發(fā)布時間：2018-05-22 08:41

  本文選題：低碳供應鏈 + 合作促銷��； 參考：《科技管理研究》2017年17期

【摘要】：研究由一個努力減排的制造商和一個努力促銷的零售商組成的雙渠道供應鏈的減排與促銷決策問題。首先建立分散決策和集中決策下供應鏈成員的Stackelberg博弈模型,表明集中決策會激勵制造商努力減排、零售商努力促銷及提高供應鏈整體利潤,為此提出合作減排、合作促銷和成本互擔3種合作模式,分別構建博弈模型來分析均衡解。研究表明:3種合作方式分別在不同的條件下能提高供應鏈及各成員的利潤,但是合作減排方式不能激勵零售商努力促銷、合作促銷方式不能激勵制造商努力減排,而成本互擔方式能同時激勵制造商努力減排水平和零售商努力促銷。最后通過數值仿真驗證模型的有效性,并對比分析3種合作方式下消費者對直銷渠道的偏好對供應鏈成員利潤的影響。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the problem of emission reduction and promotion decision in a two-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer who is trying to reduce emissions and a retailer who is trying to promote sales. Firstly, the Stackelberg game model of supply chain members under decentralized and centralized decision is established, which shows that centralized decision will encourage manufacturers to reduce emissions, retailers will strive to promote and increase the overall profit of supply chain, so the cooperative emission reduction is proposed. Three cooperative modes of cooperative promotion and cost sharing are constructed to analyze the equilibrium solution. The research shows that the three ways of cooperation can increase the profit of the supply chain and members under different conditions, but cooperative emission reduction can not motivate retailers to promote sales, and cooperative promotion can not encourage manufacturers to make efforts to reduce emissions. The cost-sharing approach can encourage both manufacturers and retailers to work hard to cut emissions and promote sales. Finally, the effectiveness of the model is verified by numerical simulation, and the influence of consumers' preference for direct selling channels on the profit of supply chain members is compared and analyzed under the three modes of cooperation.
【作者單位】： 上海理工大學管理學院;上海理工大學超網絡研究中心(中國);
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目“基于供需網(SDN)基本特征理念的企業(yè)合作優(yōu)化模型方法研究(71171135) 上海市哲學社會科學規(guī)劃課題“基于供需網合作度的街區(qū)開放判定要素與策略研究”(2016EGL007) 上海高校青年教師培養(yǎng)資助計劃項目“基于自旋玻璃的社會供需網的演化機制研究”(slg14020) 上海市高原學科建設項目“管理科學與工程”
【分類號】：F274;F724;X322
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本文編號：1921375