模式下均衡策略的數值模擬和比較分析,考察了成本分擔的作用效果,研究了Pareto最優(yōu)的決策模式。(2)構建了軍民融合協(xié)同創(chuàng)新演化博弈模型,分析了軍工企業(yè)和民用企業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新行為的動態(tài)演化過程,探尋了影響軍工企業(yè)和民用企業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新行為的關鍵因素及作用機理,并通過政府激勵與契約懲處情景的設定,給出了確保軍民融合協(xié)同創(chuàng)新實現(xiàn)的獎懲機制。(3)針對軍民融合協(xié)同創(chuàng)新體系中軍工企業(yè)和民用企業(yè)的技術共享問題,構建了微分博弈模型,分別考察了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主從博弈、協(xié)同合作博弈三種博弈情形下雙方的最優(yōu)策略及最優(yōu)收益,給出了實現(xiàn)雙方技術共享行為協(xié)調的分配機制。(4)構建了政府-軍工企業(yè)-學研機構為主體的三方博弈模型,分析了國防領域產學研聯(lián)盟協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的條件,研究了三者之間的相互作用機制,揭示了國防工業(yè)產學研協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的過程規(guī)律,引導政府通過調整自身職能來改變軍工企業(yè)和高校、科研院所的行為取向。
[Abstract]:As an important strategic pillar industry of our country, national defense industry is the core field of high-tech production and development. However, under the background of globalization, due to the refinement of social division of labor, the intensification of international competition and the rapid development of modern science and technology, The strength of a military enterprise alone is often insufficient to bear the full costs and risks of scientific and technological research and development, nor is it possible to possess all the knowledge and technology needed for innovation. Collaborative innovation has become the inevitable choice of science and technology innovation in national defense industry. This paper takes the cooperative innovation system of national defense industry as the research object and revolves around the core idea of coordinated development between national defense construction and economic construction. From the cooperative innovation mechanism of the national defense industry chain, the military-civilian integration collaborative innovation system, In this paper, the cooperative innovation behavior of national defense industry, college and research, and the guarantee framework of cooperative innovation in defense industry are discussed in detail. The research results reveal the operation of cooperative innovation system in national defense industry. For mechanisms and strategies, This paper analyzes the restricting factors and decision-making mechanism of the cooperative innovation behavior of the military enterprises, on the basis of which, combined with the actual situation of our country, This paper further puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to promote the cooperative innovation development of national defense industry in China. The innovations in this paper are as follows: 1) the differential game model of cooperative innovation mechanism of defense industry chain is constructed, which is composed of core enterprises and supporting enterprises. Through the numerical simulation and comparative analysis of the equilibrium strategy in the three decision-making modes of the decentralized decision without cost sharing, the decentralized decision under the cost sharing and the centralized decision in the cooperative cooperation, the effect of cost sharing is investigated. In this paper, the optimal decision model of Pareto is studied. The game model of military and civil fusion collaborative innovation evolution is constructed, and the dynamic evolution process of cooperative innovation behavior between military and civil enterprises is analyzed. This paper explores the key factors and mechanism that affect the cooperative innovation behavior between military and civil enterprises, and sets the situation of government incentive and contract punishment. This paper presents a reward and punishment mechanism to ensure the realization of cooperative innovation between military and civilian. Aiming at the problem of technology sharing between military enterprises and civil enterprises in the system of military and civil integration, a differential game model is constructed. In this paper, we investigate the Nash non-cooperative game Stackelberg game, the cooperative game, the optimal strategy and the optimal return. In this paper, the distribution mechanism of coordination of technology sharing behavior between the two sides is given. (4) A three-party game model with the main body of government, military industry enterprise and scientific research institution is constructed, and the conditions for cooperative innovation of industry, university and research alliance in national defense field are analyzed. This paper studies the interaction mechanism between the three, reveals the law of the process of collaborative innovation of industry, university and research in defense industry, and guides the government to change the behavior orientation of military enterprises, universities and scientific research institutes by adjusting its own functions.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F426.48;F273.1
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本文編號：1493241