【摘要】：2016年中央環(huán)保督察取得了較大進(jìn)展,垂直式環(huán)境管理體制改革也已開始試點,環(huán)境管理體制改革向前邁進(jìn)了一步。為了論證這一轉(zhuǎn)變的必要性,本文從納稅大戶的角度出發(fā),揭示了財政激勵在已有的"塊塊式"環(huán)境管理體制中的重要作用。由于財源的建設(shè)和維護(hù)是地方政府財政激勵的基本體現(xiàn),其中納稅大戶是重要保護(hù)對象,這些納稅大戶可能在地方環(huán)境治理中擁有著強(qiáng)大的議價能力。實證結(jié)果表明,地區(qū)污染密集型企業(yè)中納稅大戶占比越大,地區(qū)污染增長越快。路徑分析結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),納稅大戶能夠減弱環(huán)境規(guī)制的效果,意味著納稅大戶能夠一定程度地豁免于環(huán)境規(guī)制;同時,地方政府沒有給予這些納稅大戶直接財政補(bǔ)貼,而是通過稅收征管上的優(yōu)惠給予其一定的隱性補(bǔ)貼。根據(jù)增值稅、營業(yè)稅分成的分樣本和環(huán)保模范城市的分樣本回歸發(fā)現(xiàn),在財政激勵較弱和環(huán)境偏好較強(qiáng)的地區(qū),納稅大戶的污染效應(yīng)明顯減弱。因此,未來環(huán)境治理應(yīng)加快推進(jìn)深化環(huán)保垂直管理體制改革,完善中央環(huán)保督察制度,前者的目的是弱化地方財政激勵對環(huán)保職能的正常履行的影響,后者的目的是強(qiáng)化地方政府環(huán)境質(zhì)量偏好。
[Abstract]:In 2016, the Central Environmental Protection Inspector has made great progress, the vertical environmental management system reform has also begun to pilot, the environmental management system reform has taken a step forward. In order to demonstrate the necessity of this change, this paper reveals the important role of fiscal incentives in the existing "block" environmental management system from the point of view of large tax payers. Since the construction and maintenance of financial resources is the basic embodiment of local government financial incentives, the tax payer is an important object of protection, these tax payers may have a strong bargaining power in the local environmental governance. The empirical results show that the larger the proportion of tax payers in regional pollution-intensive enterprises, the faster the growth of regional pollution. The result of path analysis shows that taxpayers can weaken the effect of environmental regulation, which means that tax payers can be exempted from environmental regulation to a certain extent. At the same time, local governments do not give direct financial subsidies to these tax payers. But through tax collection and administration of preferential treatment to give it a certain implicit subsidies. According to VAT, sample of business tax division and sample regression of environmental protection model city, it is found that the pollution effect of tax payer is obviously weakened in areas with weak fiscal incentive and strong environmental preference. Therefore, in the future, environmental governance should accelerate the deepening of the reform of the vertical environmental protection management system and the improvement of the central environmental protection supervision system. The former aims to weaken the impact of local financial incentives on the normal performance of environmental protection functions. The latter aim is to strengthen the local government environmental quality preference.
【作者單位】： 中國社會科學(xué)院財經(jīng)戰(zhàn)略研究院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金面上項目“交通設(shè)施的空間網(wǎng)絡(luò)特征及其異質(zhì)性產(chǎn)業(yè)集聚效應(yīng)研究”(批準(zhǔn)號71573218);國家自然科學(xué)基金面上項目“中國式政府間環(huán)境事權(quán)劃分研究”(批準(zhǔn)號71673229);國家自然科學(xué)基金青年項目“最低工資與城鎮(zhèn)減貧:影響機(jī)制與實際效果的微觀檢驗”(批準(zhǔn)號71403289)
【分類號】：F812.42;X321
，

本文編號：2201394