正義感是人的首要美德——羅爾斯雙重理性假設(shè)之考察
發(fā)布時間:2018-06-15 08:43
本文選題:羅爾斯 + 理性; 參考:《吉林大學(xué)社會科學(xué)學(xué)報》2016年04期
【摘要】:針對羅爾斯提出正義理論屬于理性選擇理論的見解,批評者表示,羅爾斯是康德主義者,康德道德理性學(xué)說沖突于理性選擇理論的理性人假設(shè)。羅爾斯在康德的道德人觀念基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建一套細(xì)致的正義原則證明程序。他的兩個基本理念"自由平等的道德人"理念和"社會合作體系的社會"理念,與理性選擇理論倡導(dǎo)的理念截然不同。后者將社會視為基于個人理性的競爭性協(xié)調(diào)體系,生活于其中的理性人以追求效用最大化為目的。通過考察可知,羅爾斯提出的是一種雙重理性假設(shè),它既源于康德道德哲學(xué),又超越康德道德哲學(xué)。單從理性選擇視角批評羅爾斯正義原則的辯護(hù)邏輯有失偏頗。羅爾斯描繪了這樣一個良序社會,正義感是生活于其中成員的首要美德;公平正義是自由平等且通情達(dá)理者的理性選擇。羅爾斯晚年對公共理性的推崇,改變了其早期對個人理性的偏好,其公共理性觀念是"通情達(dá)理的人"觀念的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In view of Rawls' opinion that justice theory belongs to rational choice theory, critics say that Rawls is a Kantian, and Kant's moral rationality theory conflicts with rational man hypothesis of rational choice theory. Rawls constructed a detailed procedure of proof of justice principle on the basis of Kant's idea of moral man. His two basic concepts, "free and equal moral person" and "society of social cooperation system", are completely different from those advocated by rational choice theory. The latter regards society as a competitive coordination system based on individual rationality, in which rational people pursue utility maximization. Through investigation, Rawls put forward a double rational hypothesis, which originated from Kant's moral philosophy and transcended Kant's moral philosophy. It is biased to criticize Rawls' defense logic of justice principle from the angle of rational choice. Rawls depicts a well-ordered society in which the sense of justice is the primary virtue of the members of the society and justice is the rational choice of the free equal and reasonable. Rawls' respect for public rationality in his later years changed his early preference for personal rationality, and his concept of public rationality was the development of the concept of "reasonable man".
【作者單位】: 浙江大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院政治學(xué)系;浙江大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家社會科學(xué)基金重點項目(13AZX016);國家社會科學(xué)基金重大項目(14ZDB022)
【分類號】:D091
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1 鄧;李海青;;政治哲學(xué)視野中的公共理性的特點[J];資料通訊;2007年02期
2 史云貴;黃炯z,
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