【摘要】： 從1953年斯大林逝世到1956年蘇共二十大,赫魯曉夫一直在反對個人集權(quán),倡導集體領(lǐng)導。但在1957年下半年后,他在短短10個月的時間內(nèi),竟迅速地將黨政軍大權(quán)集于一身,開始在決定黨和國家工作的重大問題上搞獨斷專行,最終被迫下臺。個中原因自然與六月事件密不可分。本文通過對六月事件的考察,總結(jié)蘇共黨內(nèi)斗爭的教訓及其對蘇聯(lián)社會發(fā)展的影響。 在六月事件中,赫魯曉夫一方面在主席團會議上頑強抵制、盡力拖延時間,另一方面爭分奪秒地做好召開中央全會的準備工作。在軍隊的支持和中央委員的壓力下,反對赫魯曉夫的斗爭被迫從中央主席團轉(zhuǎn)移到了中央全會上,出現(xiàn)了赫魯曉夫反敗為勝的戲劇性轉(zhuǎn)變。赫魯曉夫分化反黨集團成員、對協(xié)從人員從輕發(fā)落,又發(fā)揮了高超的政治藝術(shù)。赫魯曉夫最終贏得了勝利。 從六月事件中,赫魯曉夫又得出了幾點啟示:一是軍隊的實際指揮大權(quán)仍然操縱在以朱可夫為首的一批將軍和元帥的手中,他采取措施,讓習慣聽命于元帥和將軍們的軍隊服從中央的指揮。二是黨政機構(gòu)之間沒完沒了的明爭暗斗,形成了明顯的中央黨政機關(guān)各自為政、兩軍對壘的陣勢。部長會議主席團竟然成了罷黜第一書記的總司令部,也使赫魯曉夫看到了兼任部長會議主席的必要。 從表面上看,六月事件只是一場權(quán)力斗爭,赫魯曉夫的反敗為勝也帶有很大的偶然性,但是,我們透過這一直觀的現(xiàn)象,把當時的蘇聯(lián)社會狀況、雙方的分歧和斗爭的結(jié)果聯(lián)系起來加以歷史地考察,就不難看出在權(quán)力斗爭的外衣下面,還掩蓋著深刻的思想分歧。產(chǎn)生分歧和斗爭的更深層次的原因在于繼續(xù)維持斯大林模式還是改革斯大林模式。說到底,這是一場關(guān)系到蘇聯(lián)社會發(fā)展方向的斗爭,是改革思想與保守思想、改革舊體制與維護舊體制的斗爭。 六月事件的發(fā)生,加速了赫魯曉夫的集權(quán)進程,為他開辟了一條通向權(quán)力頂峰的捷徑。如果不是六月事件,赫魯曉夫要把他的對手趕出主席團或讓他們俯首稱臣,并不是那么容易,他的集權(quán)之路,也不那么順暢。但六月事件也為赫魯曉夫的下臺埋下了伏筆:一方面使赫魯曉夫為自己的政途堵塞了言路,人們鑒于馬林科夫等人的教訓,對赫魯曉夫的錯誤和失誤不但不敢加以糾正,反而一味地贊揚和吹捧,更加強化了蘇聯(lián)高度集權(quán)的政治體制;另一方面,赫魯曉夫排除了異己,開始獨斷專行,大搞對他自己的個人崇拜,最終眾叛親離,被迫下臺。赫魯曉夫靈機一動的性格特征在失去制約的權(quán)力魔杖作用下發(fā)揮得淋漓盡致,即便比較隨意的決策也總是在一片贊揚聲中得以貫徹實施。這位反對集權(quán)和個人崇拜的斗士——赫魯曉夫最終也陷進了集權(quán)和個人崇拜的泥淖。 六月事件的發(fā)生,不過為赫魯曉夫提供了一個通向權(quán)力頂峰的契機,同時,又是導致他下臺的一把雙刃劍。
[Abstract]:From the death of Stalin in 1953 to the twenty major Soviet Communist Party in 1956, Khrushchev had been opposing individual centralization and advocating collective leadership. But after the second half of 1957, he had quickly set up the power of the party, government and army in a short period of 10 months and began to step down on the major issues that decided the work of the party and the state. The cause of this is inseparable from the events of the June. Through the investigation of the events of the June, this article summarizes the lessons of the party's struggle in the Communist Party of the Communist Party and its influence on the social development of the Soviet Union.
In the June incident, Khrushchev resisted on the one hand in the meeting of the Bureau, tried to delay time, and on the other hand, to make preparations for the central plenary session. Under the support of the army and the pressure of the Central Committee, the struggle against Khrushchev was forced to move from the central central Committee to the central plenary session. The dramatic transformation of Lu Xiao's defeat to victory was made by Khrushchev, who divided members of the anti Party group to the light of the association and the high political art. Khrushchev finally won the victory.
From the June incident, Khrushchev came to some enlightenment: first, the actual command of the army was still manipulated in the hands of a group of generals and marshals headed by Zhukov. He took measures to let the habits of the marshals and generals obey the central command. Two was an endless struggle between the party and the government. The obvious position of the Central Party and government organs in their own affairs and the opposing forces of the two armies. The chairman of the Council of ministers had become the general command to depose the first secretary, and also made Khrushchev see the necessity of serving as chairman of the Ministerial Conference.
On the surface, the June event is only a power struggle, and the victory of Khrushchev is also a great chance. However, through this phenomenon, we examine the social situation of the Soviet Union, the differences of the two sides and the results of the struggle. It is not difficult to see that under the coat of the power struggle, it is not difficult to see that it is still hidden. The deeper reasons for the disagreement and struggle are the continued maintenance of the Stalin model or the reform of the Stalin model. In the final analysis, this is a struggle that relates to the direction of the social development of the Soviet Union, the reform of the thought and the conservative thought, the reform of the old system and the maintenance of the old system.
The June incident accelerated Khrushchev's centralization process, opening him a shortcut to the summit of power. If not in June, Khrushchev was not so easy to drive his opponents out of the presidium or let them head down, and his way of centralization was not so smooth, but the June incident was also Khrushchev On the other hand, Khrushchev had blocked his way of writing. On the one hand, it blocked the way of his own political path. In view of the lessons of Mr. Ma Lin and others, he not only did not dare to correct Khrushchev's mistakes and mistakes, but rather praised and flatter it, and strengthened the highly centralized political system of the Soviet Union; on the other hand, Khrushchev ruled out dissidents, He began to be independent and dedicated to his own personal worship, and eventually to be separated and forced out of power. The character of Khrushchev's spiritual character was fully performed under the power of the lost power wand, even if the more casual decision was always carried out in a piece of praise. The opposition to centralization and personal worship was always carried out. The fighter Khrushchev finally fell into the mire of totalitarianism and personal worship.
The June incident, however, provided Khrushchev an opportunity to reach the summit of power and a double-edged sword that led him to step down.
【學位授予單位】：山東師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：K512.56

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