從演化博弈論視角探析印孟之間水資源爭端
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-03-21 20:24
【摘要】： 印度和孟加拉國是相鄰的沿岸國,共享54條河流,其中包括兩大喜馬拉雅河流系統(tǒng)-恒河和布拉馬普特拉河,影響兩國關(guān)系發(fā)展的主要原因在于印孟對恒河水資源的分享利用問題。該爭端自1971年孟加拉國在印度的幫助下獲得獨(dú)立開始就成為影響兩國關(guān)系發(fā)展的主要障礙之一。迄今為止,印度和孟加拉國兩國圍繞恒河水資源的分享與利用進(jìn)行了長達(dá)數(shù)十年的博弈,雖然在此期間兩國曾達(dá)成過兩次協(xié)議和兩次臨時(shí)性安排以及一份于1996年達(dá)成的、有效期長達(dá)三十年的《印孟恒河河水分享?xiàng)l約》,但是這些共識和條約并沒能從根本上解決該問題,印孟兩國圍繞利用恒河水資源產(chǎn)生的糾紛仍時(shí)有發(fā)生。 本文的目的就在于從演化博弈論的視角來探尋印孟之間缺乏促使水資源爭端得到永久解決的有效機(jī)制的主要原因,并在此基礎(chǔ)上以理論與事實(shí)相結(jié)合的方式為印孟兩國解決該爭端提供建設(shè)性意見。根據(jù)以上的邏輯思路,本論文的內(nèi)容共分為六章。第一章重點(diǎn)介紹印孟水資源爭端的背景。第二章提出了本文的演化博弈論分析框架。第三章介紹1996年《印孟恒河河水分享?xiàng)l約》簽署之前印孟兩國水資源爭端的發(fā)展并對其進(jìn)行相關(guān)博弈分析。第四章重點(diǎn)對印孟兩國于1996年簽署的《印孟恒河河水分享?xiàng)l約》的效力進(jìn)行分析。第五章介紹了1996年《印孟恒河河水分享?xiàng)l約》簽署之后印孟水資源爭端的發(fā)展并對其進(jìn)行博弈分析。最后一章在前文的基礎(chǔ)上探討第三方的參與對解決印孟水資源爭端所起的作用,并對該爭端的解決提供了建設(shè)性的意見。 從理論上來說,印孟之間水資源爭端不能得到有效解決的原因在于在雙方關(guān)于該問題進(jìn)行的兩人對局的“鷹-鴿博弈”中,不存在非強(qiáng)硬策略的演化穩(wěn)定策略。將這一結(jié)論應(yīng)用到現(xiàn)實(shí)中也就是說印孟單靠雙邊談判無法有效地解決該爭端。因此第三方的參與對于消除影響印孟兩國關(guān)系發(fā)展的這一“頑癥”無疑有著重要的作用。盡管如此,由于第三方所發(fā)揮的作用畢竟是間接的,解決印孟之間水資源爭端的本質(zhì)還在于有關(guān)各方能夠做出巨大的努力:印孟雙方應(yīng)互相依存,互相尊重用水的正當(dāng)權(quán)益,并共同致力于共享國際河流的開發(fā)與利用。
[Abstract]:India and Bangladesh are adjacent coastal countries, sharing 54 rivers, including the two Himalayan river systems-the Ganges and Brahma Putra rivers. The main reason affecting the development of bilateral relations lies in the sharing and utilization of Indo-Mencius water resources to the Ganges River. The dispute has been one of the main obstacles to the development of relations between the two countries since 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence with the help of India. To date, India and Bangladesh have engaged in decades-long games on the sharing and utilization of the Ganges water resources, although two agreements and two interim arrangements and one reached in 1996 have been reached between the two countries, The Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty, which is valid for up to 30 years, has failed to solve the problem fundamentally. Disputes over the use of the Ganges water resources between India and Bangladesh still occur from time to time. The purpose of this paper is to explore the main reasons for the lack of an effective mechanism for the permanent settlement of water resources disputes between India and Bangladesh from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. On this basis, it provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute between India and Bangladesh by means of combination of theory and fact. According to the above logic thinking, the content of this paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on the background of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. In the second chapter, the framework of evolutionary game theory is proposed. The third chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh before the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the relevant game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. Chapter IV focuses on the analysis of the effectiveness of the Indo-Mengol River sharing Treaty signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996. The fifth chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh after the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. The last chapter discusses the role of third-party participation in the settlement of the Indo-Mencius water dispute on the basis of the previous paper, and provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute. Theoretically speaking, the reason why the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh can not be solved effectively is that there is no evolutionary stability strategy of non-hardline strategy in the hawk-dove game between the two sides about the problem. Applying this conclusion to reality means that India and Bangladesh alone cannot effectively resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the participation of the third party plays an important role in the elimination of this "stubborn disease" which affects the development of the relations between India and Bangladesh. Nevertheless, since the role played by third parties is, after all, indirect, the essence of resolving the water dispute between India and Bangladesh lies in the ability of the parties concerned to make great efforts: India and Bangladesh should rely on each other and respect each other's legitimate rights and interests in water use. And work together to share the development and utilization of international rivers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：外交學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D835;F224.32;F294
本文編號：2445289
[Abstract]:India and Bangladesh are adjacent coastal countries, sharing 54 rivers, including the two Himalayan river systems-the Ganges and Brahma Putra rivers. The main reason affecting the development of bilateral relations lies in the sharing and utilization of Indo-Mencius water resources to the Ganges River. The dispute has been one of the main obstacles to the development of relations between the two countries since 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence with the help of India. To date, India and Bangladesh have engaged in decades-long games on the sharing and utilization of the Ganges water resources, although two agreements and two interim arrangements and one reached in 1996 have been reached between the two countries, The Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty, which is valid for up to 30 years, has failed to solve the problem fundamentally. Disputes over the use of the Ganges water resources between India and Bangladesh still occur from time to time. The purpose of this paper is to explore the main reasons for the lack of an effective mechanism for the permanent settlement of water resources disputes between India and Bangladesh from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. On this basis, it provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute between India and Bangladesh by means of combination of theory and fact. According to the above logic thinking, the content of this paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on the background of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. In the second chapter, the framework of evolutionary game theory is proposed. The third chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh before the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the relevant game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. Chapter IV focuses on the analysis of the effectiveness of the Indo-Mengol River sharing Treaty signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996. The fifth chapter introduces the development of water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh after the signing of the Indo-Menghe River sharing Treaty in 1996 and carries on the game analysis to the development of the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh. The last chapter discusses the role of third-party participation in the settlement of the Indo-Mencius water dispute on the basis of the previous paper, and provides constructive suggestions for the settlement of the dispute. Theoretically speaking, the reason why the water resources dispute between India and Bangladesh can not be solved effectively is that there is no evolutionary stability strategy of non-hardline strategy in the hawk-dove game between the two sides about the problem. Applying this conclusion to reality means that India and Bangladesh alone cannot effectively resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the participation of the third party plays an important role in the elimination of this "stubborn disease" which affects the development of the relations between India and Bangladesh. Nevertheless, since the role played by third parties is, after all, indirect, the essence of resolving the water dispute between India and Bangladesh lies in the ability of the parties concerned to make great efforts: India and Bangladesh should rely on each other and respect each other's legitimate rights and interests in water use. And work together to share the development and utilization of international rivers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：外交學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D835;F224.32;F294
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 陳亮;孟印關(guān)系研究（1971-2006）[D];云南大學(xué);2012年
，本文編號：2445289
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