發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-06 20:22

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：制度背景、高管變更與企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新　出處：《華中科技大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 高管變更 技術(shù)創(chuàng)新 短視行為 家族企業(yè) 代際傳承

【摘要】：在我國新常態(tài)時(shí)期的制度背景下,本文考察高管變更及家族企業(yè)代際傳承是否抑制了企業(yè)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新行為。本文將企業(yè)繼任高管的績效壓力和治理環(huán)境內(nèi)生于企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新決策模型中,從高管短視行為視角闡釋我國技術(shù)創(chuàng)新效率低下的一個(gè)理論與現(xiàn)實(shí)邏輯。通過綜合運(yùn)用包括基于傾向得分匹配的雙重差分模型估計(jì)在內(nèi)的諸多定量研究方法進(jìn)行因果關(guān)系的識別,從制度背景層面對因果關(guān)系進(jìn)行全面而審慎地考察,并以家族企業(yè)代際傳承為高管變更的特殊研究場景進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步研究分析,試圖為理解新常態(tài)時(shí)期中國企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新諸多影響因素中的高管行為因素提供一個(gè)新視角。研究內(nèi)容與結(jié)論如下：第一,企業(yè)高管變更后,在信息不對稱和證券市場投資者存在短期資本利得偏好的情形下,繼任高管往往從短視行為邏輯出發(fā),放大企業(yè)短期盈余以緩解績效壓力,進(jìn)而削減研究與開發(fā)支出,減少技術(shù)創(chuàng)新活動(dòng)。對于變更情形的進(jìn)一步分析發(fā)現(xiàn),發(fā)生非自愿離職的公司,外部引進(jìn)繼任高管的公司,繼任者具有較低的管理決策權(quán)力或離任高管具有政治關(guān)聯(lián)的公司,高管變更對于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的負(fù)面影響更為顯著。關(guān)于變更情形的進(jìn)一步考察支持了繼任高管在上任之初更容易選擇短視投資行為的機(jī)制過程推斷。第二,對于制度背景調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)的考察發(fā)現(xiàn),非國有企業(yè)、第一大股東持股比例較低的公司、較少被證券分析師跟蹤的公司或財(cái)務(wù)信息透明度較低的公司在發(fā)生高管變更后,繼任高管受證券市場表現(xiàn)壓力影響更為突出,削減研究與開發(fā)支出的可能性更大,高管變更對于企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的破壞作用更為明顯。第三,本文提供的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)支持了家族企業(yè)代際傳承抑制了企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的論斷。進(jìn)一步地,對于經(jīng)歷了代際傳承的家族企業(yè)而言,具有良好的家族治理、控股權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)、公司治理的公司,代際傳承對于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的破壞作用更弱。同時(shí),通過研究代際傳承中的不利于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的制度困境,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)較差的信息環(huán)境會導(dǎo)致代際傳承后技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力更為急劇的下降�；诖�,我們認(rèn)為,制度困境增加了代際傳承后企業(yè)價(jià)值滑坡的可能性。最后,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)我國家族企業(yè)的代際傳承確實(shí)帶來了比較顯著的價(jià)值損失,而代際傳承后技術(shù)創(chuàng)新水平的下降在代際傳承——價(jià)值損失的因果關(guān)系中發(fā)揮了渠道效應(yīng)。綜上,在我國資本市場有效性不足的情形下,本文提供了金融市場對于實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行存在扭曲效應(yīng)的證據(jù)；豐富了企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新影響因素的研究,驗(yàn)證了一個(gè)解釋技術(shù)創(chuàng)新抑制效應(yīng)的高管短視行為邏輯；對高管變更的研究做出了貢獻(xiàn),高管短視行為亦可以用來分析高管變更后其它經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的內(nèi)在機(jī)制；同時(shí),本文首次以中國大陸家族企業(yè)為研究對象,探索代際傳承與技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的因果關(guān)系。我們認(rèn)為,推進(jìn)我國資本市場建設(shè),扭轉(zhuǎn)客觀上抑制長期價(jià)值投入的資本市場傾向,培育有利于企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的制度環(huán)境,對于企業(yè)的長期發(fā)展和價(jià)值創(chuàng)造將產(chǎn)生積極的促進(jìn)作用。
[Abstract]:In the institutional background of China's new normal period, this paper examines executives change and succession in family business whether inhibition of technology innovation behavior of enterprises. This paper will in enterprise performance pressure and governance environment in the technology innovation decision model of enterprise executives in succession, from a theoretical and practical perspective to interpret the behavior as short logic executives in China technology innovation efficiency. By using double difference identification including propensity score matching based on model estimation, many quantitative research methods of causal relationship, to conduct a comprehensive and careful investigation in the face of a causal relationship from the institutional background layer, and in succession in family business executives to change the scene for special research for further study analysis and try to provide a new perspective for understanding the behaviors of the executives of the new normal period of technological innovation enterprises China factors affecting factors research. The contents and conclusions are as follows: first, corporate executives after the change, there are short-term capital gains preference in the information asymmetry and stock market investors under the condition that the succession executives often starting from short-sighted behavior logic, enlarge the enterprise short-term earnings to alleviate the pressure of performance, and thus reduce the cost of research and development, reduce the activities of technological innovation. For the further analysis of change of circumstances found that the non voluntary turnover of the company, the company executives outside succession, a successor has lower management decision-making power or outgoing executives political association of the company, the high tube negative impact on technology innovation change is more significant. Further investigation about the change situation in support of executive succession in the office at the beginning of more easy to choose the process of inference mechanism short-sighted investment behavior. Second, the institutional background of the regulatory effect of the discovery, the non state-owned enterprises, the first large Shareholding ratio lower, less securities analyst tracking companies or companies with low financial transparency in succession after the change of executives, executives by the securities market pressure effect is more prominent, reduce the possibility of research and development expenditure is greater, for executives to change the destructive effect of enterprise technology innovation is more obvious. Third, the paper provides empirical evidence supporting the family business succession inhibit the enterprise technological innovation thesis. Further, after the inter generational transmission of family enterprises, good family governance, ownership design, corporate governance, intergenerational inheritance for the destruction of technical innovation is weak. At the same time, through the study on the institutional predicament during the succession is not conducive to technological innovation, this paper found that the poor information environment will lead to the intergenerational transmission of technological innovation ability is more urgent after Play down. Based on this, we believe that the dilemma of the system increases the possibility of landslide succession after enterprise value. Finally, this paper found that the intergenerational transmission of family enterprises in China have brought value loss significantly, and the level of technological innovation after the decline in intergenerational inheritance inheritance: play a causal role in value loss channel effect. To sum up, in China's capital market effectiveness is insufficient, this paper provides the financial market for the existence of the distorting effects of evidence of real economy; enrich the research on the influence factors of enterprise technology innovation, proved an innovative interpretation technique suppresses the effect of executives short-sighted behavior logic; contribute to the study of executive changes the executives, short-sighted behavior can also be used for the internal mechanism of economic consequences analysis after the change of executives in this paper; at the same time, Chinese, family Enterprise as the research object, explore the succession and technological innovation. We believe that the causal relationship, promote the construction of China's capital market, reversing the restrained long-term value investment capital market tendency, fostering institutional environment conducive to technological innovation, for the enterprise long-term development and value creation will have a positive role in promoting.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.91;F273.1
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本文編號：1389398