本文選題：環(huán)境分權(quán) + 環(huán)境集權(quán)��； 參考：《南京社會(huì)科學(xué)》2017年04期

【摘要】：環(huán)境分權(quán)是政府實(shí)行環(huán)境公共治理的一項(xiàng)重要制度安排,從各國管理實(shí)踐來看,環(huán)境保護(hù)職責(zé)主要通過行政科層制在各級(jí)政府之間實(shí)現(xiàn)合理配置。基于全球78個(gè)國家的數(shù)據(jù)匹配研究表明:環(huán)境分權(quán)制度的平均處理效應(yīng)為負(fù),環(huán)境集權(quán)類國家表現(xiàn)出更好的環(huán)境質(zhì)量;財(cái)政分權(quán)有助于提高環(huán)境治理績效,但隨著政府層級(jí)數(shù)量的增加則顯著弱化環(huán)境分權(quán)治理的執(zhí)行效果。理論上Tiebout假說條件的缺失將導(dǎo)致分權(quán)治理有效的結(jié)論在環(huán)保領(lǐng)域難以實(shí)現(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:Environmental decentralization is an important institutional arrangement for the government to implement environmental public governance. From the management practice of various countries, the responsibility of environmental protection is realized by the administrative level system between governments at all levels. Data matching based on 78 countries in the world shows that the average treatment effect of the environmental decentralization system is negative and the environmental centralization is the category of environmental decentralization. The country shows better environmental quality; fiscal decentralization helps to improve the performance of environmental governance. However, with the increase of the government level, the implementation effect of environmental decentralization is weakened significantly. In theory, the lack of the Tiebout hypothesis will lead to the conclusion that the effectiveness of decentralization governance is difficult to achieve in the environmental protection field.

【作者單位】： 東南大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;南京信息工程大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自科基金青年項(xiàng)目“企業(yè)能力視角下價(jià)值鏈驅(qū)動(dòng)企業(yè)自愿性環(huán)境管理及其環(huán)境績效研究”(71603130) 國家社科基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目“網(wǎng)絡(luò)型差序格局的‘關(guān)系人’經(jīng)濟(jì)行為一般均衡研究”(15AJL004)的階段性成果
【分類號(hào)】：D035;X32
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本文編號(hào)：1774487