【摘要】：公共政策執(zhí)行是政策目標(biāo)和政策實(shí)行效果之間的重要環(huán)節(jié)，社會(huì)保障政策是我國(guó)目前實(shí)施的惠及全體國(guó)民的一項(xiàng)重要的公共政策。貴州是我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)欠發(fā)達(dá)省份，勞動(dòng)力流出量大，貧困人口較多，貧困面廣，程度深，其社會(huì)保障政策在執(zhí)行過(guò)程中呈現(xiàn)出不同于其他省份的特點(diǎn)。本文從公共政策執(zhí)行的角度分析了貴州省農(nóng)村社會(huì)保障政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中的激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制問(wèn)題。主要內(nèi)容包括：從政策執(zhí)行主體和客體分析了貴州農(nóng)村社會(huì)保障政策執(zhí)行效果；利用博弈論建立政府與政策執(zhí)行者之間的博弈模型，以及政策執(zhí)行者和政策執(zhí)行對(duì)象之間的博弈模型，分析了激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制的作用；基于調(diào)研資料和具體案例分析了貴州農(nóng)村社會(huì)保障政策執(zhí)行中的激勵(lì)與約束因素對(duì)政策執(zhí)行主體和客體的影響，進(jìn)而發(fā)現(xiàn)政策執(zhí)行中存在的問(wèn)題；最后，在此基礎(chǔ)上，提出相關(guān)政策建議供決策部門(mén)參考。 本文對(duì)貴州農(nóng)村社會(huì)保障政策的激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制的分析，得出如下主要結(jié)論：一是通過(guò)公共政策執(zhí)行主客體之間的博弈分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制是保障公共政策順利執(zhí)行的關(guān)鍵。二是貴州農(nóng)村社會(huì)保障政策執(zhí)行效果并不理想，其原因在于政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中現(xiàn)行的激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制沒(méi)有達(dá)到預(yù)期的效果，即激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制不足。由此得到的啟發(fā)是：在社會(huì)保障政策的制定過(guò)程中應(yīng)充分考慮政策執(zhí)行主體和客體的利益，調(diào)動(dòng)主客體參與政策制定和政策執(zhí)行的積極性，這不但有利于政策主客體深入了解相關(guān)政策，，減少政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中的摩擦，使得相關(guān)政策措施能夠落實(shí)到位，達(dá)到預(yù)期的政策效果。
[Abstract]:The implementation of public policy is an important link between the policy objective and the effect of policy implementation. The social security policy is an important public policy that benefits all the people in our country at present. Guizhou is an underdeveloped province in China, with a large outflow of labor force, a large number of poor people, a wide range of poverty areas and a deep degree of poverty. Its social security policy is different from other provinces in the process of implementation. From the perspective of public policy implementation, this paper analyzes the incentive and restraint mechanism in the implementation of rural social security policy in Guizhou province. The main contents include: analyzing the effect of policy implementation from the subject and object of policy execution, establishing the game model between government and policy executor by using game theory. And the game model between the policy executor and the policy implementation object, and analyzes the function of incentive and constraint mechanism; Based on the investigation data and specific cases, this paper analyzes the influence of incentive and constraint factors on the subject and object of policy implementation in Guizhou rural social security policy, and then finds out the problems existing in the policy implementation. Put forward relevant policy suggestions for the reference of decision-making department. This paper analyzes the incentive and restraint mechanism of rural social security policy in Guizhou, and draws the following main conclusions: first, through the game analysis between the subject and object of public policy implementation, Discovery of incentive and restraint mechanism is the key to ensure the smooth implementation of public policy. The other is that the implementation effect of Guizhou rural social security policy is not ideal, the reason is that the current incentive and restraint mechanism in the process of policy implementation has not achieved the expected effect, that is, the incentive and restraint mechanism is insufficient. The inspiration is that in the process of making social security policy, the interests of the subject and object of policy implementation should be fully considered, and the initiative of subject and object to participate in policy formulation and policy implementation should be aroused. This is not only helpful for the subject and object of the policy to understand the relevant policies deeply, reduce the friction in the process of policy implementation, so that the relevant policy measures can be implemented in place to achieve the expected policy effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D630

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本文編號(hào)：2241624