冷戰(zhàn)后美國臺海政策析論
發(fā)布時間：2018-12-15 04:41
【摘要】：冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后,美蘇兩極體系終結(jié),美國在政治與軍事方面取得單一的超級強(qiáng)國地位。雖然其他國家在經(jīng)濟(jì)等方面大有與美國分庭抗禮的態(tài)勢也逐漸具備了這種實力,但總體而言,單極為主多元體系(uni-multipolar)的世界結(jié)構(gòu)已然形成。美國的全球戰(zhàn)略開始從與蘇聯(lián)爭奪霸權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)向確保其超級大國地位不受挑戰(zhàn),防止挑戰(zhàn)其全球霸權(quán)地位的地區(qū)性大國的出現(xiàn)。本文以此作為背景,拉開后冷戰(zhàn)時期美國的臺海政策帷幕,以國際政治知名理論作為引導(dǎo),引用相關(guān)史實和數(shù)據(jù)作為支撐,試圖揭示美國的臺海政策實質(zhì)并探析其走向。全文共分為四章： 第一章為本文的導(dǎo)論部分。在對本課題的選題背景和研究價值闡述過后,著重圍繞本選題,按照美國、大陸和臺灣的地域劃分,對國內(nèi)外研究的相關(guān)成果進(jìn)行梳理。 第二章通過擴(kuò)大系統(tǒng)理論的理論假設(shè)基礎(chǔ),將中國大陸、臺灣和美國兩岸三方的復(fù)雜關(guān)系納入結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)實主義的經(jīng)典理論——系統(tǒng)理論之中,以美國為自變量剝離出其在臺海兩岸關(guān)系中扮演的獨特角色。并對冷戰(zhàn)后美國的臺海政策進(jìn)行歷史追溯,希冀通過史實梳理出一個更為清晰詳實的分析框架。 第三章主要將“兩岸平衡”對美國的政策引導(dǎo)作為分析重點,并探討這項政策帶來的重大戰(zhàn)略價值,由此深入分析美國采取以上舉動的內(nèi)在邏輯。其中利用美國在1995—1996年和1999年兩次臺海危機(jī)期間的表現(xiàn)作為本文提出的“兩岸平衡”政策的現(xiàn)實支持。 第四章以1995—1996年臺海危機(jī)期間三方的博弈結(jié)構(gòu)為例揭示了美國在臺海局勢特別是臺海危機(jī)中所能做到的極限,并結(jié)合三方實力變化趨勢對比,得出美國臺海政策的走向仍將是維持現(xiàn)狀,繼續(xù)扮演“兩岸平衡者”。 最終結(jié)語部分給予全文總結(jié)：冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后,雖然中美之間的共同戰(zhàn)略利益——抗擊蘇聯(lián)消失,但是隨著中國國力的上升,美國希望保持同大陸的經(jīng)貿(mào)往來,卻也不放棄《與臺灣關(guān)系法》。臺海若沒有戰(zhàn)爭威脅、兩岸從事和平競爭發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)、美國不需被迫卷入危機(jī),應(yīng)是美匡臺海政策的優(yōu)先目標(biāo)。美國對北京的期待是,不能對臺灣動武或威脅對臺使用武力；對臺北的期望則是,處理所有兩岸關(guān)系問題時必須謹(jǐn)言慎行。其中,臺�，F(xiàn)狀的核心是,臺北與北京均不得發(fā)表聲明或采取行動片面改變臺灣地位。為了維持臺�，F(xiàn)狀,美國在臺海關(guān)系上日益成為一個平衡者,究其實質(zhì),美國的臺海政策圍繞如何保全其國家利益做出。同時,中國應(yīng)該注意到這種宏觀影響并及時制定應(yīng)對措施規(guī)避甚至是利用“美國之手”,早日實現(xiàn)國家統(tǒng)一
[Abstract]:After the end of the Cold War, the two-pole system of the Soviet Union and the United States became a single super power in politics and military affairs. Although other countries have a tendency to compete with the United States in economic and other aspects, overall, the world structure of unipolar multivariate system (uni-multipolar) has been formed. The United States' global strategy began to shift from competing with the Soviet Union for hegemony to ensuring that its superpower status was not challenged and preventing the emergence of regional powers that challenged its global hegemony. Based on this background, this paper opens the curtain of American Taiwan Strait policy in the post-Cold War period, guided by the well-known international political theory, and cites relevant historical facts and data as the support to try to reveal the essence of the US Taiwan Strait policy and analyze its trend. The full text is divided into four chapters: the first chapter is the introduction of this article. After expounding the background and research value of this topic, this paper focuses on this topic, according to the regional division of the United States, mainland and Taiwan, to sort out the relevant research results at home and abroad. In the second chapter, by expanding the theoretical hypothesis of the system theory, the complex relations between mainland China, Taiwan and the United States are brought into the classical theory of structural realism, which is the system theory. With the United States as an independent variable, its unique role in cross-straits relations across the Taiwan Strait has been stripped out. By tracing the history of American Taiwan Strait policy after the Cold War, the author hopes to carve out a clearer and more detailed analysis framework through historical facts. The third chapter focuses on the policy guidance of "balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait" to the United States, and probes into the important strategic value brought about by this policy, thus deeply analyzing the inherent logic of the United States in taking the above actions. Among them, the performance of the United States during the two Taiwan Strait crises in 1995-1996 and 1999 is used as the realistic support of the "cross-strait balance" policy put forward in this paper. The fourth chapter takes the game structure of the three parties during the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996 as an example to reveal the limits that the United States can achieve in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, especially in the Taiwan Strait crisis. The conclusion is that the direction of the US Taiwan Strait policy will still be to maintain the status quo and continue to play the role of "the balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait." The final conclusion gives the full text a summary: after the Cold War, although the common strategic interests between China and the United States-the disappearance of the Soviet Union, but with the rise of China's national strength, the United States hopes to maintain economic and trade exchanges with the mainland. But he did not give up the Taiwan Relations Act. If the Taiwan Strait is free from the threat of war and the two sides are engaged in peaceful competition to develop their economies, the United States does not have to be forced to get involved in the crisis, which should be a priority goal of its Taiwan Strait policy. The United States expects Beijing not to use force or threaten to use force against Taiwan, while Taipei is expected to be cautious in dealing with all issues related to cross-strait relations. The core of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is that neither Taipei nor Beijing can make statements or act unilaterally to change Taiwan's status. In order to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, the United States has increasingly become a balancer in the Taiwan Strait relations. In essence, American policy on the Taiwan Strait revolves around how to preserve its national interests. At the same time, China should pay attention to this macro-impact and formulate timely countermeasures to avoid or even make use of the "hands of the United States" to realize national reunification at an early date.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D871.2;D822.3
本文編號：2379999
[Abstract]:After the end of the Cold War, the two-pole system of the Soviet Union and the United States became a single super power in politics and military affairs. Although other countries have a tendency to compete with the United States in economic and other aspects, overall, the world structure of unipolar multivariate system (uni-multipolar) has been formed. The United States' global strategy began to shift from competing with the Soviet Union for hegemony to ensuring that its superpower status was not challenged and preventing the emergence of regional powers that challenged its global hegemony. Based on this background, this paper opens the curtain of American Taiwan Strait policy in the post-Cold War period, guided by the well-known international political theory, and cites relevant historical facts and data as the support to try to reveal the essence of the US Taiwan Strait policy and analyze its trend. The full text is divided into four chapters: the first chapter is the introduction of this article. After expounding the background and research value of this topic, this paper focuses on this topic, according to the regional division of the United States, mainland and Taiwan, to sort out the relevant research results at home and abroad. In the second chapter, by expanding the theoretical hypothesis of the system theory, the complex relations between mainland China, Taiwan and the United States are brought into the classical theory of structural realism, which is the system theory. With the United States as an independent variable, its unique role in cross-straits relations across the Taiwan Strait has been stripped out. By tracing the history of American Taiwan Strait policy after the Cold War, the author hopes to carve out a clearer and more detailed analysis framework through historical facts. The third chapter focuses on the policy guidance of "balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait" to the United States, and probes into the important strategic value brought about by this policy, thus deeply analyzing the inherent logic of the United States in taking the above actions. Among them, the performance of the United States during the two Taiwan Strait crises in 1995-1996 and 1999 is used as the realistic support of the "cross-strait balance" policy put forward in this paper. The fourth chapter takes the game structure of the three parties during the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996 as an example to reveal the limits that the United States can achieve in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, especially in the Taiwan Strait crisis. The conclusion is that the direction of the US Taiwan Strait policy will still be to maintain the status quo and continue to play the role of "the balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait." The final conclusion gives the full text a summary: after the Cold War, although the common strategic interests between China and the United States-the disappearance of the Soviet Union, but with the rise of China's national strength, the United States hopes to maintain economic and trade exchanges with the mainland. But he did not give up the Taiwan Relations Act. If the Taiwan Strait is free from the threat of war and the two sides are engaged in peaceful competition to develop their economies, the United States does not have to be forced to get involved in the crisis, which should be a priority goal of its Taiwan Strait policy. The United States expects Beijing not to use force or threaten to use force against Taiwan, while Taipei is expected to be cautious in dealing with all issues related to cross-strait relations. The core of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is that neither Taipei nor Beijing can make statements or act unilaterally to change Taiwan's status. In order to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, the United States has increasingly become a balancer in the Taiwan Strait relations. In essence, American policy on the Taiwan Strait revolves around how to preserve its national interests. At the same time, China should pay attention to this macro-impact and formulate timely countermeasures to avoid or even make use of the "hands of the United States" to realize national reunification at an early date.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D871.2;D822.3
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 吳心伯;反應(yīng)與調(diào)整:1996年臺海危機(jī)與美國對臺政策[J];復(fù)旦學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2004年02期
，本文編號：2379999
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