本文關(guān)鍵詞：國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的模式選擇與制度分析　出處：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展 市場失靈 替代機制 雙向互動結(jié)構(gòu)

【摘要】：自1985年組建“中國新技術(shù)創(chuàng)業(yè)投資公司”以來,我國創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場(VC)的不斷擴大過程中,便始終都伴有國有資本的身影。并且,國有資本在很長一段期間內(nèi)不僅提供資金支持,而且還直接負責(zé)創(chuàng)投基金的運營。與此同時,以法治水平為標志的外部制度環(huán)境卻并非如創(chuàng)投市場那般“一日千里”,單是從成文法的角度來觀察,便會發(fā)現(xiàn)：直到2002年之后,創(chuàng)業(yè)投資領(lǐng)域(含國有資本)的運行規(guī)范才相繼頒行。質(zhì)言之,“法律至上論”常常言及的“市場經(jīng)濟就是法治經(jīng)濟”的觀點,卻在我國國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的市場實踐中遇到了“挑戰(zhàn)”——我國法律制度并不當(dāng)然構(gòu)成創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場興起的前提。那么從“法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展”的宏觀視角觀之,這兩者又存在怎樣的關(guān)聯(lián)呢?或者說是不是真的沒有關(guān)聯(lián)?這便是本文的核心理論之所在。“存在不一定合理,但存在一定有原因”。本文正是基于對國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場的商業(yè)實踐與傳統(tǒng)理論的反差,集中研判的主題是：在我國法治相對缺失的背景下,國有資本是如何建立并發(fā)展創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場的。并借此“中國故事”呈現(xiàn)和反思,在中國語境下法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的真實關(guān)系。鑒于此,本文分為如下幾章,以期給予闡述和建構(gòu)：第一章屬于全文的引論,不僅在于闡明前述事實與理論之間的“悖論”,而且試圖開宗明義地提出作者對于這一論題的解釋,并將其作為全文的理論中心：法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展之間存在著雙向的互動結(jié)構(gòu),一方面承認法律是對一定時期經(jīng)濟發(fā)展情形的反映、繼承乃至強化,否定“想當(dāng)然地”法律創(chuàng)設(shè)或者改革。并且,認為早期的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展相對獨立于法律制度；但另一方面又賦予法律以主動者姿態(tài),認為法律同樣構(gòu)成經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的約束性條件。為了厘清這一理論觀點在整個學(xué)術(shù)脈絡(luò)當(dāng)中的位置,本章特別選取了“法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展”理論中頗具代表性的四篇經(jīng)典文獻(LLSV、Pistor、Coffee、鶴光太郎,他們彼此之間也是相互映證的),并認為法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的雙向互動關(guān)系雖然能夠從其文獻之中獲得隱約感知,但是更多地還是單向度的關(guān)系研究。基于此,本文所意欲構(gòu)建的“法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展”的“雙向互動結(jié)構(gòu)”,既區(qū)別于“法律至上論”(law matters)的外生性視角,認為法律的生長獨立于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展,非成熟法治無以建立市場交易；但也有別于“法律內(nèi)生性”理論的單向度法治觀,僅認為法律是對現(xiàn)實交易均衡模式的固定和呈現(xiàn)。第二章旨在從事實角度“勾勒”我國國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的模式選擇,并將其作為后續(xù)各章理論解釋的對象。這是一種時空緯度的觀察,它既選擇從域外比較的視角來厘清我國國有資本的參與樣態(tài)：持股模式；又將視線在1985-2015年的時間當(dāng)中穿梭,并發(fā)現(xiàn)即使是國有資本的持股模式,也居然在2002年前后發(fā)生了重要變化：直接\間接。概言之,我國國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場存在兩項(模式)特色：第一、國有資本始終參與其中；第二、國有資本以持股(直接\間接)方式參與其中。第三章旨在針對上述第一項特點予以理論性解釋——為什么國有資本始終參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資。為此,本章首先比較銀行融資、民間借貸、內(nèi)部入股以及創(chuàng)業(yè)投資(VC)四種金融模式與高新初創(chuàng)企業(yè)困境的匹配情況,并借此確定發(fā)展創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場的必要性。在此基礎(chǔ)之上,本章將同時探討創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場的失靈情況——羊群效應(yīng)與規(guī)模效應(yīng)(外部性),以及國有資本的參與行為(暫且不論何種具體方式)對于克服上述市場失靈的重要價值。與此相對,本章還將專門探討另外一種克服上述市場失靈的方案——“先規(guī)范,后發(fā)展”的立法主導(dǎo)模式。也正是基于國有資本的參與行為和“先規(guī)范,后發(fā)展”的立法主導(dǎo)模式之間的這種比較,更加確定了本章的理論觀點：國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場是為應(yīng)對創(chuàng)投市場的失靈(內(nèi)生性)而進行的理性選擇,并非立法主導(dǎo)模式下的強制推行。換句話說,國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的邏輯在于市場而非法律,參與行為本身與法律制度的設(shè)計之間存在相對的獨立性。第四章是從我國創(chuàng)投市場的個性化特點——法治缺失與聲譽失靈的背景出發(fā),繼續(xù)探究“為什么國有資本始終參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資”。其主旨在于探討,國有資本在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場建立初期,起到了替代法律制度和聲譽機制的治理功效�；诖�,三、四兩章的關(guān)系可以從立論前提做出區(qū)分：一樣的市場失靈,不一樣的治理風(fēng)險。所以,本章開篇便從風(fēng)險構(gòu)成的角度將其概括為雙層代理成本,但是創(chuàng)投市場建立初期我國不僅法律約束欠缺,而且聲譽等非正式制度也功效甚微。與此同時,國有資本的參與行為卻由于地域限制和政治關(guān)聯(lián)的原因,而在客觀上替代性地發(fā)揮了降低前述代理成本的功能。綜上：國有資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場的發(fā)展(早期)是相對獨立于法律制度的。第五章則是針對前述第二項特點予以理論解釋,即國有資本為什么以持股(直接\間接)方式參與創(chuàng)投。其中,法律制度的差異導(dǎo)致投融資合作收益的不確定性,從而影響了合作方式的采用(債權(quán)模式由于缺乏動態(tài)調(diào)整而對法治條件要求更高)。而直接投資模式的產(chǎn)生,則是由于既有法律制度促成了國有資本在人力、科技、資金多方面的集聚優(yōu)勢,從而導(dǎo)致了國有資本參與模式的“路徑依賴”。國有資本之所以會向間接投資方式轉(zhuǎn)變,則是因為變化后的法律制度與聲譽機制發(fā)揮了約束效果,并且法律制度的變化還導(dǎo)致外商、民營投資等多種模式對國有資本的直接投資模式形成了競爭壓力。由此可見,經(jīng)濟發(fā)展(方式)離不開法律制度及其變化的制約與推動。第六章屬于全文的結(jié)論,一為總結(jié),二為延伸。一方面,通過對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)投資市場的建立和發(fā)展的模式解釋,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)國有資本的參與實際上屬于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的必然邏輯(應(yīng)對市場失靈),并非成文法制度自上而下進行安排和設(shè)計的結(jié)果。而且,國有資本的參與行為還替代了早期市場的法治缺失與聲譽失靈,從而說明經(jīng)濟發(fā)展(早期)對法律制度的相對獨立性。與此同時,我國國有資本以持股(直接\間接)方式參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的理論解釋,證明經(jīng)濟發(fā)展(方式)離不開法律制度的約束和推動。另一方面,本文并不是否定正式法律有效論,而僅僅是想通過考察一項具體商業(yè)交易的發(fā)生過程來全面理解法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的真實關(guān)系。并且,憑借本文提煉的法律與經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的雙向互動結(jié)構(gòu),可以適用于對國企改革、創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)等話題的繼續(xù)討論。
[Abstract]:Since 1985 the formation of "Chinese new technology venture capital company since China's venture capital market (VC) of the expanding process, will always accompanied by the state-owned capital and state-owned capital. The figure, not only provides for a long period of financial support, but also directly responsible for the operation of venture capital fund. At the same time. The external institutional environment to the level of the rule of law as a symbol of the venture capital market is not like that, one is from a thousand li a day" into grammar view, we may see that until after 2002, the field of venture capital (including state-owned capital) that have been issued. The standard operation in essence, "the supremacy of law theory" often says "the market economy is the economy ruled by law" point of view, but in the market practice of China's state-owned capital to participate in the venture investment in a "challenge" of China's legal system does not constitute the venture capital market interest The premise. So from the macro perspective of law and economic development "concept, and what is the correlation between the two? Or is not really no association? This is the core theory of this paper." there is not necessarily reasonable, but there must be a reason. "This is the business practice the state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market and traditional theory based on contrast, concentrated judged the theme: the rule of law in our country is relatively scarce in the background, state-owned capital is how to establish and develop the venture capital market. And this" Chinese story "presentation and reflection, the true relationship between law and economic development in the context of China in view of this, this paper is divided into the following chapters, in order to give explanation and construction: the first chapter is the introduction to the full text, to clarify the facts and theories is not only between the" paradox ", and tries to put forward clearly The explanation for this topic, which will serve as the theoretical center of the full text: there are two-way interactive structure between law and economic development, on the one hand that the law is to reflect the situation of economic development in a certain period, and even strengthen the denial of inheritance, the law or most probably it did not actually happen "reform. And that early economic development independent legal system; but on the other hand, the law gives to the active attitude, think the law constitutes a constraint for economic development. In order to clarify this point of view in the academic context of the position, this chapter selects" on behalf of a legal and economic development "theory of the four classic the literature (LLSV, Pistor, Coffee, Tsuruhikaru Taro, is also a mutual reflection between them, and that the) two-way interaction between the legal and economic development although can from the literature Study on the relationship between the obtained vaguely perception, but more is unidirectional. Based on this, this paper intends to construct the "legal and economic development" and "interactive structure" is different from "the supremacy of law theory" (law matters) exogenous perspective, that the law is independent of the growth of economic development, non mature rule of law to establish market transactions; but there are one-way law different from the "endogenous legal theory view, only that the law is fixed and presented to the real transaction equilibrium model. The second chapter aims to" Outline "point of view from the fact that China's state-owned capital to participate in the venture investment mode selection, and the subsequent interpretation as an object each chapter of theory. This observation is a spatio-temporal latitude, it can choose from the extraterritorial comparative perspective to clarify China's state-owned capital in state ownership mode; and the line of sight: in 1985-2015 years time The shuttle, and found that even the shareholding pattern of state-owned capital, even in 2002 and has undergone significant changes: direct and indirect. In general, China's state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market is two (mode) features: first, the state-owned capital has always been involved; second, state-owned capital holding (direct and indirect) in which third. The first chapter aims at the characteristics to be theoretical explanation for why the state-owned capital has always been involved in venture investment. Therefore, this chapter compares bank financing, private lending, venture capital and internal shares (VC), four kinds of financial models and the plight of high-tech start-ups, and to determine the necessity of the development of venture capital investment the market. On this basis, this chapter will also discuss failure: herding effect and scale effect of the venture capital market (external), and state-owned capital Participation (regardless of what specific way) for important value to overcome the market failure. In contrast, this chapter will be devoted to another to overcome the market failure of the program -- the "first legislative norms, the dominant mode of development". It is based on the participation of state-owned capital and the "first specification the comparison between the legislative mode leading development", the more certain theoretical perspectives in this chapter: the state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market is the failure to deal with venture capital market (endogenous) rational choice of legislation is not mandatory, dominant mode. In other words, the state-owned capital to participate in the venture investment logic is the market rather than the law, there is relative independence between itself and involved in the design of the legal system. The fourth chapter is from the individual characteristics of China's venture capital market and the lack of rule of Law -- Reputation failure background, to explore why the state-owned capital has always been involved in venture capital ". The main purpose is to explore the state-owned capital in China's venture capital market established, to replace the legal system and the reputation mechanism of the governance effect. Based on this, the three, 42 chapter can distinguish from the premise: the failure of the market, not the same governance risk. Therefore, this chapter begins from the perspective of risk will be summed up as double agent cost, but the early establishment of venture capital market in China not only lack of legal constraints, and the reputation of the informal institutions such as have little effect. At the same time, participation of state-owned capital is due to geographical restrictions and the political connection, and the objective of alternative play reduce agency cost function. The summary: development of state-owned capital to participate in the venture capital market (early) is Relatively independent legal system. The fifth chapter is the second characteristics to explain that the state-owned capital holdings (direct and indirect) why to participate in venture capital. Among them, the legal system difference leads to the co financing of income uncertainty, which affects the way of cooperation (pattern of debt due to the lack of dynamic adjustment of the rule of law requirements higher). A direct investment model, is due to the existing legal system of science and technology contributed to the state-owned capital in human capital, agglomeration advantages, in many aspects, which leads to the state-owned capital to participate in the mode of "path dependence". The reason why the state-owned capital shift to indirect investment, it is because of the law after the change of system and the reputation mechanism play a restraint effect, and the changes in the legal system also led to foreign, private investment and other modes of state-owned capital direct investment Capital has formed the model of competitive pressure. Therefore, the economic development (way) cannot do without restricting the legal system and its change and promotion. The sixth chapter is the conclusion of the paper, as a summary, the extension. On the one hand, through the establishment and development of China's venture capital market model to explain, the inevitable logic of state-owned capital the participation actually belongs to the economic development (with market failure), and the design results are not top of the statutory law. Moreover, participation of state-owned capital is to replace the lack of rule of law and the reputation of the early market failure, so that the economic development (early) on the legal system of the relative independence. At the same time, China's state-owned (direct and indirect) held in the capital in the interpretation of venture investment theory, proof of the economic development (way) cannot do without the legal system constraints and push. On the other hand, this paper No formal legal theory is effective, and the true relationship to the process of investigation of a specific business to fully understand the legal and economic development only. And, by virtue of interactive structure this paper refines the legal and economic development, can be applied to the reform of state-owned enterprises, innovation and other topics to continue the discussion.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：D922.28

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6 趙振宇;王斐俊;;民間資本參與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的瓶頸及政策設(shè)計:以浙江省為例[A];第八屆（2013）中國管理學(xué)年會——金融分會場論文集[C];2013年

7 張亦春;王V鐨，

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