本文選題：李登輝訪美 + 臺(tái)海危機(jī)�。� 參考：《華東師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：自新中國成立以來,中美兩國圍繞著臺(tái)灣問題爆發(fā)過三次較大的危機(jī),1995-1996年臺(tái)海危機(jī)是中美建交以來爆發(fā)的最嚴(yán)重的軍事對抗危機(jī),此次危機(jī)對21世紀(jì)的中美關(guān)系以及臺(tái)海局勢產(chǎn)生了深遠(yuǎn)的影響。本文以1995-1996年臺(tái)海危機(jī)為研究對象,運(yùn)用格倫·斯奈德和保羅·戴森所著《國家問沖突》(Conflict Among Nations)一書中的博弈理論和模型,對危機(jī)期間中美將近10個(gè)月的博弈過程展開分析和研究。 本文第一部分首先介紹了基本的博弈理論模型,重點(diǎn)闡釋了研究過程中用到的四種博弈模型,如斗雞博弈、囚徒困境博弈、訛詐博弈和關(guān)鍵風(fēng)險(xiǎn)博弈等。并且本文也提出了博弈價(jià)值結(jié)構(gòu)和博弈策略兩個(gè)概念,博弈的價(jià)值結(jié)構(gòu)主要包括軍事力量和決心兩個(gè)維度,軍事力量又包括聯(lián)盟關(guān)系。本文的基本論點(diǎn)是闡述在軍事力量對比相對不變、危機(jī)的不同階段下博弈模型以及博弈策略的變化。在危機(jī)的不同階段,博弈各方的目標(biāo)不同,運(yùn)用的博弈模型和博弈策略也不盡相同。 本文重點(diǎn)是對1995-1996年臺(tái)海危機(jī)進(jìn)行階段性研究。第一階段是從1995年5月22日美國宣布李登輝訪美至1995年10月24日中美紐約林肯中心會(huì)晤,這一時(shí)期中美兩國都采取斗雞博弈策略,中國在這一階段的博弈并沒有達(dá)到預(yù)期目標(biāo),美國依然沒有就臺(tái)灣當(dāng)局領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人訪美問題上做出公開承諾,李登輝當(dāng)局也繼續(xù)挑釁中國；第二階段是從1995年10月24日至1996年3月23日臺(tái)灣地區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人選舉結(jié)束。第一階段博弈的失利促使中國調(diào)整博弈策略,采用囚徒困境博弈方式,在1996年3月進(jìn)行第二輪大規(guī)模的導(dǎo)彈試射。中國在此階段基本實(shí)現(xiàn)了博弈目標(biāo),美國開始謹(jǐn)慎對待中美關(guān)系中的臺(tái)灣問題,臺(tái)灣也在美國的壓力取消了隨后的軍事演習(xí),不再過分挑釁中國大陸對臺(tái)政策的底線。但是“劉連昆案件”的發(fā)生,使得中國的博弈底線被美國知悉,導(dǎo)致中國的這一階段博弈效應(yīng)打了折扣。 本文結(jié)尾部分對1995-1996年臺(tái)海危機(jī)中美兩國的博弈效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了分析,從博弈結(jié)果的短期和長期效應(yīng)上評析中美兩國的博弈結(jié)果。最后,針對中國政府在博弈過程的得失問題,總結(jié)教訓(xùn)以及經(jīng)驗(yàn),并提出應(yīng)對日后可能出現(xiàn)的臺(tái)海危機(jī)的策略和方法。
[Abstract]:Since the founding of New China, China and the United States have experienced three major crises around the Taiwan issue. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is the most serious crisis of military confrontation since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. The crisis has had a profound impact on Sino-American relations and the situation in the Taiwan Strait in the 21 st century. Taking the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996 as the object of study, this paper applies the game theory and model of Glen Snyder and Paul Dyson's conflict Among Nationals, which are written by Glenn Snyder and Paul Dyson. In the first part of this paper, the basic game theory model is introduced, and the four game models used in the research process, such as cockfight game, are explained. Prisoners' dilemma game, blackmail game and key risk game. This paper also puts forward two concepts: game value structure and game strategy. The value structure of game includes two dimensions of military force and determination, and military power includes alliance relationship. The basic argument of this paper is to expound the change of game model and game strategy in different stages of crisis. In different stages of the crisis, the game models and strategies used are different with the different objectives of the game players. This paper focuses on the stage study of the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996. The first stage was from May 22, 1995, when the United States announced Lee Teng-hui 's visit to the United States, to the October 24, 1995, New York Lincoln Center meeting between China and the United States. During this period, both China and the United States adopted the strategy of fighting chickens, and China's game at this stage did not reach the expected goal. The United States has still made no public commitment on the issue of the Taiwan leader's visit to the United States, and the Li Denghui authorities continue to provoke China; the second stage is from October 24, 1995 to March 23, 1996, when the election for the leader of the Taiwan region ends. The failure of the first stage of the game prompted China to adjust its game strategy and adopt the prisoner's dilemma game to launch the second round of large-scale missile tests in March 1996. China basically achieved the game goal at this stage, the United States began to be cautious about the Taiwan issue in Sino-US relations, Taiwan also canceled the subsequent military exercises under pressure from the United States, and no longer excessively challenged the bottom line of China's Taiwan policy. However, the occurrence of "Liu Liankun case" makes the bottom line of Chinese game known to the United States, which leads to the discount of the game effect in this stage of China. At the end of this paper, the game effect between China and the United States during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is analyzed. The short-term and long-term effects of the game results are analyzed in terms of the results of the game between China and the United States. Finally, aiming at the problem of the gain and loss of the Chinese government in the process of game, this paper summarizes the lessons and experiences, and puts forward the strategies and methods to deal with the possible Taiwan Strait crisis in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D822.3;D871.2

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