本文選題：普遍人權(quán)　切入點：理性　出處：《清華法學(xué)》2017年04期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：在傳統(tǒng)的法學(xué)理念和法律制度中,人權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)被奠定在理性主義之上。然而,理性主義人權(quán)觀能夠解釋和論證權(quán)利的基礎(chǔ),但很難講明權(quán)利擴(kuò)大到最廣大的"人"的范圍的道理。從思想史和法律史來看,理性主義的人權(quán)觀容易導(dǎo)致人權(quán)的保護(hù)范圍在國內(nèi)法上被限定在特定的群體之中,而人權(quán)的實現(xiàn)領(lǐng)域在國際層面局限于特定的政治共同體之中,也即理性主義的人權(quán)觀念排除了非理性的"非人"的人權(quán),從而無法實現(xiàn)人權(quán)的普遍性。從歷史來看,普遍性的人權(quán)觀念及其制度實踐須構(gòu)筑于道德情感的基礎(chǔ)之上,也即人們在情感層面認(rèn)識到無論種族、膚色、階層、族裔等差異有多大,在內(nèi)心的痛苦感受力層面都是平等的,由此方能通過"移情"來在人心之中建立普遍人權(quán)的觀念。
[Abstract]:In the traditional jurisprudence and legal system, the foundation of human rights is laid on the basis of rationalism. However, it is difficult to state the truth that rights should be extended to the broadest range of "human beings". From the perspective of the history of thought and the history of law, rationalist views of human rights tend to lead to the limitation of the protection of human rights in domestic law to specific groups. However, the realisation of human rights is confined to a specific political community at the international level, that is, the rational concept of human rights excludes the irrational "inhuman" human rights and thus cannot realize the universality of human rights. The universal concept of human rights and its institutional practice must be based on moral feelings, that is, people realize at the emotional level how different race, colour, class, ethnicity and so on are, and are equal in terms of inner pain sensitivity, In this way, the concept of universal human rights can be established through empathy.
【作者單位】： 清華大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【基金】：清華大學(xué)自主科研計劃資助
【分類號】：D082
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本文編號：1571280