本文選題：中美關(guān)系 + PNTR　； 參考：《中國人民解放軍外國語學(xué)院》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來,經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化迅速發(fā)展,傳統(tǒng)意義上的“高級政治”和“低級政治”之間的界限日益模糊,政治多極化和經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化成為普遍共識。各國都把發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)放在首要地位,把發(fā)展對外經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系看成發(fā)展本國經(jīng)濟(jì)、處理國家關(guān)系的重要手段,對外貿(mào)易政策對各國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的影響達(dá)到前所未有的程度。 中國和美國作為世界上最大的發(fā)展中國家和最發(fā)達(dá)的國家,在以地緣政治為基礎(chǔ)的戰(zhàn)略合作關(guān)系消失后,兩國雙邊貿(mào)易卻保持良好勢頭,貿(mào)易額呈直線上升,經(jīng)濟(jì)依存度不斷提高。特別是在美國給予中國永久性正常貿(mào)易關(guān)系(PNTR)地位后,雙邊貿(mào)易以超前速度疾速發(fā)展:貿(mào)易總額由1999年的95億美元猛增至2005年的2116.3億美元,中國取代日本成為美國的第二大貿(mào)易伙伴;而美國也是僅次于歐盟的中國最大貿(mào)易伙伴。雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系成為兩國冷戰(zhàn)后新的戰(zhàn)略支點(diǎn)。在新的世紀(jì)中,中美經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系面臨著更廣闊的前景,而與此同時(shí),兩國間的貿(mào)易摩擦也不可避免的隨著不斷擴(kuò)展的雙邊貿(mào)易日益增加。在經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系愈來愈重要、貿(mào)易摩擦日益突出的背景下,如何全面理解美國的對華貿(mào)易決策就變得尤為重要。 眾所周知,美國有著世界上最為精巧復(fù)雜的對外貿(mào)易政策決策機(jī)制,一項(xiàng)對外貿(mào)易政策往往是各種理念相互交鋒、各種利益集團(tuán)彼此博弈的結(jié)果。在美國貿(mào)易政策的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)文獻(xiàn)中,國際體系主義、社會(huì)多元主義、國家制度主義三種方法并駕齊驅(qū),成為理解美國貿(mào)易政策的三大主流范式。國際體系主義認(rèn)為在塑造對外經(jīng)濟(jì)政策過程中,民族國家在國際經(jīng)濟(jì)中的地位具有決定性意義,一國在國際體系上權(quán)力分配的相對地位是理解該國對外貿(mào)易政策的鑰匙。社會(huì)多元主義則認(rèn)為貿(mào)易政策是國內(nèi)各利益集團(tuán)相互博弈的政治商品;對于任何一項(xiàng)貿(mào)易政策法案,各利益集團(tuán)都會(huì)根據(jù)本集團(tuán)的政策偏好對政府展開強(qiáng)大的游說活動(dòng),而代表各自選區(qū)利益的國會(huì)議員為了再次當(dāng)選,總是代表本選區(qū)利益投票;在這種方法下,貿(mào)易制度的設(shè)計(jì)和架構(gòu),充其量是為利益集團(tuán)進(jìn)行利益角逐提供了一個(gè)競技場,它本身不會(huì)對政策結(jié)果產(chǎn)生重要影響。而國家制度主義則從國家的內(nèi)部政治結(jié)構(gòu)、政治設(shè)計(jì)來研究貿(mào)易政策決策過程和后果,認(rèn)為一國的貿(mào)易政策是由其貿(mào)易制度的設(shè)計(jì)和架構(gòu)所決定;它們把國家看作是一個(gè)組織化的結(jié)構(gòu)或者是由先前發(fā)生的事件形成的一整套法律或制度安排,制度一旦形成就會(huì)自動(dòng)延續(xù)下去,而正是這種持久性使它們能夠影響政策。 本文認(rèn)為,以上三種范式都從不同角度局部性地解釋了美國的貿(mào)易政策,但它們無法單獨(dú)解釋美國貿(mào)易政策的全部內(nèi)容;在當(dāng)今國內(nèi)與國際界線已被打破的時(shí)代,要全面理解美國的一項(xiàng)貿(mào)易決策,不能將這三種范式割裂開來,而要對它們進(jìn)行綜合考察。 基于這一立論,本文嘗試運(yùn)用多層次分析方法對美國對華的PNTR決策進(jìn)行綜合分析,期望對如何全面理解與應(yīng)對后PNTR時(shí)代美國的對華貿(mào)易決策能起到有益的啟迪作用。 論文分為六章。 第一章為緒論部分,以1999中美簽訂關(guān)于中國加入WTO的雙邊協(xié)議、美國政府承諾給予中國永久性正常關(guān)系地位(PNTR)為切入點(diǎn),引出美國為何會(huì)通過中國PNTR議案的思考;然后簡要回顧了已有的對PNTR的研究,指出本論文意嘗試運(yùn)用多視角方法對PNTR進(jìn)行分析,以期對影響對華PNTR議案通過的各因素有全面與準(zhǔn)確的把握。 第二章為理論部分,對國際體系主義、社會(huì)多元主義和國家制度主義三種范式各自的主要預(yù)設(shè)給予了詳細(xì)闡釋;并在三種范式的文獻(xiàn)回顧中提出了本論文所要借助的具體分析理論,分別是經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依存理論、利益集團(tuán)理論和部門間政治理論。 第三章從國際體系視角出發(fā),運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依賴?yán)碚?分析了90年代以來中美兩國間急劇增強(qiáng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依存關(guān)系,認(rèn)為中美兩國經(jīng)濟(jì)互補(bǔ)性很強(qiáng),經(jīng)貿(mào)合作潛力巨大;盡管兩國間的相互依存是非對稱性的,但任何一方想要采取危害兩國經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系的舉措時(shí),不僅會(huì)給對方造成巨大傷害,也會(huì)給自己造成巨大傷害;相反,相互依存關(guān)系的事實(shí)決定了美國擴(kuò)大與中國的經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系、給予中國永久性正常貿(mào)易地位符合美國最大利益。 第四章運(yùn)用利益集團(tuán)理論,考察了中美經(jīng)濟(jì)依存對美國社會(huì)各利益集團(tuán)的影響以及各利益集團(tuán)圍繞PNTR議案所展開的游說活動(dòng)。論文指出,勞工集團(tuán)、人權(quán)組織、環(huán)保組織以及反華勢力等聯(lián)合起來加強(qiáng)對國會(huì)游說、反對對華PNTR,這些利益集團(tuán)目標(biāo)不同,動(dòng)機(jī)各異。而以工商業(yè)為核心的利益集團(tuán)由于在華有著重大的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益,這促使他們在對華永久性正常貿(mào)易關(guān)系問題上積極游說政府以發(fā)展穩(wěn)定、健康的對華關(guān)系,成為與反對給予中國PNTR的利益集團(tuán)相抗衡的強(qiáng)大力量。 第五章從部門間政治入手,考察了美國行政部門和立法部門就給予中國PNTR兩個(gè)部門之間的互動(dòng)。美國立法部門和行政部門的權(quán)力分割制衡導(dǎo)致了這兩個(gè)部門之間在決定具體貿(mào)易政策時(shí)出現(xiàn)了經(jīng)常性的不一致,不同的立場和觀點(diǎn)之間形成了一種微妙的平衡。而“政治”在這兩部門間就PNTR決策而產(chǎn)生的不一致以及最終解決這種不一致發(fā)揮了重要作用。 第六章是本文的結(jié)論部分,綜合總結(jié)了論文的研究結(jié)果。論文的分析證明:國際與國內(nèi)因素對美國通過對華PNTR議案都起到了重要作用,中美經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依存的大背景決定美國給予中國PNTR符合美國最大利益,但美國社會(huì)的多元性以及美國政治制度的分權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)使得PNTR的通過一波多折。最后,論文指出了多層視角對全面理解與分析美國貿(mào)易政策的有用性和必要性,并建議,面對日益增長的中美貿(mào)易摩擦,由于雙方經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依存的事實(shí),我們不用也不可反應(yīng)過度;但這并不意味著我們只可袖手旁觀,準(zhǔn)確分析與把握美國國內(nèi)不同利益集團(tuán)間的博弈以及行政和立法部門間的微妙關(guān)系,我們可以考慮采取適當(dāng)?shù)拇胧┓e極減少摩擦,進(jìn)而推動(dòng)雙邊貿(mào)易的正常發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Since the end of the cold war, the economic globalization has developed rapidly. The boundary between the "high politics" and the "low politics" in the traditional sense has become increasingly blurred. The political multi polarization and economic globalization have become common consensus. All countries have put the development economy in the first place and regard the development of foreign trade relations as the development of the domestic economy and the relations of the state. As an important means, the impact of foreign trade policy on the economic growth and economic development of various countries has reached an unprecedented level.
As the largest developing country and the most developed country in the world, the bilateral trade between the two countries has maintained a good momentum after the disappearance of the geopolitical based strategic cooperation relationship. The trade volume is rising and the economic dependence is increasing. Especially after the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status of China is given to the United States. Bilateral trade develops rapidly in advance: the total trade volume increases from $9 billion 500 million in 1999 to $211 billion 630 million in 2005. China has replaced Japan as the second largest trading partner of the United States, and the United States is the largest trading partner of China after the EU. Bilateral economic and trade relations become the new strategic pivot after the cold war. The economic and trade relations between China and the United States are facing a broader prospect. At the same time, the trade frictions between the two countries will inevitably increase with the expanding bilateral trade. In the context of the increasingly important economic and trade relations and the increasingly prominent trade frictions, it is particularly important to understand the US trade decision to China in a comprehensive way.
As we all know, the United States has the most sophisticated and complex policy making mechanism of foreign trade policy in the world. A foreign trade policy is often the result of the mutual confrontation between various ideas and the game of various interest groups. In the political economy literature of American trade policy, three kinds of international institutionalism, social pluralism and national institutionalism. As the three main mainstream paradigm to understand American trade policy, the international system believes that in the process of shaping foreign economic policy, the status of national countries in the international economy is decisive. The relative position of power distribution in the international system is the key to the understanding of the country's foreign trade policy. It holds that the trade policy is a political commodity for each interest group in China. For any trade policy bill, all interest groups will launch a strong lobby on the government according to the policy preference of the group, and the congressmen representing the interests of their respective constituencies are always voting for the interest of the constituency in order to be elected again. In this way, the design and structure of the trade system, at best, provides a arena for interest groups to compete for interest. It itself does not have an important impact on the policy outcome. And national institutionalism studies the process and consequences of policy decisions and the consequences of trade policy from the internal political structure of the country, and the political design of the country. Policy is determined by the design and structure of its trading system; they regard the country as an organized structure or a set of legal or institutional arrangements formed by previous events, and the system will continue as soon as the system is formed, and it is the persistence that makes it possible for it to affect the policy.
This article holds that these three paradigms all explain the American trade policy locally from different angles, but they can not explain the whole content of the US trade policy alone. In an era where the domestic and international boundaries have been broken, a comprehensive understanding of a trade decision in the United States can not be separated from the three paradigms. We conducted a comprehensive survey.
Based on this theory, this paper attempts to make a comprehensive analysis of the PNTR decision of the United States to China by means of multilevel analysis. It is expected to play a beneficial and enlightening role in understanding and responding to the United States' trade decision to China in the post PNTR era.
The paper is divided into six chapters.
The first chapter is the introduction to the bilateral agreement between China and the United States on China's accession to the WTO. The United States government promises to give China a permanent normal relationship position (PNTR) as the breakthrough point, and leads to the reason why the United States will pass the thinking of the Chinese PNTR bill. Then it briefly reviews the existing research on the PNTR and points out that this thesis attempts to use multiple perspectives. The law carries on the analysis to PNTR, with a view to having a comprehensive and accurate grasp of the factors that affect the adoption of the PNTR bill in China.
The second chapter, as the theoretical part, gives a detailed explanation of the main presuppositions of the three paradigms of international institutionalism, social pluralism and national institutionalism; and in the literature review of the three paradigms, the specific analytical theories are proposed in this paper, namely, the interdependence theory of the economy, the theory of interest groups and the interdepartmental politics. Theory.
The third chapter, from the perspective of the international system and using the theory of economic interdependence, analyzes the rapid economic interdependence between China and the United States since 90s. It is believed that the economic complementarity between China and the United States is strong and the potential of economic and trade cooperation is great. Although the interdependence between the two countries is asymmetric, the two countries want to take harm to the two countries. The measures of economic and trade relations will not only cause great harm to each other, but also cause great harm to themselves. On the contrary, the fact of interdependence determines the US expansion of economic and trade relations with China, and the permanent normal trade status of China is in the best interests of the United States.
The fourth chapter, using the interest group theory, examines the influence of the economic dependence of China and the United States on the various interest groups in the United States and the lobbying activities of the interest groups around the PNTR motion. The paper points out that labor groups, human rights organizations, environmental organizations and anti Chinese forces have joined together to strengthen the lobbying of Congress and against China's PNTR. The group has different goals and different motives, and the interest groups, with industry and commerce as the core, have great economic interests in China, which has prompted them to actively lobby the government to develop stable, healthy relations with China and become a powerful force against the interest group against China's PNTR on the issue of permanent normal trade relations with China.
The fifth chapter, starting with interdepartmental politics, examines the interaction between the United States administration and the legislature to give the two sectors of China's PNTR. The balance of power between the United States legislative and administrative departments leads to the frequent inconsistencies between the two departments in determining specific trade policies, between different positions and views. A delicate balance is formed, and "politics" plays an important role in the two divisions between the inconsistencies produced by the PNTR decision and the final resolution of the disagreement.
The sixth chapter is the conclusion of this paper. The analysis of the thesis is a comprehensive conclusion. The analysis of the thesis proves that the international and domestic factors have played an important role in the United States through the PNTR motion to China. The big background of the interdependence between China and the United States decides that the American PNTR is in accord with the greatest interests of the United States, but the diversity of American society and the United States In the end, the paper points out the usefulness and necessity of multi-layer perspective on the comprehensive understanding and analysis of American trade policy, and suggests that, in the face of growing Sino US trade frictions, we can not and can not be overreacted because of the economic interdependence between the two sides. We can only stand by, accurately analyze and grasp the game between different interest groups in the United States and the subtle relationship between the administrative and legislative departments. We can consider taking appropriate measures to reduce friction and further promote the normal development of bilateral trade.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國人民解放軍外國語學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：K712.54

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