皖南事變嚴(yán)重?fù)p失的原因分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-12-15 17:58
【摘要】： 研究新四軍的征戰(zhàn)史,皖南事變是一個不容回避的問題,這是史學(xué)界公認(rèn)的一個事實。皖南事變是我黨建軍歷史上少有的可以用慘敗來形容的事件。皖南事變問題的研究自十一屆三中全會以后開始起步并逐漸深入。30多年的研究已經(jīng)取得相當(dāng)大的成果,對皖南事變發(fā)生的原因、經(jīng)過和結(jié)果都進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的考證,取得了很多的成果,皖南事變越來越接近于史實。不同于過去的把皖南事變嚴(yán)重?fù)p失歸于某人或者某個團(tuán)體的研究,通過對當(dāng)時黨中央和新四軍應(yīng)對皖南事變的行為或者方法的研究,從黨的內(nèi)部(包括新四軍)的行為決策角度來研究造成皖南事變嚴(yán)重?fù)p失的原因。首先,應(yīng)當(dāng)承認(rèn)皖南事變是不可避免的,從當(dāng)時的國際情況來說,日本的誘降,英美的拉攏,蘇聯(lián)的支援,都讓蔣介石感到現(xiàn)在的國際環(huán)境是有利于他反共的。國內(nèi)形勢直接導(dǎo)致了事變的發(fā)生,蔣介石在華北的失敗使其把重要力量都集中在了皖南新四軍,而共產(chǎn)黨的發(fā)展與壯大讓蔣介石感到恐懼。根本原因就是階級矛盾,兩個階級的對抗是不可避免的。 關(guān)于皖南事變嚴(yán)重?fù)p失的原因應(yīng)該是兩個方面的:國民黨方面和共產(chǎn)黨方面。我黨的內(nèi)部又有兩個方面:從黨中央來說,黨對時局的一些錯誤認(rèn)識,導(dǎo)致了黨和新四軍對國民黨的反共之心沒有正確的認(rèn)識,還有就是黨沒有解決好項英和葉挺的矛盾,不利于新四軍的指揮。就新四軍方面來說,北移決策的猶豫不定讓國民黨的包圍布置有了充裕的時間,北移選擇路線的危險性讓新四軍直接走進(jìn)了敵人的包圍圈,北移過程中指揮的失誤讓新四軍最終損失慘重。 皖南事變的失敗給了我黨沉重的教訓(xùn)。啟示我們要在維護(hù)中央的權(quán)威與地方的積極性的同時,正確處理中央與地方的關(guān)系,這是是十分必要的。另外,對當(dāng)代我黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的社會主義建設(shè)來說,我們應(yīng)當(dāng)建立健全黨對突發(fā)事件的應(yīng)對機(jī)制。必須樹立憂患意識,并制定相應(yīng)的應(yīng)對方案,重要的是要提高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的應(yīng)變能力。
[Abstract]:To study the history of the New fourth Army, the Southern Anhui incident is an unavoidable problem, which is recognized as a fact in the field of history. The Southern Anhui incident is a rare event in the history of our Party's army building that can be described as tragic defeat. Since the third Plenary session of the Eleventh Central Committee, the research on the issue of the incident in southern Anhui has started and gradually deepened. Over 30 years of research, considerable achievements have been made. The reasons, the process and the results of the incident in southern Anhui have been thoroughly studied. A lot of achievements have been made, and the Southern Anhui incident is getting closer and closer to the historical facts. Different from the past research on attributing serious losses to someone or a certain group in the Southern Anhui incident, through the study of the behavior or methods of the CPC Central Committee and the New fourth Army to deal with the Southern Anhui incident at that time, This paper studies the causes of the serious loss of the Southern Anhui incident from the angle of the behavior decision-making within the Party (including the New fourth Army). First of all, it should be admitted that the Southern Anhui incident was inevitable. From the international situation at that time, the inducement of Japan, the connivance of Britain and the United States, and the support of the Soviet Union, all made Jiang Jieshi feel that the current international environment was favourable to his anti-Communism. The domestic situation directly led to the incident, Jiang Jieshi's failure in North China made him concentrate his important forces on the New fourth Army in southern Anhui, while the development and growth of the Communist Party made Jiang Jieshi feel frightened. The root cause is class contradiction, and confrontation between the two classes is inevitable. There should be two reasons for the serious loss of the Southern Anhui incident: the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. There are also two aspects of our Party: from the party Central Committee, some of the Party's misunderstandings of the current situation have led to a lack of correct understanding between the Party and the New fourth Army of the Kuomintang's anti-Communist mentality, and the failure of the Party to solve the contradictions between Xiang Ying and Ye Ting. Against the command of the New fourth Army. As far as the New fourth Army is concerned, the hesitancy in the decision to move northward has given the Kuomintang ample time to arrange its encirclement, and the danger of moving northward in choosing a route has allowed the New fourth Army to enter the enemy's encirclement directly. The mistakes in command during the northward movement resulted in heavy losses for the New fourth Army. The failure of the Southern Anhui incident taught our Party a heavy lesson. It is very necessary for us to correctly handle the relationship between the central and local governments while safeguarding the authority of the central authorities and the initiative of the localities. In addition, for the socialist construction led by our Party, we should establish and perfect the Party's response mechanism to emergencies. We must set up a sense of suffering and formulate corresponding coping plans. It is important to improve the ability of leaders to cope with emergencies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：K265
本文編號：2381061
[Abstract]:To study the history of the New fourth Army, the Southern Anhui incident is an unavoidable problem, which is recognized as a fact in the field of history. The Southern Anhui incident is a rare event in the history of our Party's army building that can be described as tragic defeat. Since the third Plenary session of the Eleventh Central Committee, the research on the issue of the incident in southern Anhui has started and gradually deepened. Over 30 years of research, considerable achievements have been made. The reasons, the process and the results of the incident in southern Anhui have been thoroughly studied. A lot of achievements have been made, and the Southern Anhui incident is getting closer and closer to the historical facts. Different from the past research on attributing serious losses to someone or a certain group in the Southern Anhui incident, through the study of the behavior or methods of the CPC Central Committee and the New fourth Army to deal with the Southern Anhui incident at that time, This paper studies the causes of the serious loss of the Southern Anhui incident from the angle of the behavior decision-making within the Party (including the New fourth Army). First of all, it should be admitted that the Southern Anhui incident was inevitable. From the international situation at that time, the inducement of Japan, the connivance of Britain and the United States, and the support of the Soviet Union, all made Jiang Jieshi feel that the current international environment was favourable to his anti-Communism. The domestic situation directly led to the incident, Jiang Jieshi's failure in North China made him concentrate his important forces on the New fourth Army in southern Anhui, while the development and growth of the Communist Party made Jiang Jieshi feel frightened. The root cause is class contradiction, and confrontation between the two classes is inevitable. There should be two reasons for the serious loss of the Southern Anhui incident: the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. There are also two aspects of our Party: from the party Central Committee, some of the Party's misunderstandings of the current situation have led to a lack of correct understanding between the Party and the New fourth Army of the Kuomintang's anti-Communist mentality, and the failure of the Party to solve the contradictions between Xiang Ying and Ye Ting. Against the command of the New fourth Army. As far as the New fourth Army is concerned, the hesitancy in the decision to move northward has given the Kuomintang ample time to arrange its encirclement, and the danger of moving northward in choosing a route has allowed the New fourth Army to enter the enemy's encirclement directly. The mistakes in command during the northward movement resulted in heavy losses for the New fourth Army. The failure of the Southern Anhui incident taught our Party a heavy lesson. It is very necessary for us to correctly handle the relationship between the central and local governments while safeguarding the authority of the central authorities and the initiative of the localities. In addition, for the socialist construction led by our Party, we should establish and perfect the Party's response mechanism to emergencies. We must set up a sense of suffering and formulate corresponding coping plans. It is important to improve the ability of leaders to cope with emergencies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：K265
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