本文選題：越南 + 北越��； 參考：《華東師范大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 本文論述從1973年1月27日巴黎協(xié)定簽署之后，到1975年4月30日西貢被北越攻占為止，越南統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的進(jìn)程。除緒論之外，，全文共分為五章。 第一章主要論述巴黎協(xié)定簽訂前后南越的形勢(shì)。美國(guó)為了推動(dòng)越南南北雙方簽署巴黎協(xié)定，向南越保證不會(huì)拋棄它，而向北越示意，在一定間隔期后不干預(yù)北越對(duì)南越的進(jìn)攻。在此情況下，北越采取了不強(qiáng)調(diào)軍事進(jìn)攻的“政治優(yōu)先”政策，而南越則推行“綏靖蠶食”政策。但事實(shí)上，越南南北雙方都沒有嚴(yán)格遵守協(xié)定。協(xié)定簽署前，雙方都力圖在�；鹕皳屨急M可能多的地盤，以便使自己的控制區(qū)合法化。協(xié)定簽署后，雙方也沒有遵守�；饏f(xié)定。 第二章主要論述北越在1973—1974年政策的轉(zhuǎn)變。1973年7月的越南勞動(dòng)黨三屆二十一中全會(huì)上，北越將政治優(yōu)先政策改為主動(dòng)的軍事進(jìn)攻。在武力統(tǒng)一的問題上，南方革命者的態(tài)度較北方更為積極。1973年和1974年戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃的制定反映出決策層在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)間和主戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)方面存在的分歧。 第三章主要論述統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)軍事決策的制訂以及軍事準(zhǔn)備。在1974年12月至1975年1月召開的北越政治局?jǐn)U大會(huì)議上，14號(hào)公路——福隆戰(zhàn)役的勝利促使北越做出了在兩年內(nèi)統(tǒng)一越南的決定。與此同時(shí)，北越一直在進(jìn)行人員物資滲透、后勤建設(shè)和軍隊(duì)整編，并發(fā)動(dòng)局部進(jìn)攻，為統(tǒng)一越南做著軍事準(zhǔn)備。 第四章主要論述北越發(fā)動(dòng)的三大戰(zhàn)役以及南越的崩潰。1975年3月，北越發(fā)動(dòng)了“西原戰(zhàn)役”，邦美蜀之戰(zhàn)的巨大勝利促使其做出了在1975年雨季來臨前解放西貢的決定。在取得“西原戰(zhàn)役”、“順化——峴港戰(zhàn)役”的勝利后，北越發(fā)動(dòng)“胡志明戰(zhàn)役”，在1975年4月30日攻克西貢，南越政府宣布投降。越南統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)最終以北越統(tǒng)一南越而宣告結(jié)束。 第五章主要分析北越勝利而南越失敗的原因。外在因素對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)局的影響是巨大的。美國(guó)拋棄了南越，急劇削減對(duì)其援助，坐視其一步步陷入絕境，而與此同時(shí)，蘇聯(lián)和中國(guó)卻一直在經(jīng)濟(jì)上、軍事上大力支援北越。此外，南越政治腐敗、政權(quán)腐朽，而北越卻斗志昂揚(yáng)，為了統(tǒng)一不惜付出任何代價(jià)。上述原因最終造成了北越勝利、南越失敗的結(jié)局。
[Abstract]:From January 27, 1973, after the signing of the Paris Agreement, to April 30, 1975, Saigon was captured by North Vietnam. In addition to the introduction, the full text is divided into five chapters. The first chapter mainly discusses the situation of South Vietnam before and after the signing of the Paris Agreement. In order to promote the signing of the Paris Agreement between the North and the South of Vietnam, the United States promised South Vietnam that it would not abandon it, and signaled to the North Vietnam that it would not intervene in the North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam after a certain interval. Under these circumstances, North Vietnam adopted the policy of "political priority", which did not emphasize military attack, while South Vietnam carried out "appeasement and encroachment" policy. But in fact, Vietnam's north and south did not strictly abide by the agreement. Before the agreement was signed, both sides tried to secure as much territory as possible before the ceasefire came into effect in order to legitimize the area under their control. After the signing of the agreement, the two sides did not abide by the ceasefire agreement. The second chapter mainly discusses the policy transformation of North Vietnam from 1973 to 1974. At the 21 Plenary session of the third Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party in July 1973, North Vietnam changed the political priority policy into an active military attack. On the issue of the unification of force, the attitude of the southern revolutionaries was more active than that of the north. The strategic plans of 1973 and 1974 reflected the differences in the time of war and the main battlefield among the decision-makers. The third chapter mainly discusses the military decision-making and military preparation of unified war. At the enlarged meeting of the political Bureau of North Vietnam from December 1974 to January 1975, the victory of the Battle of Highway 14-Fulong prompted the decision of North Vietnam to unify Vietnam within two years. At the same time, North Vietnam has been carrying out personnel and materials infiltration, logistics construction and army integration, and launched a partial offensive, for the reunification of Vietnam military preparations. The fourth chapter mainly discusses the three major campaigns launched by North Vietnam and the collapse of South Vietnam. In March 1975, North Vietnam launched the Battle of Western Plains, the great victory of the Battle of the United States and Shu led it to make the decision to liberate Saigon before the rainy season in 1975. After winning the Battle of Xiyuan and the Battle of Hue Da Nang, North Vietnam launched the Battle of Hu Zhiming, captured Saigon on April 30, 1975, and the South Vietnamese government announced its surrender. The Vietnam Unification War ended with the unification of South Vietnam to the north. The fifth chapter mainly analyzes the reasons why North Vietnam wins and South Vietnam loses. The influence of external factors on the outcome of the war is enormous. The United States abandoned South Vietnam and cut its aid sharply, while the Soviet Union and China supported North Vietnam economically and militarily. In addition, South Vietnam political corruption, regime decay, North Vietnam is fighting, at any cost for reunification. The above reasons resulted in victory in North Vietnam and defeat in South Vietnam.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：K333.6

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