【摘要】：奧爾森是集體行動(dòng)理論的代表人物,其理論為集體行動(dòng)問(wèn)題的后續(xù)研究奠定了重要基礎(chǔ),并引起學(xué)術(shù)界的極大反響。但在以往對(duì)奧爾森的研究中,大多是對(duì)他的集體行動(dòng)理論的應(yīng)用性研究,而忽視對(duì)他的理論基礎(chǔ)的剖析。本文試圖從剖析其理論基礎(chǔ)出發(fā),從集體行動(dòng)與發(fā)展的關(guān)系的分析視角對(duì)奧爾森集體行動(dòng)理論脈絡(luò)及其對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的影響進(jìn)行研究并對(duì)其理論給出一個(gè)客觀公允的評(píng)價(jià)。奧爾森從理性人假設(shè)和個(gè)人主義方法論出發(fā),利用公共物品理論成果,對(duì)傳統(tǒng)集團(tuán)理論家堅(jiān)持的集團(tuán)共同利益是其一致行動(dòng)動(dòng)力的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了批判,堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為集體物品使用上的非排他性促使理性個(gè)體搭便車的普遍發(fā)生,這導(dǎo)致了符合每個(gè)人利益的集體物品無(wú)從供給,集體行動(dòng)出現(xiàn)困境。如何走出困境呢?奧爾森提出有別于集體物品普遍性激勵(lì)的選擇性激勵(lì)之路徑選擇。奧爾森用集體行動(dòng)理論解釋國(guó)家興衰之道,認(rèn)為社會(huì)中的利益集團(tuán)如同集團(tuán)中的理性個(gè)人,具有搭便車的天性,他們?cè)诩瘓F(tuán)狹隘利益誘惑下成為分利集團(tuán),其行為扭曲了市場(chǎng)過(guò)程和政府過(guò)程,導(dǎo)致了制度僵化和經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯的社會(huì)后果。政府基于共容利益關(guān)系成為根除利益集團(tuán)分利行為的權(quán)力保障,而由于政府本身作為理性人具有侵吞個(gè)人權(quán)利的可能,在新制度主義影響下,奧爾森提出受制度約束的“強(qiáng)化市場(chǎng)型政府”以加強(qiáng)市場(chǎng)推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展之功能的構(gòu)想。筆者認(rèn)為,奧爾森的理論貢獻(xiàn)集中表現(xiàn)在兩個(gè)方面:將公共物品理論引入集團(tuán)行為的分析中,顛覆了傳統(tǒng)集團(tuán)理論并開創(chuàng)性地建構(gòu)了集體行動(dòng)理論;以利益集團(tuán)與市場(chǎng)、政府的關(guān)系為分析視角,將政府與市場(chǎng)關(guān)系的研究引向深入。不過(guò),奧爾森的理論也存在三個(gè)方面的不足:對(duì)方法論的運(yùn)用出現(xiàn)前后矛盾;對(duì)利益集團(tuán)功能的看法有失偏頗;對(duì)政府權(quán)力的認(rèn)識(shí)偏頗而富有烏托邦色彩。其理論的貢獻(xiàn)使得他成為集體行動(dòng)理論的標(biāo)志性人物,其理論的不足削弱了其理論解釋力并使之遭受學(xué)術(shù)界的質(zhì)疑。
[Abstract]:Olson is a representative of the collective action theory, whose theory lays an important foundation for the follow-up study of collective action, and causes a great reaction in academic circles. However, in the previous studies of Olson, most of them were applied research on his collective action theory, but ignored the analysis of his theoretical basis. This paper attempts to study Olson's theory of collective action and its influence on economic development from the perspective of analyzing the relationship between collective action and development, and gives an objective and fair evaluation of his theory. On the basis of rational man hypothesis and individualism methodology, Olson criticizes the traditional group theorists' view that the common interests of the group are the driving force of their concerted action, using the results of the theory of public goods. It is believed that the non-exclusiveness in the use of collective goods promotes the common occurrence of hitchhiking for rational individuals, which leads to the lack of supply of collective goods which conforms to the interests of everyone, and the predicament of collective action. How to get out of this predicament? Olson put forward the path choice of selective incentive, which is different from the general incentive of collective goods. Olson explained the rise and fall of a country with the theory of collective action, believing that interest groups in society, like rational individuals in groups, had the nature of hitchhiking, and they were seduced by the narrow interests of the group to become profit-sharing groups. Its behavior distorts the market process and the government process, and leads to the social consequence of institutional rigidity and economic stagnation. On the basis of the common interest relationship, the government has become the power guarantee to eradicate the behavior of interest division of interest groups. However, because the government itself, as a rational person, has the possibility of embezzling individual rights, it is under the influence of new institutionalism. Olson put forward the idea of "strengthening market government" to strengthen the function of market to promote economic development. The author believes that Olson's theoretical contributions are concentrated in two aspects: the introduction of public goods theory into the analysis of group behavior, the subversion of traditional group theory and the groundbreaking construction of collective action theory, and the establishment of collective action theory by interest groups and markets. The relationship between government and market is deeply studied from the perspective of analysis. However, Olson's theory also has three shortcomings: the application of methodology is inconsistent, the view of interest group function is biased, and the understanding of government power is partial and utopian. The contribution of his theory makes him the iconic figure of the theory of collective action, and the deficiency of his theory weakens his theoretical explanation and makes him be questioned by the academic circles.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D09

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前5條

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相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

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3 袁青;集體行動(dòng)的破解之道[D];華中師范大學(xué);2014年

4 房秀蘭;居民參與社區(qū)治理的理性思考[D];蘇州大學(xué);2014年

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本文編號(hào)：2252626