本文選題：日美關(guān)系 + 沖繩問題��； 參考：《南開大學(xué)》2010年博士論文

【摘要】：本文主要圍繞沖繩問題在日美兩國之間起源的歷史經(jīng)緯及緣由展開論述,時間段限跨越二戰(zhàn)后期及戰(zhàn)后初期(1942-1952年)。針對美國在沖繩問題上的早期構(gòu)想,日本政府與天皇面對媾和以及早期處理沖繩問題付諸的努力,美國政府內(nèi)部對日政策的轉(zhuǎn)變,尤其是《對日媾和條約》第三條關(guān)于沖繩問題的處理,吉田茂與杜勒斯圍繞“潛在主權(quán)”所作的交涉等進行全面梳理與詳盡論證。同時對日美兩國如何以沖繩問題為砝碼進行交涉的內(nèi)幕做了詳細考察。 沖繩問題在日美之間的起源,與美國安全保障戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整息息相關(guān),美國軍方和國務(wù)院圍繞沖繩地位問題展開了激烈論爭,美國軍方基于軍事戰(zhàn)略上的考量,力爭完全控制沖繩,并尋找琉球群島與日本本土分離的相關(guān)證據(jù),旨在確立對沖繩的戰(zhàn)略統(tǒng)治權(quán)；美國國務(wù)院則側(cè)重于政治運營的謀算,主張應(yīng)將琉球群島的“潛在主權(quán)”保留給日本,同時接受軍方在沖繩建設(shè)基地的主張。最終美國國務(wù)院的觀點占據(jù)上風,掌控美國政府沖繩問題的決策權(quán),制定了將沖繩主權(quán)保留給日本的政策。 日本方面在籌備《對日媾和條約》締結(jié)過程中,對琉球群島的將來地位及主權(quán)問題寄予了極大關(guān)注,蘆田均外相率領(lǐng)的外務(wù)省制定了多種方案,但收效甚微。而以天皇為首的宮中集團制定的《天皇備忘錄》,對實現(xiàn)日本擁有對沖繩保留“潛在主權(quán)”,影響美國國務(wù)院的沖繩問題決策發(fā)揮了巨大影響力。以吉田茂為首的日本政府通過積極的外交斡旋,堅持要求返還琉球和小笠原群島,向美國國務(wù)院遠東局和GHQ外交局爭取保留沖繩主權(quán)而付諸不懈的努力,并制定了切實可行的折沖方案,為解決沖繩主權(quán)歸屬問題發(fā)揮了重要作用。 本文認為,美國國務(wù)院最終認可日本保留對沖繩的主權(quán),與其說為了“緩和日本人的不滿和其他批判”,莫如說是為了謀求美國國家安全利益的最大化,避免喪失沖繩的戰(zhàn)略地位而采取的“吊詭之計①”。面對主張將沖繩從日本分離出去的軍方、盟總司令麥克阿瑟的固執(zhí)以及要對日本進行嚴格媾和的聯(lián)合國,杜勒斯必須充分吸納各方面意見,同時,還須提防蘇聯(lián)借助聯(lián)合國名義,在對聯(lián)合國憲章的解釋上使美國陷入困境。在平衡日美雙方及美國國內(nèi)各方利益的基礎(chǔ)上,《對日媾和條約》第三條的出臺是多方博弈的產(chǎn)物。
[Abstract]:This paper mainly discusses the origin of Okinawa problem between Japan and the United States in history, latitude and reason, the period of time span over the late World War II and the early postwar period 1942-1952. In view of the early ideas of the United States on the Okinawa issue, the efforts made by the Japanese Government and the emperor to make peace and to deal with the Okinawa issue in the early period, the change in the internal policy of the United States towards Japan, In particular, the handling of Okinawa in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace to Japan, and the negotiations made by Yoshida and Dulles around "potential sovereignty", were comprehensively sorted out and demonstrated in detail. At the same time, Japan and the United States made a detailed investigation on how to negotiate with Okinawa issue. The origin of the Okinawa issue between Japan and the United States is closely related to the adjustment of the security strategy of the United States. The US military and the State Department have launched a fierce debate over the status of Okinawa. Based on military strategic considerations, the US military is striving to completely control Okinawa. In order to establish strategic dominion over Okinawa, the State Department of the United States focused on the calculation of political operation and advocated that the "potential sovereignty" of the Ryukyu Islands should be reserved for Japan. At the same time accept the military in Okinawa construction base proposal. In the end, the State Department's views prevailed, controlling the U.S. government's decision-making power over Okinawa and establishing a policy of reserving Okinawa sovereignty to Japan. In the process of preparing for the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Japan paid great attention to the future status and sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lutian made a variety of plans, but with little success. The Emperor's Memorandum made by Emperor Miyazhong Group exerts great influence on the realization of Japan's "potential sovereignty" over Okinawa and affects the US State Department's decision on Okinawa. The Japanese government, headed by Shigeru Yoshida, through active diplomatic mediation, insisted on the return of Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands, and made unremitting efforts to strive for the retention of sovereignty over Okinawa from the far East Bureau of the US State Department and the GHQ diplomatic Bureau. A feasible folding scheme is made, which plays an important role in solving the problem of sovereignty over Okinawa. This article holds that the State Department of the United States has finally approved Japan's retention of sovereignty over Okinawa, not so much to "ease the dissatisfaction and other criticisms of the Japanese," but to maximize the national security interests of the United States. Avoid losing the strategic position of Okinawa to take the "paradox 1". In the face of the military, which advocates separating Okinawa from Japan, the stubbornness of the Commander-in-Chief of the League, MacArthur, and the United Nations, which wants to make strict peace with Japan, Dulles must fully absorb the views of all sides. At the same time, It is also important to guard against the Soviet Union's use of the United Nations to interpret the Charter of the United Nations. On the basis of balancing the interests of Japan and the United States and all parties in the United States, the introduction of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan is the product of a multi-party game.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D822.3

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