本文選題：跨區(qū)公共服務(wù) + 市場性排斥　； 參考：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】：當前,隨著我國經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展和城市化進程的不斷推進,城市逐漸成為人們生存與生活的主要載體,也成為經(jīng)濟、文化、信息、資源交匯的重要場所。與此同時,面對著市民日益增長的公共服務(wù)需求,城市轄區(qū)政府更多的傾向于以集體行動代替?zhèn)鹘y(tǒng)的單獨提供公共服務(wù)的方式來實現(xiàn)公共治理的目標,而如何深層次的協(xié)調(diào)集體行動主體之間的關(guān)系,防止合作過程中的集體行動困境,這將成為城市轄區(qū)政府有效提供公共服務(wù)的關(guān)鍵,也成為公共治理目標實現(xiàn)的核心。因此,對城市跨區(qū)公共服務(wù)供給中政府集體行動根源的探究顯得尤為重要。 城市轄區(qū)政府集體行動是指城市轄區(qū)政府基于共同獲益的利益結(jié)構(gòu)和獲益預(yù)期而采取的共同行動及其行為過程,其本質(zhì)則是集體行動參與者之間的博弈過程。西方學(xué)者所倡導(dǎo)的集體行動研究的博弈論視角及其核心思想——“囚徒困境”,“集體行動的邏輯”,“阿羅悖論”為我們的研究提供了很好的平臺。通過把集體行動的三大模型引入到城市跨區(qū)公共服務(wù)供給的具體環(huán)境中,并結(jié)合集體行動的理論基礎(chǔ),我們研究發(fā)現(xiàn),城市轄區(qū)政府跨區(qū)公共服務(wù)供給過程中的集體行動困境主要源于以下三個因素,即,不確定性,外部性與內(nèi)生結(jié)構(gòu)性。而基于公共決策機制的內(nèi)生結(jié)構(gòu)性變量是引發(fā)集體行動困境的內(nèi)在根源,不確定性、外部性所引發(fā)的“道德風險”與“逆向選擇”是其外在表現(xiàn),本文正是基于這條主線展開研究和寫作的。 公共服務(wù)供給的市場性排斥使得政府成為公共服務(wù)供給的唯一主體,而政府決策機制的結(jié)構(gòu)性排斥又使得政府對公共服務(wù)的供給力不從心,這主要源于提供公共服務(wù)并不是政府采取行動的根本出發(fā)點,獲取政治資源與行政租金才是政府存在的最大目標,這使得城市政府,尤其是自身資源有限的城市轄區(qū)政府在公共需求的發(fā)現(xiàn)方面是被動的,在公共服務(wù)的供給方面是非理性的,在治理結(jié)果上是尋求自身利益最大化的,更是缺少問責機制約束的。因此,本文基于政府經(jīng)濟人的假設(shè),提出公共決策機制是引發(fā)城市轄區(qū)政府集體行動困境的重要動因,而一系列行之有效的制度安排是避免政府集體行動的有效措施。 本文既是對西方學(xué)術(shù)成果的繼承,也是對國內(nèi)傳統(tǒng)研究領(lǐng)域的突破。我們以“跨區(qū)公共服務(wù)”為切入點,運用公共管理學(xué)和經(jīng)濟學(xué)的相關(guān)理論與研究方法,對城市轄區(qū)政府集體行動困境的根源、外在表現(xiàn)進行了深度分析,彌補了國內(nèi)現(xiàn)有研究存在的缺陷,把學(xué)術(shù)研究的觸角首度延伸到城市微觀與宏觀的交叉地帶。但是,由于本文是從純理論的角度對城市跨區(qū)公共服務(wù)供給中政府集體行動困境進行的分析,缺乏數(shù)據(jù)上的支持,使得論文顯得十分單薄,但至少為今后城市公共治理的研究提供了一個方向。
[Abstract]:At present, with the development of our country's economy and the development of urbanization, cities are becoming the main carrier of people's existence and life, as well as the important places where economy, culture, information and resources intersect. At the same time, in the face of the increasing demand for public services, the governments of urban districts tend to replace the traditional way of providing public services by collective action to achieve the goal of public governance. How to coordinate the relationship between the subjects of collective action and prevent the plight of collective action in the process of cooperation will become the key to the effective provision of public services by the government of urban districts and the core of the realization of the goal of public governance. Therefore, it is particularly important to explore the root causes of government collective action in the supply of public services in urban cross-districts. The collective action of the government in urban district refers to the common action and its course of action taken by the government of urban district based on the benefit structure and expectation of mutual benefit, and its essence is the game process among the participants of collective action. The game theory angle of view and its core thought of collective action research advocated by western scholars "Prisoner's Dilemma", "Logic of Collective Action" and "Arrow Paradox" provide a good platform for our research. By introducing the three models of collective action into the specific environment of public service supply in urban cross-district, and combining the theoretical basis of collective action, we find that, The dilemma of collective action in the process of public service supply in urban districts is mainly caused by the following three factors: uncertainty, externality and endogenous structure. The endogenous structural variables based on the public decision-making mechanism are the internal source of collective action dilemma, uncertainty, "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" caused by externality are its external manifestation. This paper is based on this main line of research and writing. The market exclusion of the public service supply makes the government become the only main body of the public service supply, and the structural exclusion of the government decision-making mechanism makes the government unable to supply the public service. This is mainly due to the fact that the provision of public services is not the fundamental starting point for government action. It is the access to political resources and administrative rent that is the greatest goal of the government. In particular, the government of urban districts with limited resources is passive in the discovery of public demand, irrational in the supply of public services, seeking maximum self-interest in the governance results, and lack of accountability mechanism constraints. Therefore, based on the assumption of government economic man, this paper puts forward that the public decision-making mechanism is an important motivation to trigger the plight of collective action of the government in urban areas, and a series of effective institutional arrangements are effective measures to avoid collective action of government. This paper not only inherits the western academic achievements, but also breaks through the domestic traditional research field. Based on the cross-district public service, using the relevant theories and research methods of public management and economics, this paper makes a deep analysis of the causes and external manifestations of the plight of collective action of the governments in urban districts. It makes up for the defects of the existing research in China, and extends the tentacles of academic research to the intersection of urban micro and macro for the first time. However, due to the analysis of the plight of government collective action in the supply of public services in urban cross-area from the point of view of pure theory, the paper is very thin because of the lack of data support. But at least for the future study of urban public governance provides a direction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D035

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 李梅華;;困擾鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府供給公共物品的道德風險研究[J];安陽工學(xué)院學(xué)報;2010年01期

2 陳毅;;走出集體行動困境的四種途徑[J];長白學(xué)刊;2007年01期

3 馮云廷,駱德武;論城市公共服務(wù)的有效供給——政府與民間投資的互補性貢獻與制度安排[J];財經(jīng)問題研究;2003年06期

4 馮巨章;;西方集體行動理論的演化與進展[J];財經(jīng)問題研究;2006年08期

5 余興厚;;跨行政區(qū)公共服務(wù)提供機制與對策分析[J];重慶工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(西部論壇);2009年06期

6 任立兵;李冰;;中西城市公共服務(wù)比較分析[J];東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2007年04期

7 楊立華;;構(gòu)建多元協(xié)作性社區(qū)治理機制解決集體行動困境——一個“產(chǎn)品-制度”分析(PIA)框架[J];公共管理學(xué)報;2007年02期

8 林閩鋼;危機事件與集體行動邏輯[J];江海學(xué)刊;2004年01期

9 吳梅;張忠勇;;個體與集體之爭——兼論集體行動的邏輯悖論[J];理論與改革;2005年06期

10 顧麗梅;新公共服務(wù)理論及其對我國公共服務(wù)改革之啟示[J];南京社會科學(xué);2005年01期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 金南順;城市公共服務(wù)研究[D];東北財經(jīng)大學(xué);2006年

，

本文編號：2048373