本文選題：責(zé)任內(nèi)閣制 + 總統(tǒng)集權(quán)制　； 參考：《武漢大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：責(zé)任內(nèi)閣制系指享有主權(quán)的國(guó)民通過行使政治決斷權(quán)產(chǎn)生出的代議制的政權(quán)組織形式。行政權(quán)與立法權(quán)相互制約平衡是其突出特征,國(guó)民主權(quán)、有限政府是責(zé)任內(nèi)閣體制背后的理念。近代中國(guó)仿行大陸法系國(guó)家進(jìn)行了內(nèi)閣制的實(shí)踐,經(jīng)歷了皇權(quán)體制下的內(nèi)閣制、三權(quán)分立下的內(nèi)閣制、五權(quán)分治下的內(nèi)閣制三個(gè)階段。其間,圍繞著內(nèi)閣制還是總統(tǒng)制更適合中國(guó)國(guó)情,中國(guó)人進(jìn)行了多種實(shí)踐,出現(xiàn)了一種奇特的現(xiàn)象：凡是規(guī)定內(nèi)閣制的憲法多未得到實(shí)施,凡是實(shí)施中的憲法均為總統(tǒng)集權(quán)制。這即是說,近現(xiàn)代中國(guó)內(nèi)閣制存在嚴(yán)重的文本表達(dá)與政治實(shí)踐的背離。究其原因,中國(guó)責(zé)任內(nèi)閣體制建設(shè)屬于政權(quán)主導(dǎo)型,自上而下是其路徑選擇,這肯定要經(jīng)歷一個(gè)分權(quán)——集權(quán)——分權(quán)的過程,但無(wú)論是主張內(nèi)閣制還是總統(tǒng)集權(quán)制,制度設(shè)計(jì)背后展現(xiàn)的理念都不是國(guó)民主權(quán)、三權(quán)分立的有限政府,而是諸權(quán)歸于一元。傳統(tǒng)政治文化中的一元集權(quán)傳統(tǒng)隨著近代立憲進(jìn)程而沉潛入中國(guó)人的思想觀念深層,通過語(yǔ)言、思維方式影響中國(guó)人的行為選擇。無(wú)論是革命黨人、立憲派還是后來的北洋軍閥、國(guó)民黨統(tǒng)治集團(tuán),內(nèi)閣制實(shí)踐呈現(xiàn)出的特色是最高決策權(quán)本身獨(dú)立,不受任何制約,在此以下通過權(quán)力單項(xiàng)傳遞設(shè)置各級(jí)各類衙門行使具體統(tǒng)治權(quán)。這反應(yīng)了一元文化在近現(xiàn)代責(zé)任內(nèi)閣體制變遷時(shí)的承續(xù)與傳遞。 本文以法律文化學(xué)的分析方法為研究路徑,通過考察近現(xiàn)代中國(guó)內(nèi)閣體制的變遷來為中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義政權(quán)組織體制建設(shè)提供歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)。具體而言,本文分為三大部分,五章。第一章為第一部分,主要是比較視野下的基本理論分析,即“責(zé)任內(nèi)閣思想傳入的中國(guó)語(yǔ)境”。首先,本章考察了西方責(zé)任內(nèi)閣的理念與制度,國(guó)民主權(quán)、有限政府是英法美德日諸國(guó)內(nèi)閣制度的基本理念,各國(guó)因地制宜設(shè)計(jì)的責(zé)任內(nèi)閣制度反映了西方自由主義傳統(tǒng)的深深影響。其次,本章考察了中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)政治文化與內(nèi)閣的關(guān)系,并就中國(guó)歷史上的內(nèi)閣制度進(jìn)行分析,服從于專制皇權(quán)、價(jià)值指向的一元主義決定了中國(guó)歷史上的內(nèi)閣制不能轉(zhuǎn)化為責(zé)任內(nèi)閣制度。再次,本章考察了西方責(zé)任內(nèi)閣思想傳入的歷史機(jī)緣、傳入歷程及傳入時(shí)與中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)文化的沖突整合。 第二部分為歷史考察視野下的近代內(nèi)閣制,即按照統(tǒng)治形態(tài)的不同對(duì)近現(xiàn)代中國(guó)內(nèi)閣體制變遷進(jìn)行研究。其中,第二章為“皇權(quán)體制下的內(nèi)閣制”。首先,本章考察了清末立憲思潮中關(guān)于內(nèi)閣制的論爭(zhēng)與設(shè)想。其次,本章對(duì)《欽定憲法大綱》和《十九信條》體系下的內(nèi)閣制的表達(dá)與實(shí)踐進(jìn)行深入分析,并對(duì)皇權(quán)體制下內(nèi)閣制表達(dá)與實(shí)踐的分離進(jìn)行原因分析。 第三章為“三權(quán)分立下的內(nèi)閣制”。首先,本章對(duì)中國(guó)歷史上第一個(gè)也是唯一一個(gè)資產(chǎn)階級(jí)性質(zhì)的文件——《臨時(shí)約法》設(shè)計(jì)的內(nèi)閣制進(jìn)行規(guī)范分析,指出這種包藏革命黨人控制國(guó)家大權(quán)心思的片面內(nèi)閣制(或稱內(nèi)閣專權(quán)制)具有先天缺陷,且開創(chuàng)了工具主義憲法的惡劣先例。其次,本章圍繞著內(nèi)閣制變遷這條主線,對(duì)北洋軍閥統(tǒng)治時(shí)期的政權(quán)組織形式進(jìn)行總體分析,并以“賄選憲法”下的內(nèi)閣制為個(gè)案分析的樣本,冷面分析此一時(shí)期風(fēng)起云涌的制憲風(fēng)潮。此一時(shí)期憲法文件不斷出臺(tái),但憲法效力極低,憲法虛置乃至廢棄是突出特色,軍閥們玩弄法統(tǒng)的手段越來越純熟,刺刀保駕下的統(tǒng)治各有其法統(tǒng),但此一時(shí)期所謂選舉、所謂議員、所謂國(guó)會(huì)、所謂憲法,成為陰謀、伎倆、交易的同義詞,整個(gè)憲政環(huán)境完全被污染,中國(guó)人的憲法信仰完全被侵蝕。再次,本章對(duì)三權(quán)分立形式下的內(nèi)閣制實(shí)踐進(jìn)行評(píng)析,指出經(jīng)由《臨時(shí)約法》、“袁記約法”及“賄選憲法”的開創(chuàng)先例,法統(tǒng)已糜爛不可用,責(zé)任內(nèi)閣制離國(guó)人的期望越來越遠(yuǎn),中國(guó)人對(duì)憲法的信仰己被政治運(yùn)行的權(quán)力決斷侵蝕殆盡,“除軍閥、興民權(quán)”的國(guó)民革命成為政治運(yùn)動(dòng)的主題。 第四章為“五權(quán)分治下的內(nèi)閣制”。首先,本章對(duì)國(guó)民黨黨治國(guó)家權(quán)能分治、五權(quán)分治體制進(jìn)行介紹,強(qiáng)調(diào)黨治國(guó)家體制是中國(guó)憲法文化的一次更新,實(shí)現(xiàn)了從個(gè)人集權(quán)向集團(tuán)集權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)變,解決了辛亥革命以來政權(quán)合法性基礎(chǔ)論證的問題。其次,本章考察了黨治國(guó)家體制下訓(xùn)政時(shí)期的內(nèi)閣制建設(shè),先闡釋作為前置性問題的黨政之關(guān)系,繼而以抗戰(zhàn)為界點(diǎn)考察抗戰(zhàn)前及抗戰(zhàn)期間的內(nèi)閣制的爭(zhēng)論與實(shí)踐,最后就訓(xùn)政時(shí)期內(nèi)閣制建設(shè)進(jìn)行評(píng)析,指出國(guó)民黨與政府之關(guān)系非責(zé)任內(nèi)閣制的中國(guó)表達(dá),行政院與立法院的關(guān)系也不符合責(zé)任內(nèi)閣制的要求,至于抗戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的國(guó)防最高委員會(huì)則將常規(guī)科層制下的行政權(quán)變?yōu)槠涓接?內(nèi)閣制從未成為政治現(xiàn)實(shí)。再次,本章考察了四六憲法下的內(nèi)閣制爭(zhēng)論與實(shí)踐,先就四六憲法關(guān)于政權(quán)組織形式設(shè)置的歷史淵源進(jìn)行探析,接著依據(jù)經(jīng)典憲政理論對(duì)四六憲法下的內(nèi)閣制進(jìn)行規(guī)范分析與實(shí)證分析,指出四六憲法下“修正的”總統(tǒng)制(或稱結(jié)合總統(tǒng)制與內(nèi)閣制部分特征的混合體制)因個(gè)人集權(quán)的需要蛻變?yōu)閭�(gè)人獨(dú)裁體制。最后,本章對(duì)黨治國(guó)家體制下的內(nèi)閣制進(jìn)行評(píng)析,指出改組后的國(guó)民黨“以俄為師”,厲行黨治,較好解決了政權(quán)合法性問題,進(jìn)行了廣泛的組織動(dòng)員,從而取得全國(guó)政權(quán)；但因內(nèi)外種種原因本身未能實(shí)現(xiàn)從革命型政黨向法理型政黨的轉(zhuǎn)變,常規(guī)科層制也貫徹不徹底,全能政治反倒因?yàn)榕上盗至ⅰ④娛露窢?zhēng)的失敗而崩潰,有限的責(zé)任內(nèi)閣體制終究未能建立。 第三部分為本文第五章,是本文的結(jié)論部分。首先,本章對(duì)近現(xiàn)代中國(guó)內(nèi)閣體制的變遷歷程進(jìn)行總結(jié),指出其變遷歷程的權(quán)力支配、人治主義和工具主義特征。其次,本章以法律文化學(xué)的分析方法探究決定近現(xiàn)代中國(guó)內(nèi)閣體制變遷走向的文化基因——一元集權(quán)傳統(tǒng)是如何發(fā)揮決定性作用的。近代以來一元集權(quán)文化沉潛入中國(guó)人思想觀念的深層,表面上看支配中國(guó)人行為模式的是憲法法律,實(shí)際上是權(quán)力；中國(guó)形式上標(biāo)榜立憲主義、責(zé)任內(nèi)閣,實(shí)際上是人治主義與權(quán)力支配。一元文化通過語(yǔ)言、思維模式發(fā)揮功能,所謂憲法、政府、選舉、政府在近代中國(guó)成為交易、伎倆、工具的代名詞,權(quán)力歸于一元是中國(guó)人設(shè)計(jì)政權(quán)組織形式的出發(fā)點(diǎn),是思維構(gòu)建的基石。最后,本章根據(jù)前文研究,尋求歷史的智慧,總結(jié)可供中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義憲政建設(shè)的歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)。
[Abstract]:The responsibility cabinet system refers to the form of the representative regime that the nationals enjoying sovereign rights produce through the exercise of the right of political decision. The mutual restriction and balance between the administrative power and the legislative power is its prominent feature, the national sovereignty and the limited government are the ideas behind the responsibility cabinet system. The cabinet system under the imperial system, the cabinet system under the separation of the three powers and the cabinet system of the five powers under the division of the five powers were divided into three stages. During the period, the cabinet system or the presidential system was more suitable for the national conditions of China. The Chinese people carried out a variety of practice, and there appeared a strange phenomenon: the constitution which stipulates the internal cabinet system has not been implemented, and the Constitution in the implementation of the constitution has not been implemented. The law is the president's centralism. That is to say, there is a serious deviation between the Chinese cabinet system and the political practice in the modern Chinese cabinet system. The reason is that the construction of the Chinese responsibility cabinet system is dominated by the regime, from top to bottom is its path choice. This must experience a decentralization - centralization - decentralization process, but no matter the cabinet. The idea behind the system design is not the national sovereignty, the limited government of the three powers is divided, but the power of the traditional political culture is attributed to the one yuan. The traditional political culture, with the modern constitutional process, sinks into the deep thought of the Chinese people, through language, and the way of thinking affects the choice of behavior of the Chinese people. Whether it is the revolutionary party, the constitutionalists or the later Beiyang warlords, the Kuomintang ruling group, the cabinet system is characterized by the independence of the supreme decision-making power itself, without any restriction. The specific power of the government at all levels and various types of government is set up through the transmission of power. This reacts the culture of one yuan to the modern and modern responsibility cabinet. The succession and transmission of the system of change.
This paper, taking the analysis method of legal culture as the research path, provides historical experience for the construction of the organizational system of socialist political power with Chinese characteristics by examining the changes in the modern Chinese cabinet system. In particular, this article is divided into three parts, five chapters. The first chapter is the first part, mainly the basic theoretical analysis under the comparative perspective, that is, " First, this chapter examines the concept and system of the Western responsible cabinet, the national sovereignty, the limited government is the basic idea of the cabinet system of the British and French virtues and Japan, and the responsibility cabinet system for the local local conditions reflects the deep influence of the western liberalism tradition. Secondly, this chapter inspects the central government. The relationship between the traditional political culture and the cabinet, and the analysis of the cabinet system in Chinese history, obeys the autocratic imperial power, and the value directed monism decides that the cabinet system in Chinese history can not be transformed into a responsible cabinet system. Again, this chapter examines the historical opportunity, the introduction and introduction of the thought of the Western responsibility. The integration of the conflict with Chinese traditional culture.
The second part is the modern cabinet system in the view of historical investigation, that is to study the changes of the cabinet system in modern China according to the different ruling forms. The second chapter is "the cabinet system under the imperial system". First, this chapter examines the controversy and imagination about the cabinet system in the constitutional trend of thought in the late Qing Dynasty. Secondly, this chapter is on the outline of the constitution of the Qin Dynasty The expression and practice of the cabinet system under the system of < nineteen credo > are deeply analyzed, and the reasons for the separation and expression of cabinet system under the imperial power system are analyzed.
The third chapter is "the cabinet system under the separation of the three powers". First, this chapter conducts a normative analysis of the first and only document of the nature of the bourgeoisie in the history of China, the cabinet system designed by the provisional law, and points out that the one-sided cabinet system (or the cabinet exclusive system), which holds the revolutionary party's control of the state's power, is innate. Secondly, this chapter focuses on the main line of the cabinet system change, and makes a general analysis of the form of political power in the period of the Northern Warlords' reign, and takes the sample of the cabinet system under the "bribery election constitution" as a case study. But the legal documents have been issued, but the constitution is very low and the constitution is discarded or even abandoned. The military valves are more and more sophisticated in playing with the law, and the rule of the bayonets has their rule. However, the so-called election, the so-called congressmen, the so-called Congress, the so-called constitution, is the synonym for the conspiracy, trick and trade, and the whole constitutional environment is finished. The constitution belief of the Chinese people is completely eroded. Again, this chapter reviews the practice of the cabinet system under the separation of the three powers, and points out that the legal system has been eroded and unavailable through the provisional contract, "Yuan Ji" and "bribery constitution", and the responsibility cabinet system is far from the expectation of the Chinese, and the Chinese people's letter to the Constitution The national revolution of "except warlords and civil rights" has become the theme of the political movement.
The fourth chapter is "the cabinet system under the division of five powers". First, this chapter introduces the Kuomintang party governing state power and energy division and the five rights division system. It emphasizes that the party's state system is a renewal of the Chinese constitution culture, and the transformation from individual centralization to group centralization has been realized, and the basic argument of the legitimacy of the regime since the 1911 Revolution is solved. Secondly, this chapter examines the construction of the cabinet system in the period of political training under the party's state system. It first explains the relationship between the party and the government as a prepositional problem, and then examines the debate and practice of the cabinet system before and during the war of resistance against the war of resistance. Finally, it evaluates the establishment of the cabinet system in the period of the political training, and points out the relationship between the Kuomintang and the government. The relationship between the responsible cabinet system in China and the relationship between the administrative court and the legislature do not conform to the requirements of the responsibility cabinet system. As for the supreme Defense Committee in the period of the Anti Japanese War, the administrative power under the conventional bureaucracy has been transformed into its appendage, and the cabinet system has never become a political reality. Again, this chapter examines the debate and practice of the cabinet system under the 46 constitution. 46 the constitution of the Constitution on the historical origin of the form of the form of political organization, and then according to the classic constitutional theory of the 46 constitution of the cabinet under the normative analysis and empirical analysis, the 46 constitution under the "revised" presidential system (or the combination of the combination of presidential and cabinet part of the system) due to the needs of individual centralization In the end, this chapter reviews the cabinet system under the party's state system, and points out that the Kuomintang, after the reorganization, "takes Russia as a teacher", and practices strict party governance, has solved the problem of the legitimacy of the regime, and has carried out extensive organizational mobilization to obtain the national regime; but because of the various reasons and internal and external reasons, it can not realize the revolutionary politics. The transformation of the party to the legal party, the conventional bureaucracy was not thoroughly carried out, and the omnipotent politics collapsed because of the factions, the failure of the military struggle, and the limited responsibility cabinet system failed to establish after all.
The third part is the fifth chapter of this article, which is the conclusion part of this article. First, this chapter summarizes the transition course of the modern Chinese cabinet system, points out the power control of the transition process, the characteristics of the rule of man and the instrumentalism. Secondly, this chapter explores the trend of the transition of the modern Chinese cabinet system by the analysis of legal culture. The cultural gene - the mono - centralization tradition is how to play a decisive role. Since modern times, the monarchy culture sank into the deep thought of the Chinese people. On the surface, it is constitutional law and power to dominate the Chinese behavior pattern. In the form of the Chinese form, it is the principal meaning of the Constitution and the responsible cabinet, in fact, the rule of man and power. Domination. One yuan culture uses the language and the thinking mode to function. The so-called constitution, the government, the election, the government in the modern China become the trade, the trick, the tool's pronoun, the power to the one yuan is the starting point for the Chinese people to design the political organization form and the cornerstone of the thinking construction. Finally, this chapter seeks the wisdom of history according to the previous study, and summarizes the wisdom of the history. Historical experience for the construction of socialist constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D691;K25

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前5條

1 田為民;內(nèi)閣集體負(fù)責(zé)制及其例外——英國(guó)憲政習(xí)慣研究[J];政法論壇;2004年03期

2 陳曉楓;《中華民國(guó)臨時(shí)約法》的文化透視[J];武漢大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(人文社會(huì)科學(xué)版);1999年06期

3 徐國(guó)利;民主與憲政理論源流及其異同[J];學(xué)術(shù)論壇;2005年09期

4 經(jīng)先靜;內(nèi)閣、國(guó)會(huì)與實(shí)力派軍閥——20世紀(jì)20年代羅文干案始末[J];史學(xué)月刊;2004年04期

5 鄭大華;重評(píng)1946年《中華民國(guó)憲法》[J];史學(xué)月刊;2003年02期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 侯春奇;清末責(zé)任內(nèi)閣研究[D];河南大學(xué);2007年

2 鄧美娜;宋教仁的“政黨內(nèi)閣”思想和實(shí)踐[D];東北師范大學(xué);2006年

3 劉艷;民初責(zé)任內(nèi)閣述論[D];吉林大學(xué);2004年

4 劉杰偉;走向制度解決之路——熊希齡內(nèi)閣與民國(guó)初年的政治制度移植[D];四川師范大學(xué);2002年

，

本文編號(hào)：1778757