本文選題：收益共享契約 + 公平偏好�。� 參考：《生態(tài)經(jīng)濟》2017年05期

【摘要】：針對現(xiàn)有低碳供應鏈決策相關研究中忽略了公平偏好的問題,以Nash討價還價解作為判斷收益分配是否公平的參考標準,基于收益共享契約建立Stackelberg博弈模型,求解得到碳減排量和批發(fā)價格等供應鏈決策,并分析公平偏好的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),收益共享契約有利于供應鏈的碳減排;零售商和供應商的公平偏好都會促進碳減排;而且,公平偏好會影響收益共享契約的批發(fā)價格和收益共享比例兩個參數(shù)的取值。因此,選擇公平偏好較強的企業(yè)構建供應鏈,并根據(jù)自身和供應鏈伙伴公平偏好強度確定恰當?shù)氖找婀蚕砥跫s參數(shù)值,對促進供應鏈碳減排都具有重要意義。
[Abstract]:In view of the neglect of fairness preference in the existing research on low carbon supply chain decision making, a Stackelberg game model based on the income sharing contract is established by using Nash bargaining solution as the reference standard to judge whether the income distribution is fair or not. The supply chain decisions such as carbon abatement and wholesale price are obtained and the influence of fairness preference is analyzed. The study found that revenue-sharing contracts are conducive to carbon emissions reduction in supply chains; that both retailers and suppliers' fair preferences contribute to carbon emissions reduction; and, Fair preference will affect the wholesale price and income sharing ratio of the revenue sharing contract. Therefore, it is of great significance to select enterprises with strong equity preference to construct supply chain, and to determine appropriate benefit sharing contract parameters according to their fair preference intensity and supply chain partners' fair preference, which is of great significance to promote carbon emission reduction in supply chain.
【作者單位】： 重慶交通大學經(jīng)濟與管理學院;重慶理工大學管理學院;
【基金】：國家社會科學基金項目“基于社會偏好及其認知動態(tài)演進的供應鏈契約優(yōu)化與協(xié)調(diào)研究”(16CGL017)
【分類號】：F274;X32
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本文編號：2104355