發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-15 15:08

  本文選題：集體行動(dòng) + 演化博弈��； 參考：《中國(guó)人口·資源與環(huán)境》2017年09期

【摘要】：當(dāng)前京津冀地區(qū)在霧霾問題上面臨環(huán)境外部性困擾和集體行動(dòng)困境,其根源在于地方政府作為霧霾合作治理集體成員的收益是不對(duì)稱的,而割裂集體行動(dòng)中收益與損失之間的聯(lián)系是一種糾正環(huán)境外部性市場(chǎng)失靈的政府失靈。奧爾森集體行動(dòng)的邏輯在京津冀三地政府執(zhí)行霧霾合作治理規(guī)制行為上表現(xiàn)為私人理性與集體理性的動(dòng)態(tài)重復(fù)博弈。針對(duì)京津冀地區(qū)大氣污染聯(lián)防聯(lián)控執(zhí)行狀況,基于集體行動(dòng)的邏輯視角,借助演化經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究工具,構(gòu)建京津冀三地政府在霧霾合作治理執(zhí)行策略的獵鹿模型、拓展模型的演化、隨機(jī)和動(dòng)態(tài)的博弈過程,探究地方政府執(zhí)行霧霾合作治理集體行動(dòng)的行為特征及其影響因素。根據(jù)復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程探討博弈主體行為演化特征和演化穩(wěn)定策略,采用數(shù)值仿真方法分析不同情形下系統(tǒng)演化軌跡及演化均衡狀態(tài),考察隨機(jī)因素對(duì)系統(tǒng)演化均衡狀態(tài)的影響以及實(shí)現(xiàn)區(qū)域環(huán)境合作聯(lián)盟的動(dòng)態(tài)演化均衡機(jī)制。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),京津冀三地政府在霧霾合作治理執(zhí)行過程中的動(dòng)態(tài)演化,很大程度上取決于本地區(qū)在區(qū)域整體中的環(huán)境偏好系數(shù)和搭便車收益與集體行動(dòng)收益的比值。因此,中央政府要健全跨區(qū)域環(huán)境治理的制度建設(shè),為京津冀地區(qū)建立一致的區(qū)域環(huán)境質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn),有效降低地方政府在合作治理霧霾集體行動(dòng)中的搭便車收益,以立法的形式對(duì)約束地方政府承擔(dān)環(huán)境治理責(zé)任的強(qiáng)制和選擇性激勵(lì)措施加以確定。此外,將霧霾造成的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失作為重要指標(biāo)納入地方官員政績(jī)考核體系,加強(qiáng)對(duì)地方政府霧霾治理執(zhí)行情況的監(jiān)管力度,實(shí)現(xiàn)合作治理霧霾集體行動(dòng)責(zé)任落實(shí)的帕累托改進(jìn)。
[Abstract]:At present, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is confronted with environmental externalities and collective action dilemma on the issue of haze, the root of which lies in the asymmetric benefits of local governments as collective members of haze cooperative governance. Separating the relationship between profit and loss in collective action is a kind of government failure which corrects environmental externality market failure. The logic of Olson's collective action is a dynamic repeated game between private rationality and collective rationality in the implementation of haze cooperative governance regulation by Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei governments. Based on the logic perspective of collective action and evolutionary economics research tools, the paper constructs a deer hunting model of the implementation strategy of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei governments in the haze management cooperation, aiming at the implementation of joint air pollution control in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, based on the logic perspective of collective action. Expanding the evolution of the model and the stochastic and dynamic game process, this paper explores the behavior characteristics and influencing factors of the collective action of local government implementing haze cooperative governance. Based on the replicative dynamic equation, the evolution characteristics and evolutionary stability strategies of game players are discussed, and the evolution trajectory and equilibrium state of the system under different conditions are analyzed by numerical simulation method. The influence of random factors on the evolution equilibrium state of the system and the dynamic evolutionary equilibrium mechanism of regional environmental cooperation alliance are investigated. It is found that the dynamic evolution of the three governments in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in the process of implementing cooperative governance of haze depends to a great extent on the regional environmental preference coefficient and the ratio of hitchhiker benefit to collective action income in the region as a whole. Therefore, the central government should improve the system of trans-regional environmental governance, establish a consistent regional environmental quality standard for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, and effectively reduce the hitchhiker benefits of local governments in the cooperative haze collective action. In the form of legislation, the compulsory and selective incentive measures to restrain local governments from assuming responsibility for environmental governance are determined. In addition, taking the economic loss caused by haze as an important index, we should bring it into the performance assessment system of local officials, strengthen the supervision and control of the implementation of local government haze governance, and realize the Pareto improvement of cooperative governance of haze collective action responsibility.
【作者單位】： 東北大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;東北大學(xué)秦皇島分校經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;中國(guó)科學(xué)院科技戰(zhàn)略咨詢研究院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“空間正義視閾下京津冀協(xié)同發(fā)展的城市群治理研究”(批準(zhǔn)號(hào):17BJY054) 河北省自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“基于情景分析的河北省碳減排環(huán)境效應(yīng)與碳市場(chǎng)路徑研究”(批準(zhǔn)號(hào):D2016501095)
【分類號(hào)】：X513

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