【摘要】：道德判斷通常有兩種取向:功利性道德判斷(也被稱為結(jié)果論道德判斷,即接受能帶來潛在益處的傷害)和道義性道德判斷(或稱作義務(wù)論道德判斷,即不論傷害是否帶來益處都譴責(zé)傷害行為)。之前的研究表明,道義性判斷是起因于人們面對(duì)傷害時(shí)的情緒反應(yīng),而功利性判斷起因于理性的對(duì)益處大于損失的深思熟慮。但是,是否在任何時(shí)候道義性判斷都是情緒反應(yīng)的結(jié)果,功利性判斷都是理性的權(quán)衡利弊的結(jié)果呢?當(dāng)用調(diào)節(jié)定向視角來看待這個(gè)問題時(shí),結(jié)果可能會(huì)有所不同。研究表明,促進(jìn)定向的個(gè)體在面對(duì)兩難道德困境時(shí)更傾向于做出功利性的判斷,而防御定向的個(gè)體卻更傾向于做出道義性判斷;并且促進(jìn)定向的個(gè)體在決策或者判斷時(shí)偏好使用直覺啟發(fā)式策略,而不同的是防御定向的個(gè)體偏好使用理性的分析推理策略;采取更加防御的狀態(tài)會(huì)增加個(gè)體對(duì)堅(jiān)守可接受行為的公認(rèn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的關(guān)注,這也會(huì)使得個(gè)體在形成判斷時(shí)更少依賴他們的直覺經(jīng)驗(yàn)。值得思考的是,如果道義性判斷是情緒反應(yīng)的結(jié)果,那么偏好理性分析的防御定向個(gè)體就不會(huì)傾向于做出道義性判斷,促進(jìn)定向也同理。那么這是否意味著在道義性判斷中可能存在非情緒因素呢?這是很有可能的,并且導(dǎo)致不同調(diào)節(jié)定向的被試有不同道德判斷取向的原因可能是由于他們?cè)诘赖屡袛鄷r(shí)所偏好的決策策略不同(該問題將在實(shí)驗(yàn)1中探討)。那么如果不同調(diào)節(jié)定向的被試采取其偏好的策略進(jìn)行判斷也很有可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)調(diào)節(jié)匹配效應(yīng)。那么調(diào)節(jié)匹配效應(yīng)的機(jī)制是什么呢(該問題將在實(shí)驗(yàn)2中探討)?實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)調(diào)節(jié)定向的確影響道德判斷取向:促進(jìn)定向的被試傾向于做出更多功利性判斷,防御定向的被試傾向于做出更多的道義性判斷,并且這種取向上的差異并不是由情緒強(qiáng)度上的差異引起,而很可能是由于不同調(diào)節(jié)定向的被試使用的策略不同(直覺策略和理性策略)導(dǎo)致的;并進(jìn)一步探討了當(dāng)調(diào)節(jié)定向和決策策略形成調(diào)節(jié)性匹配時(shí),是否出現(xiàn)調(diào)節(jié)匹配效應(yīng),結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)被試對(duì)道德判斷相比不匹配狀態(tài)下更道德,說明促進(jìn)定向的確是偏好使用直覺策略,而防御定向的確偏好使用理性策略,而后又進(jìn)一步證明了正確感在調(diào)節(jié)匹配與道德程度判斷間起到完全中介作用。
[Abstract]:Moral judgment usually has two orientations: utilitarian moral judgment (also known as result-oriented moral judgment, i.e. acceptance of harm that can bring potential benefits) and moral judgment (or obligation moral judgment). That is to say, the injury is condemned regardless of whether the harm is beneficial or not. Previous studies have shown that moral judgment stems from the emotional reaction of people to harm, while utilitarian judgment results from rational consideration of benefits over losses. But is moral judgment the result of emotional reaction at any time and utilitarian judgment the result of rational weighing of pros and cons? When you look at the problem from an adjustable orientation perspective, the result may be different. The research shows that the individuals who promote orientation tend to make utilitarian judgments in the face of the dilemma of moral dilemma, while individuals who defend the orientation tend to make moral judgments; And the individuals who promote the orientation prefer to use intuitionistic heuristic strategy when making decision or judgment, but the individual preference of defensive orientation is to use rational analytical reasoning strategy. Adopting a more defensive state increases the attention of individuals to the accepted criteria for adhering to acceptable behavior, which also makes individuals rely less on their intuitive experience in shaping their judgments. It is worth considering that if moral judgment is the result of emotional response then the defensive oriented individual who prefers rational analysis will not be inclined to make moral judgment and promote orientation. So does this mean that there may be non-emotional factors in moral judgment? This is very possible, and the reason why the subjects with different regulation orientation have different moral judgment orientation may be that they prefer different decision strategies in moral judgment (this question will be discussed in experiment 1). Therefore, if the subjects with different regulation orientation adopt their preferred strategy to judge, it is very likely that the adjustment matching effect will occur. So what is the mechanism for regulating the matching effect (which will be discussed in experiment 2)? The results show that adjusting orientation does affect moral judgment: subjects who promote orientation tend to make more utilitarian judgments, those who defend orientation tend to make more moral judgments. Moreover, the difference in orientation is not caused by the difference in emotional intensity, but probably due to the different strategies (intuitive strategy and rational strategy) used by the subjects who regulate the orientation. Furthermore, when adjusting orientation and decision strategy form a regulatory matching, it is found that the subjects are more moral than those in the state of mismatch. It shows that promoting orientation is a preference to use intuitive strategy, while defensive orientation does prefer to use rational strategy, which further proves that correct sense plays a complete intermediary role between adjusting matching and moral judgment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：B842

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