美國在蘇伊士運河危機中的作用和影響
[Abstract]:The Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 was a complex international event and one of the more important events during the Cold War. Although it lasted only a few months, its causes and processes were complex. The United States played a subtle role in the whole crisis. The outcome of the crisis affected American policy towards the Middle East and the United States, Britain and the United States. The consequences of the development of the relationship between Egypt and Egypt are far-reaching and far beyond the Middle East.
In this crisis, the United States, Britain, France, Israel, Egypt, the Soviet Union and other countries have full performances, although it happened in Egypt, but it is a typical event in the game of great powers. Among them, the United States played a very important balance in the process of the crisis. The United States adopted a peaceful settlement in the Suez Canal crisis. The policy of crisis has made great efforts for the peaceful settlement of the crisis, but its policy has been contradicted by Britain, France and other countries. It has failed to prevent the outbreak of war and has produced unexpected consequences.
The modern Suez Canal was officially opened in 1869, and the Suez Canal Company was founded in 1858. It was then controlled by Britain and France. Arms and weapons, the United States to cancel loans to build Aswan Dam as a means to force Egypt, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which led to the outbreak of the Suez Canal crisis.
After the Suez Canal Crisis broke out, countries with great interests in the canal made different reactions, and the different reactions of each country paved the way for different policies in the future. Public opinion, the CIA, the President and the Secretary of State made different decisions and had different impacts before the Soviet War broke out. Congress and public opinion did not play a substantive role, but became a tool for the President to oppose the war. The CIA did not provide accurate and fully affirmative information, resulting in the United States Failure to stop the outbreak of war in time limits the role of American peaceful means on the other hand.
After the outbreak of the Suez Canal War, the various departments that influenced American foreign policy-making, including the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the President and the Secretary of State, carried out different foreign policies and practices, which played an important role in the end of the war. The National Security Council of the United States discussed and formulated a cease-fire decision. In the draft, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff provided military information and suggestions, the United States was ready for military preparations, the CIA was accurate in its intelligence analysis of the Soviet Union, and regarded the Soviet threat as a means of forcing Britain and France to surrender. The end played a crucial role.
In Anglo-French aspect, before the war, Britain and France opposed American policy and wanted American support. On the one hand, they negotiated diplomatically with the United States, hoping to win the support of the United States for their military action, on the other hand, they wanted the support of the United States. After the war, under the mediation and pressure of the United States, Egypt had to accept the cease-fire resolution and withdraw its troops from Egypt. Egypt supported the U.S. policy and hoped to alleviate the crisis through the U.S. restrictions on Anglo-French actions. After the war, Egypt resisted fully. The Soviet Union warned the Soviet Union not to use force, the Soviet Union did not want to use force war with the United States, only want to use this war for profit, so no military intervention in the Suez Canal crisis. The balance function made the checks and balances between Britain and France and the Soviet Union changed the trend and outcome of the crisis.
【學位授予單位】:山東師范大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:K153
【參考文獻】
中國期刊全文數(shù)據(jù)庫 前8條
1 武向峰;;蘇伊士運河戰(zhàn)爭前的美國外交決策分析[J];重慶科技學院學報(社會科學版);2008年11期
2 楊冬燕;關于1956年蘇伊士運河危機的英美外交史學[J];世界歷史;2001年04期
3 蘭嵐;;20世紀50年代美國的中東政策——從歐米加計劃到艾森豪威爾主義的誕生[J];世界歷史;2009年01期
4 羅會鈞;美國與1956年蘇伊士運河危機[J];湖南師范大學社會科學學報;1998年06期
5 溫顯娟;論蘇伊士運河戰(zhàn)爭中的英美關系[J];歷史教學;2003年10期
6 楊冬燕;巴格達條約的形成及其對中東的影響——英美在中東的矛盾與爭奪[J];南京大學學報(哲學.人文科學.社會科學版);2001年02期
7 胡才珍;左昌飛;;從蘇伊士運河事件看英美“特殊關系”[J];武漢大學學報(人文科學版);2006年02期
8 朱偉東;蘇伊士運河戰(zhàn)爭后英美“特殊關系”的變化[J];西安聯(lián)合大學學報;2001年01期
中國碩士學位論文全文數(shù)據(jù)庫 前6條
1 楊小林;試析艾森豪威爾政府的中東政策[D];陜西師范大學;2001年
2 馮志偉;艾森豪威爾、杜勒斯與美國外交政策的制定(1953—1959)[D];陜西師范大學;2002年
3 石玉瑤;英國麥克米倫時期外交政策調整探析[D];華中師范大學;2006年
4 褚浩;艾森豪威爾政府對埃及政策研究[D];云南師范大學;2006年
5 汪芳;論哈羅德·麥克米倫與蘇伊士運河危機[D];浙江大學;2007年
6 戴中伏;論二戰(zhàn)后艾登的對埃政策[D];浙江師范大學;2009年
本文編號:2239625
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/shekelunwen/xifanglishiwenhua/2239625.html