本文關(guān)鍵詞：帶有外部選項(xiàng)的薪酬合同設(shè)計(jì)與運(yùn)營(yíng)決策　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 薪酬設(shè)計(jì) 外部選項(xiàng) 最優(yōu)控制 污染防治 投資決策 展望理論

【摘要】：隨著社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,科學(xué)技術(shù)的不斷進(jìn)步,企業(yè)迎來(lái)重大發(fā)展機(jī)遇的同時(shí)也面臨著諸多挑戰(zhàn),如環(huán)境污染加劇,盲目投資加重,研發(fā)投入不足,員工壓力劇增,人才流失嚴(yán)重等問(wèn)題亟待解決.本文探討了員工存在外部選項(xiàng)(企業(yè)外部的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì))情況下,企業(yè)如何設(shè)計(jì)薪酬合同和制定相關(guān)的運(yùn)營(yíng)決策,如污染防治決策、跨期投資決策、研發(fā)投入決策和員工分配決策等.主要工作包括:研究了帶有外部選項(xiàng)的高管薪酬設(shè)計(jì)與污染防治決策問(wèn)題,其中高管的污染防治能力(私人信息)影響著外部選項(xiàng)和實(shí)施污染防治策略的決定.基于委托代理理論建立了高管薪酬合同與污染防治決策模型,應(yīng)用最優(yōu)控制方法分別求解固定與可變外部選項(xiàng)情形下的委托代理模型,獲得了最優(yōu)薪酬合同與污染防治策略,并探討了外部選項(xiàng)對(duì)于薪酬合同和污染防治策略的影響.研究了存在在職搜尋行為下的高管薪酬設(shè)計(jì)與跨期投資決策問(wèn)題,其中高管的在職搜尋努力水平影響其外部選項(xiàng),跨期投資項(xiàng)目收益為高管的私人信息.為防止高管進(jìn)行在職搜尋并使其努力工作,公司需要制定最優(yōu)的薪酬合同和跨期投資策略.基于委托代理理論構(gòu)建了高管薪酬合同與跨期投資決策模型,應(yīng)用最優(yōu)控制方法分別求解有無(wú)在職搜尋行為的模型,獲得了最優(yōu)薪酬合同和投資策略.研究了非對(duì)稱信息下高管薪酬設(shè)計(jì)與企業(yè)研發(fā)投入問(wèn)題,其中高管決定研發(fā)投入,且研發(fā)項(xiàng)目收益為其私人信息.構(gòu)建了關(guān)于薪酬合同與研發(fā)投入決策的兩期委托代理模型,應(yīng)用極大值原理求解該模型,獲得了最優(yōu)薪酬合同與研發(fā)投入策略,并分別探討了非對(duì)稱信息和可變外部選項(xiàng)對(duì)最優(yōu)薪酬激勵(lì)和研發(fā)投入的影響.研究了考慮工作滿意度時(shí)員工的工作分配問(wèn)題,構(gòu)建了多周期勞動(dòng)力規(guī)劃模型,其中假設(shè)員工為有限理性人,以外部選項(xiàng)為參照點(diǎn),應(yīng)用展望理論刻畫了員工關(guān)于加班時(shí)間的工作滿意度水平.依據(jù)模型特點(diǎn),設(shè)計(jì)了基于逼近方法的聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)算法,并與混合粒子群算法進(jìn)行比較.數(shù)值實(shí)驗(yàn)說(shuō)表明了方法的有效性.
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of social economy and the continuous progress of science and technology, enterprises are facing many challenges, such as environmental pollution, blind investment and insufficient R & D investment. This paper discusses how to design the salary contract and make the relevant operation decisions under the situation of the employees' external options (the employment opportunities outside the enterprise) and other problems such as the sharp increase of employee pressure and the serious brain drain. Such as pollution control decision, intertemporal investment decision, R & D investment decision and employee allocation decision, etc. The main work includes: the executive compensation design and pollution control decision with external options are studied. The ability of executives to prevent and control pollution (private information) affects the decision of external options and the implementation of pollution control strategy. Based on the principal-agent theory, the executive compensation contract and pollution control decision-making model is established. Applying the optimal control method to solve the principal-agent model with fixed and variable external options, the optimal compensation contract and pollution prevention strategy are obtained. The effects of external options on compensation contracts and pollution prevention strategies are also discussed. The executive compensation design and intertemporal investment decisions with on-the-job search behavior are studied. Among them, the level of in-service search efforts of senior executives affects their external options, and the income of intertemporal investment projects is the private information of the executives, to prevent them from conducting on-the-job searches and to make them work hard. The company needs to make the optimal compensation contract and intertemporal investment strategy. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs the executive compensation contract and intertemporal investment decision-making model. The optimal compensation contract and investment strategy are obtained by applying the optimal control method to solve the model with or without on-the-job search behavior, and the problem of executive compensation design and enterprise R & D investment under asymmetric information is studied. The executives decide the R & D investment, and the R & D project income is its private information. A two-period principal-agent model about salary contract and R & D investment decision is constructed, and the maximum value principle is applied to solve the model. The optimal compensation contract and R & D investment strategy are obtained. The effects of asymmetric information and variable external options on the optimal salary incentive and R & D investment are discussed respectively. The employee is assumed to be a limited rational person with external options as the reference point, and the level of employee job satisfaction about overtime is described by applying the prospect theory, according to the characteristics of the model. A joint combat algorithm based on approximation method is designed and compared with the hybrid particle swarm optimization algorithm.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

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