本文選題：政治關(guān)聯(lián) + 內(nèi)部治理��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：迄今為止,西方國(guó)家已經(jīng)掀起了5次并購(gòu)浪潮,并購(gòu)已經(jīng)成為實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)規(guī)模擴(kuò)張甚至是全球范圍內(nèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)資源優(yōu)化配置的重要方式之一。但從國(guó)內(nèi)的并購(gòu)實(shí)踐來(lái)看,隨著我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)分置改革的逐步完成,以及國(guó)內(nèi)資本市場(chǎng)的進(jìn)一步完善,我國(guó)上市公司并購(gòu)進(jìn)入新的發(fā)展階段,無(wú)論是并購(gòu)目的還是并購(gòu)方式等方面都呈現(xiàn)出不同的特點(diǎn)。在新的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)下,上市公司并購(gòu)呈現(xiàn)出新的特點(diǎn),也要求對(duì)企業(yè)并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略選擇問(wèn)題從新的視角進(jìn)行深入研究。并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略是公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)治理、高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制等因素共同影響下選擇的。而政治關(guān)聯(lián)既是一種政治聯(lián)系存在,也是一種資源獲取渠道,影響著公司的戰(zhàn)略決策。因此,本文將政治關(guān)聯(lián)、內(nèi)部治理與并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略選擇納入一個(gè)研究框架當(dāng)中,并采用理論與實(shí)證相結(jié)合的研究方法,對(duì)三者的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了深入研究。本文通過(guò)選取2009-2013年我國(guó)上市公司發(fā)生在并購(gòu)重組市場(chǎng)中的所有并購(gòu)事件為樣本來(lái)研究政治關(guān)聯(lián)、內(nèi)部治理與并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略選擇之間的關(guān)系。首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了綜述,分析了政治關(guān)聯(lián)、內(nèi)部治理與并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略選擇三者的相互作用機(jī)理,接著提出研究假設(shè),運(yùn)用Logit回歸模型,借助于計(jì)量軟件對(duì)樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,得出政治關(guān)聯(lián)、內(nèi)部治理與并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略選擇之間關(guān)系的結(jié)論。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):國(guó)有股比例越高的企業(yè),越傾向于進(jìn)行相關(guān)并購(gòu)活動(dòng);董事會(huì)規(guī)模越大或者獨(dú)立董事比例越高,企業(yè)越傾向于進(jìn)入相關(guān)行業(yè),采取相關(guān)并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略;相關(guān)并購(gòu)也多發(fā)生在獨(dú)立董事比例較高的企業(yè)中;高管持股比例越高,他們?cè)絻A向于推動(dòng)企業(yè)進(jìn)入非相關(guān)行業(yè),進(jìn)行非相關(guān)并購(gòu);在政治關(guān)聯(lián)作為調(diào)節(jié)變量的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)中卻只有部分假設(shè)得到了證實(shí),即政治關(guān)聯(lián)正向調(diào)節(jié)國(guó)有股比例與并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略選擇之間的關(guān)系,政治關(guān)聯(lián)對(duì)高管持股比例與并購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略選擇之間的關(guān)系有正向調(diào)節(jié)作用。最后,本文在上述研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上得出一些有益的啟示。
[Abstract]:Up to now, there have been five waves of M & A in western countries, and M & A has become one of the most important ways to realize the expansion of enterprise scale and even the optimal allocation of resources in the world. However, from the point of view of domestic M & A practice, with the gradual completion of the split share structure reform of listed companies in China and the further improvement of the domestic capital market, the M & A of listed companies in China has entered a new stage of development. Both the purpose of M & A and the mode of M & A show different characteristics. Under the new economic situation, M & A of listed companies presents new characteristics, and it also requires a further study on the strategic choice of M & A from a new perspective. M & A strategy is chosen under the influence of ownership structure, board governance, executive incentive mechanism and so on. Political connection is not only a kind of political connection, but also a resource acquisition channel, which influences the company's strategic decision. Therefore, this paper brings the political relationship, internal governance and strategic choice of M & A into a research framework, and makes a deep study of the relationship between the three by using the research method of combining theory with empirical research. In this paper, we choose all the M & A events in the M & A market of listed companies in China from 2009-2013 as samples to study the relationship between political correlation, internal governance and strategic choice of M & A. First of all, this paper summarizes the domestic and foreign research literature, analyzes the interaction mechanism of political connection, internal governance and strategic choice of M & A, and then puts forward the research hypothesis and applies Logit regression model. With the help of econometric software, the empirical analysis of sample data is carried out, and the conclusion is drawn that there is a relationship among political association, internal governance and strategic choice of M & A. It is found that the higher the proportion of state-owned shares, the more inclined to conduct related M & A activities; the larger the size of the board of directors or the higher the proportion of independent directors, the more inclined enterprises are to enter relevant industries and adopt relevant M & A strategies. Related mergers and acquisitions also occur in enterprises with a high proportion of independent directors. The higher the proportion of senior management ownership, the more inclined they are to push enterprises into non-related industries and conduct non-related mergers and acquisitions. However, in the empirical test of political association as a regulating variable, only some hypotheses have been confirmed, that is, the relationship between the proportion of state-controlled shares and the strategic choice of M & A is positively adjusted by political association. The political connection has a positive effect on the relationship between the proportion of senior managers' shareholding and the strategic choice of M & A. Finally, on the basis of the above conclusions, this paper draws some useful enlightenment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D0;F271;F272

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

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本文編號(hào)：1897850