【摘要】：當(dāng)前，國(guó)際核裁軍進(jìn)程遇到的一個(gè)主要問題，是美俄兩個(gè)核大國(guó)能否在新的《戰(zhàn)略武器削減條約》（新START條約）基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)一步削減戰(zhàn)略核武器數(shù)量。其主要的障礙是，美俄難以突破“相互確保摧毀”戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性概念的束縛。 冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期發(fā)展起來的戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性理論，從防御性現(xiàn)實(shí)主義和結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)實(shí)主義出發(fā)，以“國(guó)家理性”假定和“不可接受損失”概念，構(gòu)筑起以損失計(jì)算為核心的“相互確保摧毀”戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性分析方法，結(jié)論是：只要兩個(gè)國(guó)家的核武器數(shù)量達(dá)到“相互確保摧毀”的水平（即可以在“報(bào)復(fù)還擊”中給對(duì)方造成“不可接受損失”），雙方就可以實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定（被稱作“相互確保摧毀”戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性）。這在冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期及冷戰(zhàn)后美蘇（俄）擁有大量核武器的時(shí)候，指導(dǎo)了雙方的核軍備控制與裁軍談判，但卻沒有回答低于這一核武器數(shù)量水平時(shí)可否實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定的問題。 本論文從傳統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性理論用比較“首先核攻擊”與“報(bào)復(fù)還擊”兩種策略下所遭受損失來評(píng)價(jià)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性的基本邏輯出發(fā)，吸收自由主義相互依賴?yán)碚摰乃悸罚诤藨?zhàn)爭(zhēng)損失計(jì)算時(shí)考慮相互依賴因素所帶來的損失（傳統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性計(jì)算中沒有計(jì)入這部分損失）。首先，從核武器的毀傷效應(yīng)出發(fā)，分析了環(huán)境、經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治相互依賴因素的構(gòu)成，討論了環(huán)境（“核冬天”、“大氣臭氧層破壞”和“全球放射性塵降”）及經(jīng)濟(jì)（直接投資、相互間貨物/服務(wù)貿(mào)易和金融資產(chǎn)）等相互依賴因素在核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中造成損失的計(jì)算方法；然后，在高、低兩種核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)規(guī)模下進(jìn)行了模擬案例的定量計(jì)算，，分別評(píng)估了相互依賴因素造成損失對(duì)傳統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性計(jì)算結(jié)果的影響程度。得到的結(jié)論是：在大數(shù)量核武器情況下，“核冬天”環(huán)境相互依賴因素對(duì)“相互確保摧毀”戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性的計(jì)算會(huì)產(chǎn)生明顯影響；在小數(shù)量核武器情況下，經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依賴因素對(duì)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性計(jì)算有重要影響，環(huán)境相互依賴因素也具有一定作用。從而證明了在戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性分析中考慮相互依賴因素造成損失的必要性，說明考慮相互依賴因素有助于戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性的提高。 從上述結(jié)論可以看出，如果美俄在戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性計(jì)算時(shí)考慮相互依賴因素所帶來的損失，則不僅達(dá)到“相互確保摧毀”戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性所需的核武器數(shù)量可以明顯減少，而且還可能突破“相互確保摧毀”的核武器數(shù)量水平實(shí)現(xiàn)大幅度削減。這對(duì)美俄實(shí)現(xiàn)深度核裁軍有明顯的促進(jìn)作用。之后，如果美俄（包括其他核國(guó)家）不斷發(fā)展相互間的經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系，使各自經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依賴因素在戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定性分析中的比重增大，則可以進(jìn)一步推動(dòng)國(guó)際核裁軍進(jìn)程。
[Abstract]:At present, one of the major problems in the process of international nuclear disarmament is whether the two nuclear powers of the United States and Russia can further reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons on the basis of the new Strategic Arms reduction Treaty (new START Treaty). Its main obstacle is that the US and Russia struggle to break through the shackles of the concept of mutual assured destruction of strategic stability. The theory of strategic stability developed during the Cold War, based on defensive realism and structural realism, is based on the assumption of "national rationality" and the concept of "unacceptable loss". The strategic stability analysis method of "mutual assured destruction" with loss calculation as the core is constructed. The conclusion is that as long as the number of nuclear weapons in both countries reaches the level of "mutually assured destruction" (i.e. "unacceptable loss" caused to each other in the "retaliatory response"), both sides can achieve strategic stability (referred to as "mutual destruction"). "mutual assurance destroy" strategic stability). This led to nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations during the Cold War period and when the US and Soviet Union (Russia) possessed a large number of nuclear weapons after the Cold War, but did not answer the question of whether strategic stability could be achieved when the nuclear weapons quantity level was lower. This paper starts from the basic logic of the traditional strategic stability theory to evaluate the strategic stability by comparing the losses suffered under the "first nuclear attack" and "retaliatory response" strategies, and absorbs the idea of liberalism interdependence theory. The loss caused by interdependence is taken into account in the calculation of the loss of nuclear war (which is not included in the traditional calculation of strategic stability). First, based on the destructive effects of nuclear weapons, the composition of environmental, economic and political interdependence is analysed, and the environment ("nuclear winter", "atmospheric ozone layer destruction" and "global radioactive dust fall") and the economy (direct investment) are discussed. Methods of calculating the losses caused by interdependent factors, such as trade in goods / services and financial assets, in a nuclear war; then, quantitative calculations of simulated cases are carried out in both high and low scale nuclear wars, The influence of the loss caused by interdependence factors on the results of traditional strategic stability calculation was evaluated respectively. It was concluded that in the case of large quantities of nuclear weapons, the environmental interdependence of the "nuclear winter" would have a significant impact on the calculation of the strategic stability of "mutually assured destruction"; in the case of small quantities of nuclear weapons, Economic interdependence factors play an important role in the calculation of strategic stability, and environmental interdependence factors also play a certain role. It is proved that it is necessary to consider the loss caused by interdependence in the analysis of strategic stability, and the consideration of interdependence is helpful to the improvement of strategic stability. From the above conclusions, it can be seen that if the United States and Russia take into account the losses caused by interdependence in the calculation of strategic stability, the number of nuclear weapons required to "ensure mutual assurance" of strategic stability can be significantly reduced not only. It could also lead to deep cuts in the number of nuclear weapons that can be destroyed by mutual assurance. This will obviously promote the US and Russia to achieve deep nuclear disarmament. After that, if the United States and Russia (including other nuclear countries) continue to develop their economic and trade relations and increase the proportion of their respective economic interdependence factors in the strategic stability analysis, the process of international nuclear disarmament can be further promoted.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D815.2

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