1954年艾森豪威爾政府兩次印支“聯(lián)合行動”計(jì)劃的破產(chǎn)
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-10-08 07:49
【摘要】： 本文主要以解密的美國對外關(guān)系文件集[Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. The Geneva Conference Volume XVI (1952-1954)],以及解密文件參考系統(tǒng)(Declassified Documents Reference System)上的相關(guān)材料為基礎(chǔ),努力探求在戰(zhàn)后冷戰(zhàn)背景下,日內(nèi)瓦會議前后,印支地區(qū)的中越法美英之間錯綜復(fù)雜的關(guān)系,以考察美國在印支地區(qū)“聯(lián)合行動”的深刻根源,進(jìn)一步了解到美國推行全球擴(kuò)張政策的方式,揭示出其二戰(zhàn)后霸權(quán)主義本質(zhì)。通過對這些文件的梳理,可以清楚地了解艾森豪威爾政府的兩次印支聯(lián)合行動,從而更清楚地認(rèn)識這一時(shí)期的美國印支政策。多米諾骨牌效應(yīng)的出臺,艾森豪威爾“新面貌”戰(zhàn)略的提出,都毫無例外的肯定了印支地區(qū)在美國全球戰(zhàn)略中的地位,從支持納瓦爾計(jì)劃開始,美國一步步卷入印支地區(qū)的事務(wù),而奠邊府戰(zhàn)役前后,由于法國態(tài)度的轉(zhuǎn)變,更使艾森豪威爾政府堅(jiān)定了承擔(dān)所謂“保護(hù)自由世界”責(zé)任的決心,“聯(lián)合行動”標(biāo)志著美國更深入的插手印支事務(wù)。文件清楚地反映了在印度支那政策方面,美國關(guān)于自身利益的種種考量,最后確定“聯(lián)合行動”后美國政府內(nèi)部的討論,法美和英美的分歧,以及美國國務(wù)卿杜勒斯為達(dá)成“聯(lián)合行動”的種種努力。 本文分三個部分討論了艾森豪威爾政府策劃“聯(lián)合行動”的始末:第一部分,主要回顧了艾森豪威爾政府對印支地區(qū)的總體政策,交待了“聯(lián)合行動”發(fā)生的宏大背景;第二部分,具體細(xì)致的考察了美國策劃“聯(lián)合行動”的經(jīng)過,指出此次行動計(jì)劃破產(chǎn)的原因;第三部分是對兩次“聯(lián)合行動”破產(chǎn)影響的解析,美國逐漸取代了法國,成為了印支地區(qū)反共的主角。
[Abstract]:This paper mainly uses the decrypted American Foreign Relations File set [Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954]. The Geneva Conference Volume XVI (1952-1954], as well as the relevant materials on the decryption document reference system (Declassified Documents Reference System), trying to explore the Indochina region in the context of the post-war Cold War, before and after the Geneva Conference. More? Law? Beautiful? The intricate relations between Britain and Britain are to examine the deep roots of the "joint action" of the United States in the Indochina region, to further understand the way in which the United States pursues its global expansion policy, and to reveal the essence of its hegemonism after World War II. Through combing these documents, we can clearly understand the two Indochina joint actions of the Eisenhower Administration, and thus more clearly understand the Indosinian policy in this period. The introduction of the domino effect and the proposal of Eisenhower's "New face" strategy all affirmed the Indosinian region's position in the global strategy of the United States without exception, starting with the support of the Navar Plan. The United States was involved in the affairs of the Indosinian region step by step. Before and after the Battle of Dien Bian Fu, the Eisenhower administration was even more determined to assume the responsibility of "protecting the free world" because of the change of attitude in France. Joint Action marks America's deeper involvement in Indosinian affairs. The document clearly reflects the various considerations about the self-interest of the United States regarding the Indochina policy, and finalizes the discussions within the US government after the "joint action", as well as the differences between France and the United States and between the United States and the United States. And Secretary of State Dulles's efforts to reach a joint action. This paper discusses the beginning and end of the Eisenhower Administration's "Joint Action" in three parts: the first part mainly reviews the general policy of the Eisenhower Administration towards the Indochina region and explains the grand background of the "Joint Action"; The second part, specifically and meticulously examines the process of the United States planning "joint action", and points out the reasons for the bankruptcy of the action plan. The third part is an analysis of the impact of the two "joint actions" bankruptcy. The United States has gradually replaced France. Became the main role of the Indochina anti-communist region.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：K712.54
本文編號：2255986
[Abstract]:This paper mainly uses the decrypted American Foreign Relations File set [Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954]. The Geneva Conference Volume XVI (1952-1954], as well as the relevant materials on the decryption document reference system (Declassified Documents Reference System), trying to explore the Indochina region in the context of the post-war Cold War, before and after the Geneva Conference. More? Law? Beautiful? The intricate relations between Britain and Britain are to examine the deep roots of the "joint action" of the United States in the Indochina region, to further understand the way in which the United States pursues its global expansion policy, and to reveal the essence of its hegemonism after World War II. Through combing these documents, we can clearly understand the two Indochina joint actions of the Eisenhower Administration, and thus more clearly understand the Indosinian policy in this period. The introduction of the domino effect and the proposal of Eisenhower's "New face" strategy all affirmed the Indosinian region's position in the global strategy of the United States without exception, starting with the support of the Navar Plan. The United States was involved in the affairs of the Indosinian region step by step. Before and after the Battle of Dien Bian Fu, the Eisenhower administration was even more determined to assume the responsibility of "protecting the free world" because of the change of attitude in France. Joint Action marks America's deeper involvement in Indosinian affairs. The document clearly reflects the various considerations about the self-interest of the United States regarding the Indochina policy, and finalizes the discussions within the US government after the "joint action", as well as the differences between France and the United States and between the United States and the United States. And Secretary of State Dulles's efforts to reach a joint action. This paper discusses the beginning and end of the Eisenhower Administration's "Joint Action" in three parts: the first part mainly reviews the general policy of the Eisenhower Administration towards the Indochina region and explains the grand background of the "Joint Action"; The second part, specifically and meticulously examines the process of the United States planning "joint action", and points out the reasons for the bankruptcy of the action plan. The third part is an analysis of the impact of the two "joint actions" bankruptcy. The United States has gradually replaced France. Became the main role of the Indochina anti-communist region.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：K712.54
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