【摘要】：本文針對(duì)京津冀如何形成有效的跨域污染聯(lián)合治理機(jī)制展開(kāi)研究。首先構(gòu)建了跨域合作污染治理的特征函數(shù)及模糊合作博弈的參與度函數(shù)。其次結(jié)合京津冀實(shí)際環(huán)境數(shù)據(jù),利用模糊博弈Shapley值法獲得合作省市成本分?jǐn)偡桨�。最后分析了年平均濃�?年空氣質(zhì)量未達(dá)標(biāo)天數(shù)及環(huán)境污染治理力對(duì)成本分?jǐn)傊档挠绊戧P(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明各省市在評(píng)價(jià)期內(nèi)用于污染治理的資金預(yù)算越大,計(jì)算的模糊博弈參與度越小,且平均濃度及污染天數(shù)與成本分?jǐn)傊党烧壤P(guān)系,環(huán)境污染治理力與成本分?jǐn)傊党煞幢壤P(guān)系。同時(shí)應(yīng)鼓勵(lì)合作省市前期治污的有效投資,在前期投資越大治污效果越好,且后期成本分?jǐn)傊稻驮叫�。�?jù)此本文建立的聯(lián)合治污經(jīng)濟(jì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制能對(duì)參與者起到有效激勵(lì)的作用,促使跨域聯(lián)合治污有效實(shí)施。
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on how to form an effective cross-regional pollution control mechanism in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Firstly, the characteristic function of cross-domain cooperative pollution control and the participation function of fuzzy cooperative game are constructed. Secondly, combined with the actual environmental data of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, the cost-sharing scheme of cooperative provinces and cities is obtained by using the fuzzy game Shapley method. Finally, the relationship between the annual average concentration, the days when the annual air quality is not up to the standard and the environmental pollution control capacity on the cost assessment are analyzed. The results show that the larger the capital budget for pollution control in the evaluation period, the smaller the calculated fuzzy game participation, and that the average concentration and pollution days have a positive proportional relationship with the cost-sharing value. The environmental pollution control ability is inversely proportional to the cost-sharing value. At the same time, we should encourage the effective investment in the early stage of pollution control in the cooperative provinces and cities. The larger the investment in the earlier stage, the better the pollution control effect, and the smaller the cost-sharing value in the later period. Therefore, the coordination mechanism of economic benefits of joint pollution control established in this paper can play an effective incentive role to participants and promote the effective implementation of cross-domain joint treatment of pollution.
【作者單位】： 上海理工大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;上海商學(xué)院商務(wù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71171134) 上海市一流學(xué)科建設(shè)項(xiàng)目(S1201YLXK) 上海市高原學(xué)科(管理科學(xué)與工程) 滬江基金資助項(xiàng)目(A14006)
【分類號(hào)】：X51

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